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particularly how and when they labeled a particular utterance ‘poetic’. The first chapter addresses fifthcentury prose authors whose work survives in significant degree (Herodotus, Thucydides), or whose
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investigation, looking now at relevant fourth-century authors who show an explicit interest in literary
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poihthv~); various words of song (e.g. ajoidov~, mevlo~); and several adjectives and adverbs that
consistently appear in the period in discussions of literary distinctions. There emerges, when these terms
are traced through time, a clear picture of the ongoing instability of literary categories. Meter is
consistently put forward as a formal feature that marks off poetry from prose, for instance, but it is just as
consistently rejected by the same authors as a satisfying distinction; instead, further categories defined
by subtler features are introduced to more accurately describe literary productions, and those
productions’ relationship to the poetic. Studying how the authors of this period distinguished literary
categories makes it clear that our emphasis on the contrast between prose and poetry is too simplistic.
Rather, the continual negotiations we see these authors engaged in when trying to define the poetic alerts
us to the relative nature of literary categories, and how poetry only becomes what it is in contrast to what
it is not.
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ABSTRACT
CONCEPTIONS OF THE POETIC IN CLASSICAL GREEK PROSE
Alison C. Traweek
Dr. Sheila Murnaghan
This dissertation explores how prose authors of the Classical period envisioned literary
distinctions, particularly how and when they labeled a particular utterance ‘poetic’. The
first chapter addresses fifth-century prose authors whose work survives in significant
degree (Herodotus, Thucydides), or whose projects are inherently interested in literary
categorization (Gorgias). The second chapter continues the investigation, looking now at
relevant fourth-century authors who show an explicit interest in literary categories and,
especially, the place of poetry (Isocrates, Plato). The final chapter addresses Aristotle’s
treatment of poetry. The foundation of the project is a semantic analysis of the language
used to describe or single out a work or production as poetic. The primary terms are
various POI- root words (e.g. poivhma, poihthv~); various words of song (e.g. ajoidov~,
mevlo~); and several adjectives and adverbs that consistently appear in the period in
discussions of literary distinctions. There emerges, when these terms are traced through
time, a clear picture of the ongoing instability of literary categories. Meter is consistently
put forward as a formal feature that marks off poetry from prose, for instance, but it is
just as consistently rejected by the same authors as a satisfying distinction; instead,
further categories defined by subtler features are introduced to more accurately describe
literary productions, and those productions’ relationship to the poetic. Studying how the
authors of this period distinguished literary categories makes it clear that our emphasis on
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the contrast between prose and poetry is too simplistic. Rather, the continual negotiations
we see these authors engaged in when trying to define the poetic alerts us to the relative
nature of literary categories, and how poetry only becomes what it is in contrast to what it
is not.

vii
Table of Contents

Introduction

1

Chapter 1: Defining Poetry in the Fifth Century
Gorgias
Herodotus
Thucydides

7
8
17
35

Chapter 2: Defining Poetry in the Fourth Century
Isocrates
Plato

53
55
74

Chapter 3: Aristotelian Poetics

119

Conclusions

168

Bibliography

171

1
Introduction

Dr. Diana Deutsch, a professor of psychology at the University of California in
San Diego, studies sound perception, and particularly how we perceive music. Among
her findings are a number of what she calls ‘musical illusions,’ situations where our brain
recategorizes the musical sounds it is hearing into something quite different from what is
actually being played.1 She found that the brain does something similar with speech, a
phenomenon she labels ‘phantom words.’ When a given phrase or sentence is repeated
exactly, as by playing a recording again and again, the brain begins to assign a pattern to
its intonations, a melody: the words gradually come to be perceived as sung rather than
spoken.
Once this has happened, there is no way of turning the words back into speech.
Even when that sentence or phrase is returned to its context and heard as it was originally
intended to be, it remains song rather than speech; the brain hears the reintegrated words
as if the speaker, who had been going along normally, suddenly burst into song, and then
returned, seamlessly, to normal speech.2 That is, the brain has permanently marked those
words, permanently differentiated them from ordinary speech. Considering the nature of
Greek poetry, Dr. Deutsch’s ‘phantom words’ provide an unusually clear illustration of
the issue at the heart of this project: most of us, if presented with a segment of language,
would be able to categorize it as song or speech immediately, but Dr. Deutsch has shown

1

Discussions and sound files of her so-called ‘musical illusions’ are available on her website,
http://deutsch.ucsd.edu/psychology/deutsch_research1.php.
2
An example and discussion by Dr. Deutsch of this phenomenon of ‘phantom words’ can be found at
http://philomel.com/phantom_words/sometimes.php.
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that the distinction is not only imprecise, but is even impermanent. The inconsistencies
we find in the delineation of song and speech in antiquity, then, is not only not surprising,
but precisely what we should expect.3
Dr. Deutsch’s work observes the unstable line between the broad categories of
song and speech, but a similar instability is apparent in more specific generic distinctions
as well. Although most of us understand them to be anachronistic, we have generally
come to accept the literary typologies of archaic and classical literature constructed by
the Alexandrians, and built in part on the theories of Aristotle. We acknowledge that
Sappho would probably not have considered her verses in quite the same way as
Aristotle, but at the same time accept the generic distinctions as basically useful. What
has not been interrogated before is the category in which the various poetic genres are
subsumed, the genus to their species – that is, poetry. Why do we assume we have any
more certain of an understanding about what marked off poetry as distinct than we do
about what marked off Sappho from Anacreon? There are clear differences between the
two poets, but it is difficult to know which of those differences would have been
perceived as essential, and the same, it turns out, is true for poetry more broadly.
The shift that comes into view in the fifth century when song begins to be
eclipsed by something else is as fascinating as it is inexplicable. None of the authors who
choose to not write song explain their choice, and none of the authors who continue to
produce song defend theirs. There are hints of competition, sometimes even antagonism,

3

The introduction in Booth (1981) provides an interesting discussion of what makes ‘song’ different from
‘poetry’ in the modern world; while it does not carry over to the poetry of ancient Greece for a number of
reasons, it is a useful illustration of the fluidity of categories.
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between the two forms, but no statement of the differences that can be maintained, no
boundary that can be set as absolute.
For us, so far removed from a culture for which song must have been almost a
part of daily life, song and its partner are fairly simply ‘poetry’ and ‘prose;’4 Thucydides,
Plato and Demosthenes are as naturally of a piece as are Homer, Euripides and Pindar,
and there is ample evidence that similar groupings were made in antiquity. To take the
next step, however, and assume they were made for similar reasons, is to discount the
‘strangeness of song culture.’5 Why should we think that a society that had accepted song
as its primary medium of history, philosophy, science, mythology, religion, ritual and
entertainment for centuries would draw a simple distinction when it was joined by the
new medium that we call prose? What if the prose-poetry dichotomy, while
straightforward and superficially functional, actually concealed subtler, more interesting
negotiations?
The consequences would be significant: we cannot hope to adequately understand
anyone’s claims or arguments about poetry unless we first understand what it is he thinks
sets poetry apart. When those first authors who chose to not write song made their choice,
what is the other against which they set their own work? What is it they saw themselves
4

Because the modern ideas and assumptions about poetry and the poetic are a constant, if largely implicit,
backdrop to this study, it will be worthwhile to say a few words about them here. The modern terminology
like ‘poem,’ ‘song,’ and ‘poetic’ is used in this study as if those concepts were simple and straightforward
in the modern world, and are used in the casual sense, with the resonances you would expect any given
person on the street to give them, and no more than that. That is, the idea of a poem is closely linked to
metered language, that of the poetic to an elevated, artful tone, and so on. Scholarship on the complications
of the modern conceptions abounds: Matterson and Jones (2000) ch.9 offers a succinct discussion of some
of the complications inherent in the modern idea of poetry, for instance, and Zolla (1983) explores the
implications of the mythologized poet. On the contested purpose of poetry in the modern world, see
especially the eponymous essay in Heaney (1995).
5
To borrow a phrase from Leslie Kurke’s article of the same name.

4
as not doing, that the songmakers did? Would they have agreed on the distinctions
between their own work and the poetic other, or were the lines flexible and shifting?
What, finally, did they think poetry was? These are the fundamental questions of this
dissertation.
This study takes as its subject the prose authors of Greece from the fifth century,
the first period for which we have substantial literary remains, to the first real attempt in
the fourth century to codify the older, poetic, mode. It focuses on authors who either take
poetry up as an explicit topic, or have occasion to address it consistently if
circumstantially. It proceeds chronologically, addressing Gorgias, Herodotus and
Thucydides in the first chapter (‘Defining Poetry in the Fifth Century’), Isocrates and
Plato in the second (‘Defining Poetry in the Fourth Century’), and Aristotle in the third
(‘Aristotelian Poetics’). Each author is first studied individually to see what kinds of
language he uses to talk about the poetic, how consistent he is with that use, and what we
can infer from this about his underlying assumptions of literary categorization,
particularly with regard to the category of the poetic. Each chapter ends by bringing the
relevant authors back into dialogue with each other, and then with their predecessors. The
sections and chapters necessarily build on each other, as each one adds another piece to
our understanding of the several ways in which boundaries of literary type were
negotiated.

5
The organizing principle of this study, necessarily in tandem with chronology, is a
semantic study of the language of the poetic.6 It traces, first, the vocabulary that we
associate most naturally with the poetic: terminology built off the POI- root, such as
poivhsi~, poivhma, and poihtikhv, as well as their compounded relatives and relevant verbal
uses; and words related to the archaic language of song, such as ajoidov~ and w/jdhv. We then
address a less coherent set of terms which are brought to bear in particular periods, or by
particular authors, on the categorization of literature more generally. In the ways that
these authors, self-consciously or not, talk about poetry and the poetic, we can infer more
explicit information about their ideas of the boundaries of the category.
This is complicated, of course, by the fact that many of these authors were not
using the terminology in any ‘technical’ sense, and were often referring to poetry only
tangentially. Additionally, there is variation in meaning not only from author to author,
but often within individual authors. Both of these potential complications, however, are
ultimately helpful: while we do not find a single, simple, straightforward answer to the
question ‘what is poetry?’, we do find illustrations of the range of viable ways that the
poetic was being thought about in the period.
What will become clear over the course of the study is that, while all the authors
at various times appeal to the familiar prose-poetry dichotomy, all of them also find the
dichotomy insufficient. Time and again, they propose alternative systems of classification
based not on form but on other markers. Time and again, they abandon the bifurcated
model in favor of more complicated distinctions that result in a multiplicity of categories.
6

Meijering (1987) has many of the same aims and questions as I do, and takes an approach similar to mine,
but focuses on the scholia and Alexandrian critics of archaic poetry.
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Finally, although all of them will acknowledge meter as a simplistic but convenient
demarcation, the more meaningful distinctions are drawn according to the same issues
that marked off the genres of archaic poetry: content, context, and function.7
Ultimately, this dissertation serves as a corrective to the idea that prose, from its
inception, was in any simple way directly in opposition to the poetic. It’s formal features,
then as now, were convenient markers, and served well enough to suggest a general idea
of what a given work might be or do. Every author in this study, however, when he
probes the question, finds the dichotomy insufficient and incapable of capturing the
nuances that interest him. Every author, more or less explicitly, posits at least a third
category, and draws distinctions by means of something other than straightforward form.
There is no denying that the prose authors of the Classical period saw themselves in a
dialogue with the poetic tradition, but the lines of that tradition, and the motivations for
engaging with it, are more flexible than was previously understood.

7

Carey (2010) 21-22 provides a succinct overview of the complications scholars face when trying to
categorize archaic poetry, and discusses several of the ways they have attempted to mitigate these
complications. Also see e.g. Graziosi and Haubold (2010), who discuss the relationship between lyric and
other genres; Dougherty (1994) on the relationship of genre and occasion with regard to archaic foundation
poetry in particular; Bowie (1986) on elegy; Rotstein (2010) opens with an extended discussion of genre,
especially as it relates to iambic, and Rosen (2009) 13-15 discusses the genres of comic poetry more
broadly. Harvey (1955) remains one of the fullest discussions on the obstacles to our understanding of
generic distinctions in the archaic period, and Fowler (1987) and West (1974) are still foundational works
for a number of more recent studies.
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Chapter One: Defining Poetry in the Fifth Century
Gorgias, Herodotus, Thucydides

It has often been assumed that the choice of prose, even in the fifth century, was
inherently a polemic one, signifying a strong break with the tradition of poetry that stood
as the great cultural authority.8 In practice, however, the picture is rather different; far
from envisioning a straightforward poetic tradition against which to position themselves,
the earliest extant prose authors have widely varying attitudes towards and ideas about
the literary culture into which they were inserting themselves. Gorgias, for example, does
indeed offer a picture of a literary world in which there seems to be a simple way of
setting poetry apart as a distinct literary category, only to then show that the distinction is
merely a cosmetic one that does not address the underlying power of language.
Herodotus, on the other hand, refers more or less casually to quite a number of categories
of poetry – hymns, dithyrambs, dramas and so on – but turns to a formal distinction
between poetry and prose primarily when he wants to identify those who were doing
something other than poetry. Thucydides, unsurprisingly, shares more with Herodotus
than Gorgias, but ultimately draws his boundaries differently again, so that he sets all
overly crafted language, metrical or not, in a category against his own more spare
production.
This chapter explores the different and sometimes contradictory ways that these
authors attempt to mitigate the instability of the category of the poetic, especially against
8

See e.g. Goldhill (2002) 5, who suggests that “the invention of prose involves a contest of authority”
(emphasis his).

8
their conscious choice to, themselves, not participate in it. In the course of this, it will
become clear that, even as the poetic becomes more easily and recognizably unified
against the category of unmetered language, the unity of the set of unmetered language is
simultaneously subjected to more rigorous typological distinctions. Moreover, when the
formal distinctions prove insufficient, all three authors turn to something like context or
function to focus their distinctions – that is, they ultimately draw their boundaries along
lines unrelated to form.9
Since all three of these authors were working in the same city at roughly the same
time, we can see in their lack of consensus about the boundaries of poetry a reflection of
a society in which literary categories have not yet stabilized, or which has not yet agreed
upon a method of dividing the literary productions. What is perhaps most interesting is
the lack of even internal consistency; various features of poetry are brought to bear at
different points, so that the lines marking off its boundaries are constantly changing.
Finally, the impulse to categorize based on meter is probably a response to the emerging
set of prose, although it quickly becomes clear that ‘prose’ is no more single than poetry
is; neither poetry nor prose is simply meter or lack thereof, although that distinction
serves as a useful starting point for more precise negotiations once prose works come on
the scene.

***

9

See n.7 in the introduction for some bibliography on this subject.

9
Gorgias of Leontini came to Athens in the latter part of the fifth century, bringing
with him a new kind of performance – a performance of lovgo~ that will come to be seen
as the beginning of oratory. According to Diodorus Siculus, Gorgias amazed the
Athenians – although they were already skilled in the use of lovgo~ – with his new and
exotic devices such as homoioteleuton and isokola.10 From Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
we learn that it was Gorgias who first introduced orators to poetic and metaphorical
expressions.11 In fact, most of our ancient sources that have anything favorable to say
about Gorgias treat him as a great innovator in performative speech, and as someone who
revolutionized oratory in Athens.
Gorgias himself, of course, never called himself a poet or even claimed that his
works were especially poetic. Rather, as this discussion will demonstrate, he made a great
show of highlighting the importance of discrete categories of literature, emphasizing that
his own was not poetry. While explicitly arguing that poetry and incantations were
special kinds of literary productions, however, Gorgias is implicitly eliding the
distinctions at every turn. Again and again, with reference to literary types, to particular
disciplines, even to the difference between material and verbal art, Gorgias emphasizes
the importance of distinctions, only to then blur those same distinctions. Finally, Gorgias
conceives of an extraordinarily unified lovgo~: various forms may differ in cosmetic
ways, but ultimately those differences matter less than what unites them, which is the
immeasurable power of language.

10
11

Diod. Sic. Universal History 12.53.
Dion. Hal. Life of Lysias 3, a point Aristotle will more or less agree with.
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Gorgias is unique in the Classical period for offering a straightforward, if
facetious, definition of poivhsi~: it is, he says at Helen §9, lovgo~ having meter. It is a
strange statement made stranger by its context, which deserves further attention:
lovgo~ dunavsth~ mevga~ ejstivn, o{~ smikrotavtw/ swvmati kai; ajfanestavtw/
qeiovtata e[rga ajpotelei`: duvnatai ga;r kai; fovbon pau`sai kai; luvphn
ajfelei`n kai; cara;n ejnergavsasqai kai; e[leon ejpauxh`sai. tau`ta de; wJ~
ouJtw`~ e[cei deivxw: dei` de; kai; dovxh/ dei`xai toi`~ ajkouvousi: th;n poivhsin
a{pasan kai; nomivzw kai; ojnomavzw lovgon e[conta mevtron: h|~ tou;~
ajkouvonta~ eijsh`lqe kai; frivkh perivfobo~ kai; e[leo~ poluvdakru~ kai;
povqo~ filopenqhv~, ejp j ajllotrivwn te pragmavtwn kai; swmavtwn eujtucivai~
kai; duspragivai~ i[diovn ti pavqhma dia; tw`n lovgwn e[paqen hJ yuchv.12
(lovgo~ is a powerful master, which by means of the smallest and most
indiscernible bodies accomplishes the most god-like works; for it is able to
stop fear and remove physical suffering and stir up delight and augment
compassion. I will demonstrate how this is the case; it is necessary to
demonstrate this to my audience by a judgment also; I both consider and
name all poivhsi~ as lovgo~ having meter. Terrifying shuddering and tearful
pity and grievous longing come over the hearers of it [poivhsi~], and at the
actions and physical experiences13 of others both in good fortune and bad
the soul experiences some suffering of its own because of lovgoi, §8-9).
The judgment (dovxh/) by which he intends to make his case is his definition of poivhsi~,
and the verbs he uses to assert it (nomivzw, onomavzw) are strong enough to suggest that the
definition was not a common or generally assumed one, and perhaps even that Gorgias’
offering of a definition was a display in itself. The particular demonstration he provides,
however, presents poivhsi~ as not just one subset of lovgo~, but as almost identical to it in
the power of its effects: poivhsi~ stirs up the emotions, he claims, presumably because of
its share in lovgo~. Verbal echoes then suggest that, however poivhsi~ might differ from
12

The lack of connective and explanatory particles here is odd; Bers (1984) might associate this with a
more prosaic style, but he is careful to say that it is rarely so simple. Some have suggested that this
description may be of tragedy, and it certainly is similar to Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy’s effects,
although of course the anachronism of that is obvious.
13
Accepting Sprague’s translation of swmavtwn as “physical experiences”.
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lovgo~, ultimately the similarities overshadow any differences: the fovbo~ that lovgo~ stops
in the earlier part of the passage is picked up by the frivkh perivfobo~ in the later part of
the passage, and the e[leo~ that lovgo~ augments is seen again in the poluvdakru~ e[leo~
that comes over those listening to poetry. In short, immediately after defining poivhsi~ as
a type of lovgo~, he goes on to describe it as identical to lovgo~. That is, he claims that
poivhsi~ is distinct from lovgo~ in some important way, and then immediately elides that
distinction by describing the effects of poivhsi~ as identical to those of lovgo~.
From that swift if subtle denial of distinction, he moves to a discussion of
incantatory magical songs, which he affords the same powers again: they bring pleasure
and banish pain (aiJ ga;r e[nqeoi dia; lovgwn ejpw/dai; ejpagwgoi; hJdonh`~, ajpagwgoi; luvph~
givnontai, §10). 14 He has signaled this as a move from one type of lovgo~ to another (pro;~
a[llon ajp j a[llou lovgon, §9), but again both the effects of the chants and the language he
uses to describe them are almost identical to his original description of the powers of
lovgo~. Again, he has posited a ‘type’ of lovgo~ only to undermine the proposition that it
is, in any important way, different from lovgo~ writ large. He then abandons talk of lovgo~
and its supposed types, but the several examples he presents serve, again, to show that the
power of lovgo~ is intrinsic to it rather than dependent on external decorations like meter

Taking this diav, like the previous one, with an almost instrumental force. It is interesting that his
discussion of poetry focuses on language without reference to song, and that song is here put forward as a
third category. While we should not put too much weight on this suggested separation of the musical and
linguistic components of poetry, particularly as it is a particular kind of song that was in some sense distinct
from poetry, it is interesting, especially since his definition of poetry selects out only meter – that is,
rhythm, but not melody or mode. The distinction will be seen again in Herodotus and Plato but articulated
most clearly in Aristotle. On the relationship between magic and Gorgias’ idea of language, see especially
Walsh (1984) 81-85, also e.g. Meijering (1987) 8-9, Verdenius (1981) 122-123.
14

12
or song; any kind of lovgo~ will, regardless of its form, be able to stir up or quiet
emotions.15
Thus we see a pattern of Gorgias proposing literary ‘types’ only to describe their
particular powers in ways that actually undermine the proposed differences. Gorgias
makes a similar move with the work as a whole when he identifies the Helen as an
ejgkwvmion in the succinct antithesis that closes out the speech: to;n lovgon jElevnh~ me;n
ejgkwvmion, ejmo;n de; paivgnion (this speech is an encomium of Helen, but a diversion for
me, §131).16 What Gorgias has presented, however, even if he names it an encomium,
satisfies none of the expectations the word should raise; however much it plays with
rhythm and other so-called poetic devices, it is not worked into meter, and however little
we may know about its context, we can assume he had no musical or choral
accompaniment – it is, quite adamantly, not any kind of ordinary song.
Moreover, the fact that this more or less specific term is applied only at the very
end – and then further qualified as a paivgnion – may be one final joke. He has presented
a speech in a style that was enormously innovative, if our sources can be trusted, but a
15

Meijering (1987) 7 makes a similar observation: “poetry is but one usage of language out of many that
seek to delude people. It is distinguished from other such usages merely by its metric form.”
16
Egcwvmion and its verbal relatives were not especially uncommon in the fifth century; the noun, for
instance, appears five times in Pindar, where, based on both context and immediate vocabulary, it must
refer to song. (Pindar Ol.2.47, in close proximity to luvra; Ol.10.77, with ajeivdeto; Ol.13.29, lacking
explicit song vocabulary but likely referring to a victory procession at which song would be expected;
Pyth.10.53, with u{mnon; Nem.1.7, with mevlo~.) Moreover, the word seems to be derived from what happens
in the kw`mo~, thus further tying it to the tradition of ritual song. A passage at Herodotus 5.5, too, suggests
that an encomium was likely to be a song of some sort, although there is no mention of musical
accompaniment. However, the context of the praise is a funeral ritual, and therefore probably involved a
kind of stylized song. A later reference in Xenophon, too, as well as numerous references in Plato, imply
that the ejgkwvmion was a song of some sort: Xenophon Ag.10.3; the references in Plato are far too many to
list, but see e.g. Lysis 205e; Prot. 326a; Sym. 177b. Harvey (1955) 163f posits two distinct uses of the
word, one referring to the poetic song and the other, a rhetorical term, referring to any speech of praise,
whether in verse or not. Certainly the word is beginning to be attached to prose in the fifth century, but
Harvey perhaps goes too far in drawing a sharp line between the two uses.
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speech that would nonetheless not have been mistaken for poetry. At the last moment,
however, he names it a kind of poetry, calling into question a distinction that, if we are
understanding the joke correctly, would have been clearly felt if not fully articulated. Just
as he elided the distinctions between types of lovgo~, then, here he is pointing to the
fallacy of assuming that even speech and song can be easily distinguished. By Gorgias’
work of emphasizing the weakness of the boundaries, however, we can glimpse his
expectation that his audience assumed a clear break between the poetic and his own
project, even if he wished to challenge that.
Gorgias creates a similar elision when he compares his project to that of the poets
(poihtaiv) who have been the primary vehicle of Helen’s bad reputation:
*** tou;~ memfomevnou~ JElevnhn, gunai`ka peri; h|~ oJmovfwno~ kai;
oJmovyuco~ gevgonen hJ te tw`n poihtw`n ajkousavntwn pivsti~ hJ te tou`
ojnovmato~ fhvmh, o{ tw`n sumforw`n mnhvmh gevgonen. ejgw; de; bouvlomai
logismovn tina tw`/ lovgw/ dou;~ th;n me;n kakw`~ ajkouvousan pau`sai th`~
aijtiva~, tou;~ de; memfomevnou~ yeudomevnou~ ejpideivxa~ kai; deivxa~
tajlhqe;~ hj pau`sai th`~ ajmaqiva~.
(*** those blaming Helen, a woman about whom the assurances of the
poets of good reputation and the fame of the name, which is the memorial
of the events, are univocal and universally reproachful. But I, offering
some reasoning in my speech, wish to give the accused rest from blame,
demonstrating that the ones making the accusation are lying, and showing
the truth to give them rest from ignorance, §2).
In spite of the lacuna that opens this passage, we can infer that Gorgias would reject the
ones blaming Helen, and would include the poets among them. He then sets himself the
opposite task, to save Helen from blame. The vocabulary he uses underscores the
difference of assumptions and methodology between the poetic tradition and his own
project: the former is described with words of persuasion and tradition – pivsti~, mnhvmh,
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fhvmh – while his work promises logismov~ and deivxa~, calculation and proof. He is, in
effect, setting up dichotomy: the poetic tradition against the scientific one.
Of course, Gorgias ultimately has it both ways here: he has drawn our attention to
two distinct traditions and set them against each other, just as he did with lovgo~ and
poivhsi~. Furthermore, as he did there, so too here he blurs the supposed distinctions
immediately. The Helen consistently relies on persuasion and pathos rather than
calculation or proof, and even the brief aside on the work of astronomers, philosophers
and debaters (§13) focuses on how they use persuasion rather than any appeal to their
reasoning. Moreover, the treatise On Not Being offers some insight into his ideas about
the reach of lovgo~. There, he argues that language is useless for communicating
knowledge, since it bears no relationship with reality.17 The implication is clear: lovgo~
grants no transparent access to truth. What it can do, the Helen argues, is stir up the
emotions and incline a person one way or another. This is finally what the Helen does,
under the guise of making rational arguments; it persuades based on reasonable
possibilities.
At every turn, Gorgias comes back to hybridization. He begins by acknowledging
a boundary, and then erases it. There is a poetic tradition and a scientific one, the
beginning of the Helen posits – but Gorgias ends up using techniques drawn from both.
There is a song tradition and a speech one – but Gorgias makes great use of rhythms and
calls his prose work an ejgkwvmion.18 There are subsets of lovgo~ that should have various
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On Gorgias’ theory of knowledge and its relationship to language, see e.g. Verdenius (1981) 116.
On Gorgias’ intentional and considered appropriation of poetic rhythms for emotional effect, see Segal
(1962) 127, who suggests that Gorgias “brings within the competence of the rhetor the power to move the
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powers – but Gorgias makes them all identical in force. We see in these moves an
underlying assumption of distinctions that Gorgias will acknowledge only to transgress.
In the case of poivhsi~, the rejection of a delimited category is twofold: after
undermining the differentiation of poivhsi~ a{pasa from lovgo~ as discussed above,
Gorgias later uses the word – the only other instance of the word in the (admittedly
slender) surviving corpus – in its material sense, parallel to ejrgasiva to refer to the
creation of statues that grant divine pleasure to the eyes (hJ de; tw`n ajndriavntwn poivhsi~
kai; hJ tw`n ajgalmavtwn ejrgasiva qevan hJdei`an parevsceto toi`~ o[mmasin, §18). The effect
of this poivhsi~ is remarkably similar to that of the verbal one: it can induce grief or
longing in the viewer, it imparts something of the divine, and Gorgias notes that it plays a
part in stirring up desire for activities and physical experiences (polla; de; polloi`~
pollw`n e[rwta kai; povqon ejnergavzetai pragmavtwn kai; swmavtwn, §18).
On its own, the claim appears unrelated to the discussion of poetry; there is no
great surprise in finding poivhsi~ used to refer to art beyond literary creations. What is
remarkable, however, is the similarity of this passage with the description of linguistic
poivhsi~. Both passages use povqo~, ejnergavzetai, the cognates qeiovtata and qevan, and
the pairing of pra`gma and sw`ma to explain how the viewer or auditor responds to works
of art.19 That is, the verbal echoes are many, enough that they are unlikely to be
accidental.

psyche by those suprarational forces which Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of
the formal structure of music.”
19
In an author less obsessed with the crafting of his piece we might think this a coincidence, as the words
are all common enough on their own. For Gorgias, however, intentionality seems more likely.
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He has already suggested that literary types show no significant differences in
their impacts, and demonstrated this on a larger scale by assigning the same powers to
several allegedly different kinds of lovgo~ and by calling his Helen an ejgkwvmion. Here, by
applying the semantics and practical effects of verbal poivhsi~ to material poivhsi~, he
breaks another boundary: he shows that language and material art both work on their
audiences in the same ways. The parallel Gorgias has set up between the effects of
material and linguistic poivhsi~ may also work in the other direction, allowing us a
glimpse into his conception of how poetry is made. Since material poivhsi~ – a statue, for
instance – is the result of human technical skill being applied to a stone or to metal,
linguistic poivhsi~ – poetry – must be the result of human technical skill being applied to
language. Linguistic poivhsi~, however, has already been shown to have the same powers
as lovgo~, differing from it only in its form rather than in its essential nature; the further
implicit comparison of material and linguistic poivhsi~ calls into question the idea that
any lovgo~ could be free of human technical skill.
While Athenian anxiety about the deceptive possibilities of artistic and delightful
language were not yet at their peak when Gorgias was making his presence felt in the
city, concerns about the ability of beautiful language to convince an audience of the
weaker argument were already being raised. Gorgias himself raises the problem at Helen
§13, reminding his audience that speech can delight and persuade a great crowd because
it was written with skill, even if it does not tell the truth (ei`~ lovgo~ polu;n o[clon e[terye
kai; e[peise tevcnh/ grafei~, oujk ajlhqeiva/ lecqeiv~). This, combined with the elision of
meaningful literary distinctions made elsewhere, reveals a characteristically Gorgianic
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play: an acknowledgement of a concern about the power of crafted language, and a
subsequent assertion that all language is crafted, that no language can finally be simple or
‘safe’. This fits with the distinction he draws in On Not Being between language and
reality, where language, like any other object of sense perception, is shown to have the
power to influence opinion but not to impart knowledge.
Finally, then, after laying out his clear and simple definition of poetry, Gorgias
shows how the feature that distinguishes poetry is one that actually plays only a minimal
role in poetry’s power. As noted above, however, the very fact of Gorgias’ hybridization
reveals an awareness of clear categories to blend; there must be, behind Gorgias’
bombastic prose, a model of a simpler prose style to which he was applying the tricks and
turns of the poetic tradition. If poetry has its effects qua language rather than qua poetry,
however, the distinction was in some sense arbitrary, as his own mixed style shows.20
After all, when all lovgo~ is equally powerful and incapable of conveying reality in an
unproblematic way, literary categories are only the ways language is shaped and
ornamented, but whose impacts are dwarfed by the power of language itself.

***

Unlike Gorgias, Herodotus never directly addresses the question of poetry.
Nonetheless, he regularly makes use of poetry as a source, and so poetic productions
receive tangential attention on numerous occasions and from numerous angles. As should
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Certainly Aristotle treated him as a kind of hybrid; see below in chapter 3.
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be expected for his period, his vocabulary is generally broad and inconsistent: the agent
noun poihthv~ seems to be fairly restricted in its use to those creating song of one sort or
another, but the idea of song itself is much less bounded. There is one suggestion of
formal distinction when he discusses the logopoiov~, but he nowhere mentions any formal
features of poetry explicitly – in fact, metrical observations are limited to oracles and
inscriptions, and never brought up in the context of poetry. On the whole, Herodotus
treats his poetic evidence just as he does his non-poetic sources, singling out specific
claims for approval or rejection, but never assuming that a source gains or lacks value
based on its formal features.
What is most important in this discussion of the Histories, however, is that
Herodotus draws no firm or simple lines between works like his and the works of the
poets, and does not even consistently group poetry as a whole into a bounded category set
off from other literary productions. Sometimes he and the poets share a common goal and
even a common approach, but sometimes he is able to point to a methodological move
made by a poet that is clearly antithetical to his own approach. He sometimes gestures
towards more specific categories of literary productions, but in ways that are internally
inconsistent and suggest that he had nothing like a formal system of literary distinction in
mind. Where Gorgias shows great self-consciousness of breaking down walls between
literary categories, then, Herodotus shows few, if any, consistent boundaries at all;
instead, while he does show an interest in distinguishing literary types, the lines he draws
are different at different times.
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The term that seems to carry the most consistent and limited definition of all the
terms attached to poetry is poihthv~, the agent noun, and it thus provides a useful focal
point around which to begin this discussion. One of the most common roles of the
poihthv~ in Herodotus is the disseminator of common knowledge: information found in
the poets may or may not be reliable, but it can be assumed to be wide-spread. The most
explicit example of this is at 6.52.1-2, where Herodotus presents a story that the Spartans
tell about how they came to possess their land, noting that their version of events has no
parallel in any poet (Lakedaimovnioi ga;r oJmologevonte~ oujdeni; poihth`/ levgousi …). This
has been taken to mean that the poets tell a different version – as indeed later poets like
Apollodorus will – but that Herodotus reports here what the Spartans say about
themselves. 21
In the following chapter, however, Herodotus rejects the Spartan version, using
both a me;n-de; construction and a tau`ta-tavde contrast to distinguish what the Spartans
say from the story as the rest of the Greeks tell it (tau`ta me;n Lakedaimovnioi levgousi
mou`noi JEllhvnwn: tavde de; kata; ta; legovmena uJp j JEllhvnwn ejgw; gravfw, 6.53.1). The ta;
legovmena here should refer to the more general tradition, apart from the specific Spartan
one, as How and Wells note.22 While Herodotus is not explicit about it, the story as told
by the non-Spartan Greeks is likely the same one found in the poets, which allows us to
read back into the qualification made to the Spartan version at 6.52.1: the implication is
that the lack of a poetic source means the story will be at least less well known, if not
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e.g. How and Wells (1912) ad loc.; Pausanias 3.1.6, Apollodorus 2.8.2.
How and Wells (1912) ad loc. identify this ta; legovmena as “i.e. the common Hellenic tradition found in
the poets and logographers.”
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actually suspect. It is impossible to sort out cause and effect from this – do stories
become well known because the poets tell them, or do poets tell stories that are already
common knowledge? – but we can at least see an expectation of overlap.
A well-known passage in book 2 again links poets with general knowledge,
although in a different way. At 2.53, Herodotus addresses the chronological details and
cultural importance of Homer and Hesiod, claiming that they lived about four hundred
years before his own time, and asserts that the poets who are alleged to be earlier than
these two were actually after them (2.53.3).23 He has clearly separated these two out from
the rest of the poets as exceptional, but his description of their activities may nonetheless
tell us something about the activities he envisioned as proper to poets: they were the ones
who laid out the genealogy of the gods, and gave epithets24 to the gods, and separated out
their particular honors and functions, and explained their appearances (ou|toi de; eijsi; oiJ
poihvsante~ qeogonivhn {Ellhsi kai; toi`si qeoi`si ta;~ ejpwnumiva~ dovnte~ kai; timav~ te
kai; tevcna~ dielovnte~ kai; ei[dea aujtw`n shmhvnante~, 2.53.2). That is, they supplied
instructions on how to know and worship the gods. He does not, however, give a picture
of their work as particularly inspired or divinely authorized.25 They are in fact depicted as
doing work similar to Herodotus’ own, although in relation to gods rather than men: their
works are a sort of divine ethnography, just as Herodotus’ is, in part, a human one.
Homer and Hesiod are not themselves called poets, then, but the comparison with the poihtaiv in 2.53.3
make it likely that Herodotus would have been comfortable applying the term to them as well.
24
Following Mikalson’s suggestion (Mikalson (2004) 34) that this ejpwnumiva~ is best translated as
‘epithets’. How and Wells (1912) ad loc. suggest ‘patronymics’ as opposed to ‘epithets,’ perhaps because
they are interested in not pushing the distinction that unnamed “others” make, connecting Hesiod to the
making of the genealogy and Homer to the other activities of naming and describing.
25
Although the archaic poets were themselves implicated in the connecting of their poetry to the
supernatural, it is remarkable how rarely it shows up in the prose corpus; in fact, it is almost limited to, and
most likely exaggerated by, Plato; see below in chapter two.
23
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An aside on Aeschylus in the midst of the Egyptian discussion shows a more
concrete example of a poet doing just what Herodotus himself does. In the midst of
retelling an Egyptian aetiological story about Apollo’s temple being on a floating island,
Herodotus asserts that Aeschylus took from this Egyptian tale an idea which was found in
none of the earlier poets (ejk touvtou de; tou` lovgou kai; oujdeno;~ a[llou Aijscuvlo~ oJ
Eujforivwno~ h{rpase26 to; ejgw; fravsw, mou`no~ dh; poihtevwn tw`n progenomevnwn, 2.156.6).
As was the case with the Spartan tale above, what Herodotus finds notable is that the
information was not found in other poets, although of course he himself purports to have
identified the source of Aeschylus’ innovation.27 Here, Herodotus passes no judgment on
Aeschylus’ innovation, likely because he has verified its origin for himself. It is
particularly interesting to note that he portrays Aeschylus as performing a very
Herodotean task: finding obscure information to bring back to Greece and put into his
literary creations.
A similar instance from the same book, however, has Herodotus passing
judgment, precisely because he can find no outside proof:
oJ de; peri; tou` jWkeanou` levxa~ ej~ ajfane;~ to;n mu`qon ajneneivka~ oujk e[cei
e[legcon: ouj ga;r tina; e[gwge oi\da potamo;n jWkeano;n ejovnta, {Omhron de;
h] tina; tw`n provteron genomevnwn poihtevwn dokevw to; ou[noma euJrovnta ej~
poivhsin ejseneivkasqai.
26

How and Wells (1912) ad loc. note that this word is “harsh” and suppose that it may reflect Herodotus’
jealousy at Aeschylus beating him to the discovery, or his resentment at a distortion of Greek mythology. It
is indeed an odd choice, but nothing else in the passage suggests any reason to take it as necessarily
pejorative. If anything, the rather strong ejk touvtou tou` lovgou kai; oujdeno;~ a[llou – especially paired with
the assertive ejgw; fravzw – suggests that Herodotus may be more interested in refuting another suggestion
as to the origin of the detail than judging Aeschylus’ use of it.
27
The following line gives us a final interesting detail: Aeschylus, having taken this story that no earlier
poet had used, then makes, ejpoivhse, Artemis the daughter of Demeter. The many and complex
significances of the verb poievw and its relationship to poetry will be taken up below, but its appearance
here, so soon after the cognate noun, is worth noting.
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(The one who told about Ocean and brought it up in his opaque myth has
no proof; for I at least don’t know of any river Ocean, but I think Homer
or someone earlier of those who are poets invented the name and brought
it into his poetry, 2.23.)
How and Wells suggest that Herodotus is here ridiculing Hecataeus or someone like him
for accepting an unverifiable story from the poetic tradition, which seems likely enough,
especially since the only other usage of mu`qo~ in the Histories is similarly dismissive.28 In
spite of the difference in attitude, however, the language Herodotus uses is interesting: in
both anecdotes, a storyteller is said to have brought a new or unfamiliar detail into his
poetry. The verbs that describe the activity of poet and myth-maker are both fevrw
compounds, suggesting that there is some kind of parallelism between their activities.29
His problem, however, has less to do with the invention of the poet than with the mythteller’s acceptance of an unverifiable story. This is a place where Herodotus would
clearly differentiate himself and his methods, but the group against which he is setting his
own work does not fall out as poetry against prose, but invention or unreliability against
verifiability; it is entirely a criticism of content rather than form. The poihtaiv are one part
of the group that is given license to invent, but by virtue of something other than
producing poetry, whereas Herodotus separates himself off from that group – but
includes in it other less reliable prose authors.

2.45, where a mu`qo~ about Heracles is called eujhvqh~ and grouped with other stories that Herodotus
identifies as ajnepiskevptw~.
29
The physicality implied by these verbs echoes the physicality of the h{rpase in the Asechylus anecdote,
and likely reflects the theory of material language that was prevalent in Herodotus’ time; see e.g. Ford
(2002) 161ff.
28
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The last occurrence of the term involves Alcaeus, and gives a different picture of
the poihth;~. Herodotus reports the story about Alcaeus’ famous flight from battle, saying
that Alcaeus put his battle experience into a mevlo~ and sent it to Mytilene, reporting his
suffering to his companion Melanippos (tau`ta de; jAlkai`o~ ejn mevlei poihvsa~ ejpitiqei`
ej~ Mutilhvnhn, ejxaggellovmeno~ to; eJwutou` pavqo~ Melanivppw/ ajndri; eJtaivrw/, 5.95.2).
The information that Alcaeus sends to Mytilene is categorically different from the kinds
of information preserved by poets in the previous examples in several ways: it was his
own personal experience, notably, and it has the conceit of being directed, like a letter, to
a specific person, rather than being intended for a wider public.
This example shows us that the category of poihth;~ was quite broad: it
encompassed the religious knowledge of Homer and Hesiod, imported and even
fabricated information like that of Aeschylus or the poet who named Ocean, and more
intimate narratives like those we think of as proper to lyric poetry. It included oral
tradition as well as written, if we can take literally Herodotus’ suggestion that Alcaeus
sent his mevlo~ to Melanippus. The poihth;~ practiced both research and invention. In fact,
it is difficult to find the limit of the term, as Herodotus provides no information on what
might distinguish a poihth;~ from any other sort of literary artist; even the terms used to
describe their productions are varied, if they appear at all. A comparison of the several
other literary producers that Herodotus identifies, however, will shed some light on the
realm of the poihth;~.
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We will begin with the ajoidov~, the term that is thought to have been the default
term for a poet before the introduction and adoption of poihth;~.30 Arion is the only figure
identified as an ajoidov~ (1.24), in fact: that he is tou` ajrivstou ajnqrwvpwn ajoidou` (1.24.5)
seems to be the main reason the Corinthian sailors allow him to sing (ajei`sai) the novmo~
o[rqio~ before jumping into the ocean. The preceding lines give further information about
Arion’s work: he was the best kithara player of his age, and he created, named and taught
the dithyramb ( jArivona … ejovnta kiqarw/do;n tw`n tovte ejovntwn oujdeno;~ deuvteron, kai;
diquvrambon prw`ton ajnqrwvpwn tw`n hJmei`~ i[dmen poihvsantav te kai; ojnomavsanta kai;
didavxanta ejn Korivnqw/, 1.23).
Arion is the only ajoidov~ in the Histories, but there are interesting comparanda in
several other passages that should be brought into the discussion before we set the ajoidov~
beside the poihthv~. The discussion of the Egyptian version of the Linus song at 2.79, for
instance, includes a cluster of words cognate with ajoidov~:
patriovoisi de; crewvmenoi novmoisi a[llon oujdevna ejpiktw`ntai: toi`si a[lla
te ejpavxia ejsti; novmima, kai; dh; kai; a[eisma e{n ejsti, Livno~, o{sper e[n te
Foinivkh/ ajoivdimo~ ejsti; kai; ejn Kuvprw/ kai; a[llh/, kata; mevntoi e[qnea
ou[noma e[cei, sumfevretai de; wJuto;~ ei\nai to;n oiJ {Ellhne~ Livnon
ojnomavzonte~ ajeivdousi, w{ste polla; me;n kai; a[lla ajpoqwmavzein me tw`n
peri; Ai[gupton ejovntwn, ejn de; dh; kai; to;n Livnon oJkovqen e[labon to;
ou[noma: faivnontai de; aijeiv kote tou`ton ajeivdonte~. e[sti de; Aijguptisti; oJ
Livno~ kaleuvmeno~ Manerw`~. e[fasan dev min Aijfuvptioi tou` prwvtou
basileuvsanto~ Aijguptou pai`da mounogeneva genevsqai, ajpoqanovnta de;
aujto;n a[nwron qrhvnoisi touvtoisi uJpo; Aijguptivwn timhqh`nai, kai; ajoidh;n
te tauvthn prwvthn kai; mouvnhn sfivsi genevsqai.
([The Egyptians] retain their ancestral customs, adding nothing. Among
these is one notable custom, one song in particular, the Linus, who is the
subject of song in Phoenicia and Cyprus and elsewhere, although each
tribe has its own name for it. It happens to be the same song that the
30

See e.g. Nagy (1989), Braun (1938) 265f.
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Greeks sing, calling it the Linus. So, many other things that go on among
the Egyptians amaze me, particularly where they got the name Linus – for
it is clear that they have always sung it, although among the Egyptians
Linus is called Maneros. The Egyptians told me that he was the only son
of the first king of Egypt, and that because he died young he is honored
with these dirges by the Egyptians; this was the first and only song for
them, 2.79.)
The term ajoivdimo~ is an unusual choice, as it is a highly poetic word that appears, outside
of Herodotus and before the Hellenistic period, only in Pindar, Euripides, the Homeric
Hymn to Apollo, and Homer.31 Herodotus himself uses it one other time, in his discussion
of the Naucratian courtesan Rhodopis: another courtesan, Archidike, while never
achieving the fame of Rhodopis, herself became the subject of song throughout Greece
(ajoivdimo~ ajna; th;n JEllavda ejgevneto, 2.135.5). The almost certainly secular nature of the
song about Archidike argues against any strong link between the term and religion or
ritual, although most of the uses in the poets refer to figures or themes that are, if not
actually divine, strongly mythical.
Some have seen in these passages a divorce between the idea of making a song
and the act of performing it; while the ajoidov~ in Homer was simultaneously maker and
performer, Herodotus gives a picture, for example, of Arion’s process.32 Olen too, at
4.35.3, is shown as having made a u{mno~ to be sung by others, and elsewhere Phrynichus
is said to have made and then produced a dra`ma; the creating again occurs separately
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Pindar Ol.14.2; Pyth.8.59; Nem.3.79; and fr.52f. Euripides Electra 471 and fr. inc. 3.33. hH Apollo 299.
The Iliadic occurrence at 6.358 is unique in referring to a negative reputation. Stesichorus fr. S103 likely
includes the word as well, but it is difficult to be certain as the text breaks off at aoidim-. Theocritus and
Callimachus both pick the term up in the Hellenistic period, although it never becomes particularly
common.
32
See e.g. Ford (2002) 133 and n.4.

26
from the public production.33 However, it is important to note that the activities are all
still related back to the single individual, even if they are separated out into a process –
Herodotus may note that there were three stages in Arion’s dissemination of the
dithyramb, but all three of them nonetheless remain closely linked to Arion. That is,
while Herodotus’ observation of the process is interesting and perhaps even
representative of a more recent awareness of the mechanics of song culture, he still seems
to envision all the aspects of the Homeric ajoidov~ as encapsulated within one individual.
The emphasis in these passages on performance is quite different from what was
seen in the passages that dealt with poihthv~. When the language of song – cognates of
ajoidov~ – appears, it seems, Herodotus has in mind something different than when he
discusses the work of the poihthv~. When he addresses the works of the poihtaiv, for
instance, he tends to discuss only content, while the passages addressing the ajoidov~ and
his a[eisma focus more on the ornaments of performance, and have relatively little
interest in content. The activities of the poihtaiv are also described with a vocabulary that
evokes the very physical, tangible world: thus Aeschylus h{rpase his detail from the
Egyptians, and Homer, Hesiod and Alcaeus produce their works with participles of
poievw. The first step in Arion’s process, too, is to poiei`n, which he does before his work
can be named or taught – and, presumably, performed. When Herodotus talks about the
poihtaiv, then, he may be focusing particularly on one aspect of the process, namely the
mechanical constructing of the narrative.
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A digression on the habits of the Massagetae supports this. Herodotus describes
their habit of getting drunk on smoke from certain herbs, comparing it to the drunkenness
of Greeks on wine, and describes the effects: they rise up into dance and come into song
(… ej~ o[rchsivn te ajnivstasqai kai; ej~ ajoidh;n ajpiknevesqai, 1.202.2). Given the
circumstances, their songs are likely to be either traditional or very much ex tempore, and
Herodotus’ language appropriately emphasizes not the construction or content of the
songs but the active performance of them, the activity of song and dance. This is not to
suggest that he conceived of the poihthv~ as a figure who was entirely distinct from and
unlike the ajoidov~ more broadly; indeed, they are, for him, involved in essentially similar,
and often identical, projects. Rather, his semantic choices might reflect which aspect or
activity of the poet he was then focusing on in a particular passage. Thus when he speaks
of or makes use of the poihtaiv, it is by virtue of the content of their productions rather
than the embellishments – the music, dance, meter – of them. When separated out from
their ornaments, then, what is left is simply information with which Herodotus can deal
as he does with any other source: subject it to verification and investigation, and use it
with greater or lesser reservation.
Herodotus’ use of Aristeas provides a compelling example of this. Virtually
nothing survives of Aristeas’ Arimaspea, and the bulk of our information about him
comes from this very passage in Herodotus (4.13-17), but they seem to have had similar
projects in mind and, in some cases, even similar methodologies.34 The passage in

34

Other than Herodotus, we have a brief quotation of six lines of the Arimaspea in Longinus (10.4), and
entries giving biographical details in Tzetzes Chiliades (2.723-740, 4.523, 7.678-686) and in the Suda. The
lines quoted by Tzetzes are almost certainly not from the Arimaspea, as it was lost by the time of Dionysius
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Herodotus, however, is far from explicit about the form of the work he is discussing; the
Arimaspea is identified in one sentence, without reference to meter and with few of the
terms that should signal poetry:
e[fh de; jAristevh~ oJ Kaustrobivou ajnh;r Prokonnhvsio~ poievwn e[pea,
ajpikevsqai ej~ jIsshdovna~ foibovlampto~ genovmeno~, jIsshdovnwn de;
uJperoikevein jArimaspou;~ a[ndra~ mounofqavlmou~ u{per de; touvtwn tou;~
crusofuvlaka~ gru`pa~, touvtwn de; tou;~ JUperborevou~ kathvkonta~ ejpi;
qavlassan.
(Aristeas, the son of Kaustrobios and a Proconnesian man, making e[pea,
claimed that, possessed by Phoebos,35 he reached the Issedones, and that
beyond the Issedones lived the Arimaspians, one-eyed men, and that
beyond these lived gold-guarding griffons, and beyond these lived the
Hyperboreans right against the sea. 4.13)
Herodotus presents a picture of Aristeas as involved in a project that is essentially similar
to Herodotus’ own: he traveled, studied the people and places he saw, and reported back
about what he witnessed. However, Herodotus examines Aristeas’ version of events as
presented in the Arimaspea, and finds it lacking since it does not agree with the reports of
the Scythians themselves. In short, Herodotus treats Aristeas’ poem exactly as he treats
his other sources, and neither grants it special privilege nor submits it to unusual scrutiny
because of its status as poem.
The very fact that it is a poem, in fact, hardly seems to interest Herodotus at all;
he discusses the Arimaspea for several more paragraphs, but does not make a more

of Halicarnassus. The Suda represents him as the author of both an epic poem, the Arimaspea, and a prose
Theogony, although Herodotus mentions only the Arimaspea, the work that was directly relevant to his
discussion in book 4. Birch (1950) 82ff lays out everything we know about the works, and categorizes the
Arimaspea as “an inferior poetic counterpart of Herodotus’ own work”; see also Scratchley (1843) 413. For
a complete list of sources see Birch (1950), especially pp.79-80.
35
The Foibovlampto~ is interesting as it is the only suggestion in the Histories that poets might have
something to do with the divine, but it seems clearly to be referring to his travels rather than his poetry.
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explicit mention of its form, except for the recurrence of two key terms, e[po~ and various
forms of poievw. 4.14.3 describes how, having returned to Proconnesus seven years after
having allegedly died in the fuller’s shop, Aristeas produced the Arimaspea and, having
made it, went away again: poih`sai ta; e[pea ta; nu`n uJp j JEllhvnwn jArimavspea kalevetai,
poihvsanta de; ajfanisqh`nai to; deuvteron. Finally, at 4.16.1, Herodotus notes that even
Aristeas did not claim in making his e[pea that he had traveled beyond the Issedonians:
oujde; ou|to~ proswtevrw jIsshdovnwn ejn aujtoi`si toi`si e[pesi poievwn e[fhse ajpikevsqai.
While Aristeas is never identified as either poihthv~ or ajoidov~, cognates of
poihthv~ abound in the passage, as they do in most of the passages dealing with the work
of the poihtaiv.36 The meaning of poievw as ‘to perform the activity of a poet’ is familiar
from the classical period on, but Herodotus’ uses of it in this sense are interesting as they
are some of the earliest attested.37 However, the construction is not limited to poetry, but
refers more generally to the process of organizing language, with or without meter.
If Herodotus had a strong sense of literary categories, we might expect to see
some consistency in the various objects of poievw– that is, if e[pea poiei`n means ‘to
compose an epic poem,’ we would expect to find it with Homer and Aristeas, but not
elsewhere, and if mevlo~ is already limited to lyric poetry as we understand it today, we

For instance, Arion, at 1.23, is described as the diquvrambon prw`ton ajnqrwvpwn tw`n hJmei`~ i[dmen
poihvsantav te kai; ojnomavsanta kai; didavxanta ejn Korivntw/. At 4.35, the Delian women celebrate using a
hymn tovn sfi jWlh;n ajnh;r Luvkoi~ ejpoivhse, and the passage notes that Olen also tou;~ a[llou~ tou;~
palaiou;~ u{mnou~ ejpoivhse. Herodotus thinks that Pindar ojrqw`~ ... poih`sai novmon pavntwn basileva fhvsa~
ei\nai.
37
Theognis 1.713 may come closest to making this sense of the verb: yeudeva me;n poivoi~ ejtuvmoisin o{moia
– this seems to be a direct reference to the line at Hesiod’s Theog.27, to which it is identical except that the
Hesiodic verb is levgein. The closest Homeric examples are Od.14.393, where someone wants to make a
rJhvtra, and Od.21.71, where someone would be unable to make, poihvsasqai, any other ejpiscesivhn muvqou.
See especially Braun (1938), passim.
36
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would expect it to be applied to Sappho and Alcaeus but not, for instance, Aeschylus.
Instead, what we find is a great variety of terms for the product of poievw but little explicit
interest in how the distinctions are made.
Homer and Aristeas are described as makers of e[pea, for example (Aristeas in the
passage above, Homer at 4.32), but so are Croesus and Xerxes: at 1.90.1, Cyrus approves
Croesus’ ability to speak well and wisely with e[pea poiei`n, and Xerxes’ dream at 7.14
reprimands him for not reporting its words – ta; ejma; e[pea poihsamevno~ – in his speech to
the Persians. To poiei`n an e[po~, then, is not restricted to composing epic, or even to
composing poetry at all, but does suggest authoritative language, although that authority
may stem from different sources: Aristeas’ comes from the fact that he is, like Herodotus,
reporting his own experiences, while Xerxes’ dream carries the weight of all divine
communications in Herodotus.
Herodotus’ use of compounds of the two words, however, suggests a more precise
category. Homer is identified as an epopoiov~ at 7.161, and his product named an
ejpopoiivh at 2.116. Herodotus gives us an interesting detail of Homer’s work in that same
passage, where Herodotus asserts that Homer knew the tale of Helen’s sojourn in Egypt
but chose not to tell it because it was not as well suited to ejpopoiivh. This suggests that
ejpopoiivh is a particular type of poivhsi~, and further that the differentiation Herodotus
makes is based on its content; certain types of narrative details fit an ejpopoiivh, while
others do not. However, the activity of the ejpopoiov~ again shares some aspects with that
of Herodotus himself: he does his research, like Herodotus, but then – unlike Herodotus –
selects out the version that is most suited to ejpopoiivh.
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The other terms for the product of poievw are numerous, but infrequent enough
that drawing conclusions about what distinguishes them is difficult. Both Sappho and
Alcaeus produce a mevlo~, for instance, and in both cases the content is of a personal
nature. No further details are given that would allow us to conjecture if it is labeled a
mevlo~ because of its content or due to some other reason that Herodotus thought too
obvious to mention. The term that will eventually become a catch-all for poetry in
general, poivhsi~, is, in Herodotus, still very broad in its significance, so that it can be
applied to Homer’s literary production at 2.23 but to wine and incense at 3.22; while we
see an assumption of categories marking off different kinds of poetry, then, the only
suggestion that these kinds can be grouped together in any cohesive way comes with the
term poihthv~. That is, Herodotus sees a coherence in the way that poets go about creating
their various products, but shows no impulse to group those products into a whole across
specific types; the differences between the distinct genres of poetry – the dithyramb, the
paian, and so forth – outweigh their incidental similarities, although their makers are seen
as of a kind.
There is one term, however, that suggests Herodotus was drawing distinctions of
literary type based firmly on form rather than content, at least in one case. This is
logopoiov~, a compound with obvious parallels to the ejpopoiov~ discussed above. Only
two figures are identified as logopoioiv, Aesop and Hecataeus, and the only thing their
productions could possibly have in common is their form, namely its lack of meter.38 The
resonance of the term is not well understood, and scholars have hypothesized various
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Aesop at 2.134, Hecataeus at 2.143, 5.36 and 5.125-6.
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nuances.39 What we can conclude, however, is that here at least Herodotus must be
conceiving of a broad category of literature, like that of Aesop and Hecataeus, that is
united only by its lack of meter. What should be its opposite, however – namely, metered
language – is rarely presented as a unified body of literary productions in the same way;
that is, poetry as a whole becomes a meaningful unified category only when it is the
negative of prose.40
Interestingly, the formal feature that we assume is poetry’s most defining and
obvious characteristic – its meter – comes into play in Herodotus only in relation to
oracles and inscriptions.41 It is difficult, therefore, to conclude that Herodotus’ definition
of poetry would resemble Gorgias’.42 Indeed, his references to the meters of oracles and
inscriptions seem to be related more to establishing Herodotus’ authority as actual
eyewitness to the verses in question. While exact recitation of inscriptions may not have
had implications beyond bolstering Herodotus’ authority and indulging the curiosity of
his audience, the situation with the oracles was different. As Ford observes, it was
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Murray (2007a) 24-5, for instance, surmises that Herodotus would have referred to himself as a
logopoiov~, and understands the term to essentially mean a compiler of stories. Other scholars, on the other
hand, find a dismissive or derogatory sense in the word; thus Thomas (2002) 163 asserts that Herodotus
conceives of a logopoiov~ as someone who failed to make use of iJstoriva and was therefore less reliable
than Herodotus himself.
40
Equally interesting is the implication here that categories of prose literature have not yet been
distinguished from each other, which will be more clearly seen in Thucydides below.
41
Of the oracles that are reported, most are cited in meter, and for several Herodotus specifically names the
meter before providing an exact quotation: 1.47 and 1.62 are described as ejn eJxamevtrw/ tovnw/, while 7.220
is ejn e[pesi eJxamevtroisi and 1.174 is ejn trimevtrw/ tovnw/. 5.60 and 61 present Cadmean inscriptions on
tripods, and Herodotus again identifies them as ejn eJxamevtrw/ [tovnw/] and says that he himself saw them. See
also West (1994) 243.
42
pace Ford (2002) esp. 135 and 150, who conjectures that Herodotus’ idea of poetry was very much like
Gorgias’, and based on putting a lovgo~ into meter.
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essential to preserve the precise wording of oracles, as their meaning was dependent on
interpretation; changing the words could significantly alter their meaning.43
In fact, Herodotus only quotes poetry in meter once, at 2.116, where he is arguing
that Homer knew more versions of his story than he presented in the Iliad. Elsewhere, all
poetry is paraphrased, even to the extent that his reference to the line of Pindar at 3.38
preserves every word of the quotation in the same order that Pindar had, but has lost
meter by being put into indirect speech.44 This suggests that Herodotus felt no
compunction about separating the content of poetry from its meter, and therefore that
meter was not a feature that, in any essential way, defined poetry – at least, not until a
category of unmetered literature identified (lack of) meter as a distinguishing
characteristic; again, for Herodotus, poetry became a unified category in reaction to
prose.
Herodotus’ interest in literary categorization is apparent, but much more
complicated than Gorgias’ – so complicated, in fact, that he had to be quite innovative in
his terminology; the POI- compounds he uses, for instance, both those describing literary
productions and others addressing productions in the physical world, are unattested
before the Histories but allow him to distinguish categories of agency and product.45 His
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Ford (2002) 82, following Most. Perhaps some of the authority of the poets is related to this, as meter
implied that preserving the exact words as the poet had them was significant, but this can only be
speculation.
44
Interestingly, Plato cites the same line, but retains meter.
45
See e.g. Braun (1938) 280, 287; Ford (2002) 133-34, 139. The fact that several of these terms, along with
non-literary compounds discussed below and other similar compounds that do not show up in Herodotus,
do become relatively common in Athenian literature shortly after Herodotus suggests that they belonged to
a tradition for which evidence is lost rather than that the linguistic innovations of the Histories had such a
strong and immediate impact. Euripides in particular adopts several of the terms; it is worth asking, given
the general complaints against his plain and lowly language, if this is an example of a poet borrowing from
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only clear references to form have to do with oracles, inscriptions and prose, however,
while his categories of poetry are consistently related to content;46 nonetheless, he treats
all sources with the same hand, granting no more authority to poetry than to any other
available source. He clearly recognizes distinct types of poetry but is seemingly
uninterested in, or perhaps unconscious of, an overarching category of poetry into which
all those types fit – although he does group the creators of those forms into the broad
category of ‘poet’.
It seems, then, that Herodotus had a clear conception of different genres of poetry,
but little interest in grouping the different genres into a cohesive unit under the aegis of
‘metrical literature’. A sign of the relative newness of prose may be evident in
Herodotus’ ease of categorizing it according to its form: the different kinds of song were
prescribed to varying degrees, making their formal features seem almost intrinsic to them,
and making them seem very different from each other. The newer prose literatures,
however, were not yet bounded by any traditions. This freedom and flexibility, in fact,
may be part of why Herodotus relies on many of the structuring features of the poetic

a non-poetic tradition. logopoiov~ appears several times in Plato; Euripides Troiades 853 and Xenophon
Hier.1.29 use teknopoiov~; Euripides has mousopoiov~ at Hipp. 1428 and Troiades 1189; sitopoiov~ is
picked up by Euripides as well as Thucydides, Plato and Xenophon, among others; Euripides also adopts
paidopoiov~ at Rhesus 980 and Phoin. 338b, as well as in several other authors, with the verbal form being
more common than the nominal; ajgalmatopoiov~ appears in Plato at Prot. 311c and later in Aristotle. The
epopoi- compounds are the most common.
46
Context is another very plausible category by which Herodotus is grouping poetry, but he makes no
explicit mention of it; the only times he comes close to discussing context is in the song passages.
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tradition in shaping his Histories: the poetic tradition provided narrative frames that the
prose tradition had not yet had time to create.47
Thus Herodotus, like Gorgias, is again blending what he sees as different
traditions, but his do not break down so neatly into poetry versus prose; instead,
Herodotus envisions a multiplicity of poetic traditions which are only beginning to be
conceived of as a single group. His identification of a separate category unified by its
lack of meter assists this coherence, allowing the various traditions of song to be grouped
by their form against the equally broad, and still undifferentiated, categorization of prose.
He does not subject his poetic sources to particular scrutiny or grant them special status;
in fact, his few judgments of his sources are based on how well they accomplished their
purpose.48

***

Thucydides, perhaps unsurprisingly, has much more in common with Herodotus
than with Gorgias. In fact, his position is almost antithetical to Gorgias’; while Gorgias
was at pains to show that artless language was impossible, Thucydides is concerned with
keeping his language free from ornaments that will delight his audience – ornaments he is
never explicit about, but that are very likely quite similar to the ones Gorgias
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The Histories’ relationship with its poetic antecedents is rich and has been well studied; for its
connections to tragedy, see especially Ostwald (1992). For its connections to epic, see e.g. Rosenmeyer
(1982), Thomas (2002), and Nagy (1987), among many others.
48
A connection between judgments and a work’s intended purpose may also help explain his detailed
description of his own work in his prologue.
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appropriated so gleefully from the poetic tradition. Nor does he mark off his categories
exactly as Herodotus does, however; where Herodotus seems to have grouped literature
first by context and content and only secondarily by form, Thucydides finds a middle
ground between the formal but facetious distinction of Gorgias and the thematic
distinctions of Herodotus. He fixes on a third aspect, artfulness, and styles himself as
taking his stand against that.
Thucydides is far less forthcoming about his sources than Herodotus is, poetic and
prose alike; Homer is the only source he names, in fact, although he refers to generic
poihtaiv numerous times and to logografoiv once.49 The creation of the poihthv~ is only
once called a poivhsi~, and poivhsi~ is elsewhere used of building (3.2.2); as in Herodotus,
the term for the maker seems to have become tied to literary production before that of the
product. The poihthv~ in Thucydides is very often a mouthpiece for general knowledge,
too, as he was in Herodotus, although little attention is paid in either author to the form in
which that knowledge was disseminated.
At 1.5.2, for instance, the facts Thucydides has laid out – that pirates were not
always disparaged – are clear (dhvlousi) because of a combination of analogous
contemporary evidence and the questions asked by the ancient poets (oiJ palaioi; tw`n
poihtw`n). 1.11.2, similarly, explains how the Trojan expedition was weaker than both its
fhvmh and the lovgo~ told by the poets. Several other places do reference particular details
presumably gleaned from a general body of unattributed poetry: 1.13.5 has the wealth of

Hesiod oJ poihthv~ is named at 3.96, but only in the context of identifying a place as the alleged location
of his death. The term aoidov~ appears twice, both times in quotations of Homer at 3.104, never in
Thucydides’ own language.
49
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Corinth made clear (dedhvlwtai) by the ancient poets, who named it wealthy (ajfneio;n
ga;r ejpwnovmasan); 2.29.3 has the nightingale named the Daulian bird by many of the
poets (polloi`~ de; kai; tw`n poihtw`n ejn ajhdovno~ mnhvmh Daulia;~ hJ o[rni~ ejpwnovmastai);
and in 6.2.1 Thucydides confesses that he can neither name the race nor the origin of the
Cyclopes or the Lastrygonians, but asks the reader to let suffice what is said by the poets
and what each man knows about these races (wJ~ poihtai`~ te ei[rhtai kai; wJ~ e{kasto~ ph/
gignwvskei peri; aujtw`n).
In all these cases, Thucydides has the poihtaiv standing in as almost parallel to ta;
legomevna, the received tradition, perhaps beyond the scope of verification because of its
age (as he observes at one point), but generally assumed to be more or less true. The
grammatical constructions of these passages reinforce this: almost all of them make use
of impersonal verbs with a dative of agent – a normal construction, but one that
emphasizes the absence of real accountability; what the poets hand down, these passages
imply, is closer to general wisdom than specific knowledge.50
The situation is, however, slightly different when Thucydides deals with Homer.
Homer, unlike his unnamed counterparts, is regularly the active subject of indicative
verbs, and is interrogated in a way that the general poihtaiv are not: at 1.3.3, Homer is
presented as the best proof (tekmhrioi` de; mavlista {Omhro~) of the fact that the Greeks
only recently identified themselves as a unified group, since even long after the Trojan
War he never named them as a whole (wjnovmasen again). At 1.9.4, too, Homer has made
clear (dedhvlwken) that Agamemnon’s contingent was the strongest – although here
50

See also the Marchant and Morris commentaries ad loc. On the significance of the use of the passive
voice for making claims, especially with regard to the archaeology, see Crane (1996) 32ff.
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Thucydides expresses some doubts, qualifying his statement: if Homer is enough for
anyone to prove this positively (ei[ tw/ iJkano;~ tekmhriw`sai).51
A slightly longer passage at 3.104 gives more information: to demonstrate that
Delos was once the site of a major Ionian festival, Thucydides again turns to Homer. This
passage contains a number of marked terms, and so deserves here quotation in full:
dhloi` de; mavlista {Omhro~ o{ti toiau`ta h\n ejn toi`~ e[pesi toi`sde, a{ ejstin
ejk prooimivou jApovllwno~: [citation]. o{ti de; kai; mousikh`~ ajgw;n h\n kai;
ajgwniouvmenoi ejfoivtwn ejn toi`sde au\ dhloi`, a{ ejstin ejk tou` aujtou`
proiomivou: to;n ga;r Dhliako;n coro;n tw`n gunaikw`n uJmnhvsa~ ejteleuvta
tou` ejpaivnou ej~ tavde ta; e[ph, ejn oi|~ kai; eJautou` ejpemnhvsqh: [citation].
tosau`ta me;n {Omhro~ ejtekmhrivwsen o{ti h\n kai; to; pavlai megavlh
xuvnodo~ kai; eJorth; ejn th/` Dhvlw/.
(Homer particularly has made these things clear in these e[ph, which come
from the prooimivon of Apollo: [citation]. That there was also a musical
contest and that the Ionians went to them as contenders is again clear from
these lines, which are from the same prooimivon, for having hymned the
chorus of Delian women he finished up his ejpaivno~ in these e[ph, in which
he even remembered himself: [citation]. Homer has provided this evidence
that there was in ancient times too a great assembly and festival in Delos,
3.104.4-6.)
All of this vocabulary of poetics corresponds perfectly with our idea of Homer’s
activities, so it is perhaps not surprising to find that this passage receives little attention in
the scholarship.52 However, it is worth reflecting on the vocabulary here in order to
compare the appearances of these terms elsewhere in the text of Thucydides. prooimivon
is an easy starting point, as this is the only passage in the text that uses it; it seems to refer
to the hymn as a whole, and there is an assumption behind it of a genre more or less well
51

The Marchant and Morris commentaries both suggest that Thucydides’ reservations apply only to
specific details, not to the general idea. In other words, Homer is an essential source as he is likely the only
source available to Thucydides, but Thucydides is aware that he must be used with care.
52
Allison (1997) 190, for instance, simply states that ejpimimnhvsesqai clearly has to do with words, and
most scholars spend little or no time on this passage.
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defined. The other terms, fortunately, prove more fruitful. The passage ends by
identifying Homer’s activity as hyming and naming Homer’s work an ejpaivno~, which he
brings to a close in more e[ph – which even include a remembrance of himself.53
The impact of e[po~ here seems fairly clear: it seems to refer to the individual lines
of verse – what we mean, for instance, when we say someone has quoted a line of verse:
a small, usually metrical excerpt of a longer whole. Thus Thucydides introduces both of
his quotations with the term, signaling that he is about to provide some lines of Homer.
The other uses of the term, though, provide more insight into its significance. Instances of
e[po~ are relatively rare in the Peloponnesian Wars; it appears only seven times in the
work, three of which attach to Homer, with two of those coming from this passage.
Nonetheless, from the several instances, we can begin to conjecture about the nuance of
the term in Thucydides.
One instance of the word that has no connection with Homer still suggests a very
similar meaning: it involves an ancient line of verse, cited at 2.54.2.54 In the midst of the
plague, Thucydides tells us, some Athenians called to mind an e[po~ which the elders said
had been sung long ago (ajnemnhvsqhsan kai; tou`de tou` e[pou~, favskonte~ oiJ
presbuvteroi pavlai a{/desqai).55 Thucydides then tells us that the line itself, given in
hexameter, apparently gave rise to a dispute about whether it was actually plague
(loimov~) rather than famine (limov~) that was named in the verse (wjnomavsqai ejn tw`/ e[pei).
This passage, then, aligns quite nicely with the usage above, where e[po~ means a line of
53

The significance of hymns and hymning will be taken up in greater detail below.
The source of this quotation is unknown, but Fontenrose (1981) 246 does consider it an oracle.
55
The detail that the line was sung, a{/desqai, explains the manipulation the e[po~ here; it is separated off
from ordinary language.
54
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metrical verse, although it is less certain whether this line belongs to a longer whole or is
complete on its own.
The remaining two instances of the term complicate the matter significantly.
Pericles uses the word at 2.41.4, pointing out that the marvels of Athens are so
remarkable that they have no need of someone like Homer to praise them, or anyone else
who might give delight in the immediate moment with his e[po~, as the truth will dispel
any uncertainty about the actual facts (oujde;n prosdeovmenoi ou[te JOmhrvou ou[te o{sti~
e[pesi me;n to; aujtivka tevryei, tw`n d j e[rgwn th;n uJpovnoian hJ ajlhvqeia blavyei). Marchant,
in his commentary, suggests that we supply poihthv~ to that o{sti~; it is a simple enough
solution, and plausible, and has been accepted by others.56 The contrast, however, seems
broader than limiting that o{sti~ to a poihthv~ would suggest: it is not simply that poetic
praise is superfluous for Athens, but actually that lovgo~ in itself falls short of the great
e[rga of the city.57 Any lovgo~ of praise would be insufficient, as Pericles makes clear at
several places in his speech.58 The o{sti~ here, then, should be granted its full breadth and
not limited to a poihthv~, as Thucydides does not see embellished language as restricted to
poets at all. This usage of e[po~, then, takes a broader meaning of the term, to mean not
metrical verses but decorated words.59
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e.g. Ford (2002) 72, although he changes his translation at 130 to ‘eulogist’ rather than ‘poet’.
The lovgo~-e[rgon distinction in Thucydides in general, and in this passage in particular, is familiar from a
number of scholars; see e.g. Hunter (1973) 178, who points to de Romilly passim.
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e.g. at the opening of the speech, 1.35.
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Of course, this is a perfectly acceptable usage, found frequently in Homer and Herodotus as well, and
there is no reason that Thucydides could not use the specific, metrical meaning in one place and the more
general meaning in another – as indeed Herodotus does as well.
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The final instance of the term is at 3.67.6. The Thebans have been making their
appeal to the Spartans regarding the fate of the Plataeans. At the close of their speech,
they encourage the Spartans to do what is just, and not be swayed by words:
mh; toi`~ tw`nde lovgoi`~ periwsqe`men ejn uJmi`n, poihvsate de; toi`~ {Ellhsi
paravdeigma ouj lovgwn tou;~ ajgw`na~ proqhvsonte~ ajll j e[rgwn, w|n ajgaqw`n
me;n o[ntwn bracei`a hJ ajpaggeliva ajrkei`, aJmartanomevnwn de; lovgoi e[pesi
kosmhqevnte~ prokaluvmmata givgnontai.
(Do not let us lose our place in your favor, but make for the Hellenes an
example, setting up contests not of words but of actions; brief reports are
sufficient for noble actions, but descriptions of miscarried actions
decorated with e[pesi become obscure.)
In this instance, e[po~ almost certainly does not refer to verse of any kind, but rather to
decorative, perhaps even deceptive, language. Marchant’s commentary notes that e[pesi
here should be understand as ‘fine phrases’, and offers the synonym rJhvmasi. Smith, too,
translates it as ‘speeches adorned with fine sentiments’.60 Much of this work is done by
the participle kosmhqevnte~, ‘decorated’, but it is clear that the noun itself allows for the
broader significance.61
Two passages from other authors offer useful comparanda. Euripides’ Medea,
first produced in 431 – the year of Pericles’ oration in Thucydides – has the chorus
respond to Jason’s self-justification that he has decorated his words well, but is
nonetheless acting unjustly: jIa`son, eu` me;n touvsd j ejkovsmhsa~ lovgou~: o{mw~ d j e[moige,
keij para; gnwvmh ejrw`, dokei`~ prodou;~ sh;n a[locon ouj divkaia dra`n (576-8). The
60

Smith (1894) ad loc.
Elsewhere, to kosmei`n language is the work of poets: at 1.10.3, for example, Homer ejpi; to; meivzon
kosmh`sai the story of Agamemnon’s army, exaggerating its size because of being a poet. At 1.21.1,
similarly, Thucydides asserts that anyone would do well to trust the evidence he has brought to bear rather
than what the poets hymn, since they ejpi; to; meivzon kosmou`nte~.
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implication is that Jason has distorted reality by embellishing his words. Socrates, at
Apology 17c, makes a similar claim regarding his opponents: unlike them, Socrates will
speak only the truth, although his lovgou~ will not be rJhvmasiv te kai; ojnovmasin oujde;
kekosmhmevnou~ – “finely tricked out with words and phrases”, as Fowler’s translation
has it.
In the Thucydides passage, then, as in the lines from Euripides and Plato, the
neutral character of lovgo~ can be changed by embellishment with rJhvmasi or e[pesi. There
are several ways to make this move, of which meter is perhaps the most obvious, but the
distinction has more to do with general artifice than with meter in particular; an e[po~ is a
crafted lovgo~. This reads back easily onto the example at 2.41, too, so that the o{sti~ who
would momentarily delight his audience does it not necessarily with verse, but with fine
sentiments or phrases – with language more artful than casual and straightforward
speech, whatever the metrical situation. Moreover, there is no inherent contradiction in
applying this conception to the Homeric or oracular examples either; meter is certainly
part of their decoration, but we know well that Homeric performances involved other
details of spectacle as well, and the oracular passage is not just in hexameters but
specifically said to have been sung or chanted, marking it as equally subject to a special
or particular kind of delivery. Thus e[po~ is the specialized, marked term against the much
more common and neutral lovgo~, setting up a distinction not between verse and prose,
but between artful language and plain words.62

Thus more or less Smith (1894), whose commentary on 3.104 says that Thucydides uses ta; e[ph only of
verses or poetic expressions which he implies may or may not be in meter. Several other passages provide
further evidence of the neutrality of lovgo~. At 3.83.3, for instance, in the discussion of the stasis in
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Another passage with slightly different vocabulary lends credence to the idea that
Thucydides thought of lovgo~ as something whose essence could be changed – generally
for the worse – by manipulation. Athenagoras, attempting to calm the Syracusans down
after Hermocrates has warned them of impending war with Athens, denounces
Hermocrates and others like him as, essentially, rumor-mongers, warning that they
fabricate stories that reflect neither current nor future reality (ou[te o[nta ou[te a]n
genovmena logopoiou`sin, 6.38.1).63 The logopoievw here is a rare instance in Thucydides
of a POI- compound referring to language, and, as discussed above,64 such compounds
are, even in the late fifth century, new and uncommon enough that their precise resonance
can be difficult to determine.
The passage that offers the best comparandum is 1.21.1, where he compares the
reliability of his information to that of the information one might find in poets and
logographers:
ejk de; tw`n eijrhmevnwn tekmhrivwn o{mw~ toiau`ta a[n ti~ nomivzwn mavlista a{
dih`lqon oujc aJmartavnoi, kai; ou[te wJ~ poihtai; uJmnhvkasi peri; aujtw`n ejpi;
to; mei`zon kosmou`nte~ ma`llon pisteuvwn, ou[te wJ~ logogravfoi
xunevqesan ejpi; to; prosagwgovteron th`/ ajkroavsei h] ajlhqevsteron, o[nta
ajnexevlegkta kai; ta; polla; uJpo; crovnou aujtw`n ajpivstw~ ejpi; to; muqw`de~

Corcyra, Thucydides describes the fear of the common men lest they come off the worse in their
arguments, and become the victims of plots because of the versatility of their enemies (mh; lovgoi~ te
h{ssou~ w\si kai; ejk tou` polutrovtou aujtw`n th`~ gnwvmh~ fqavswsi proepibouleuovmenoi). As Marchant
notes in his commentary, poluvtropo~ here recalls Odysseus, suggesting that the concern is based on the
enemies’ command of persuasive language against the simplicity of the faulovteroi.
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ejknenikhkovta, huJrh`sqai de; hJghsavmeno~ ejk tw`n ejpifanestavtwn
shmeivwn wJ~ palaia; ei\nai ajpocrwvntw~.
(From the evidence expounded one would not be far off the mark
believing the sorts of things I have explained, rather than trusting in how
the poets have hymned about these things, embellishing them to be greater
than they were, or how the logographers have put them together to be
more pleasing to the audience than truthful, since their subject matter
cannot be investigated and since most of it, because of the passage of time,
has won its way into legend; but guiding himself from these clearest
proofs he will discover enough about how things were in ancient times.)
Thucydides distinguishes his work from the work of poets and logographers not by its
style or methodology, but by how its goals can be expected to shape it: poets are
interested in praising their subjects, which often leads to the need to exaggerate, and
logographers are interested in catching and keeping the audience’s ear, which calls for a
different kind of embellishment.65 Thucydides, on the other hand, aims to provide a
reasonable approximation, in words, of events as they actually were, with as little bias as
possible.66 What he has done, then, is draw a line between his own work and any work of
embellished lovgo~, regardless of its form: his is reliable, theirs is not, and the different
forms that their works take is incidental to this more important distinction.
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See also Allison (1997) 246, who observes that Thucydides’ emphasis on the contrast of reliability rather
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not explicitly declare himself free of it.
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The significance of the nominal compound at first seems similar to that found in
Herodotus, where the logopoiov~ was simply a producer of literature whose work was
distinguished by not being metered. The verbal form, however, and a comparison with a
similar compound, complicate the matter. The only other POI- compound in the work is
the sitopoiov~; he turns grain into bread, forcing a significant change on the original
material. 67 While pushing too strong an analogy would be unwise with so little evidence,
it is possible that, with the unusual compound, Thucydides meant to suggest that these
logopoioiv and the ones who logopoivousin were doing something similar to what bakers
do: changing the object of their activity of making into something different. Starting with
a lovgo~ that reflects things as they are or will be, these men altered the narrative so that it
did not reflect any present or future reality; in short, they embellished their lovgo~ into
something more akin to an e[po~.
It is important to note, however, that there are several ways of embellishing a
lovgo~ into an e[po~; meter, as mentioned above, is the most obvious method, for instance,
but hardly the only one. The problem, however, is not necessarily the embellishment
itself, but its context.68 Thucydides several times questions the advisability of accepting
Homer’s details as reflecting the reality of a given event or situation, for instance, but
nowhere accuses him of willful deception or even of doing anything a poet should not
do.69 Exaggeration, he seems to suggest, is proper to poetry, while absolute adherence to
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investigated reality is not required of it; one may thus find some worth in it as a source of
evidence, but must be a careful judge.70
This transformation is not automatically negative, however. Several statements
suggest disdain for the work of poets and logographers, especially in respect to the
‘shallow’ pleasure they provide, but 1.21, for instance, does not carry any strongly
negative judgment; the main problem with the works of the poets and logographers there
is that their information cannot be tested because of the passage of time. The linguistic
tricks they use to accomplish their goals are appropriate for their particular productions,
but those same tricks become dangerous in the wrong context. That is precisely the
problem that the Thebans have in the speech cited above: the Plataeans might use
embellished language at a time when it is not appropriate, when the Spartans are
expecting, rather, artless truth, and thus their e[pea will be understood as lovgoi.71
This is similar to what is at stake in what may be Thucydides’ most famous line,
1.22.4, where he declares his work to be a kth`mav te ej~ aijei; ma`llon h] ajgwvnisma ej~ to;
paracrh`ma ajkouvein xuvgkeitai – a possession for the ages rather than a contest piece
aimed at the immediate audience. Unlike the works of the poets and logographers whose
productions cross too far into the world of to; muqw`de~, Thucydides explicitly declares
that his own work will consist of to; mh; muqw`de~, and claims that, while that may make it
the less delightful (ajterpevsteron),72 it will also make it useful.73 Thucydides’ own text
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Of course, this is tempered by the fact that, for ancient history at least, the poets were likely his only
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One proper context for embellished lovgoi, of course, is a public festival, precisely what Thucydides says
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will be unembellished, as is proper, in his estimation, for a story that is supposed to grant
access to the truth of the situation it purports to report.74
Thucydides’ creation of speeches throughout his history presents an interesting
problem: he himself admits that he has crafted them to reflect what the occasion
demanded (1.22.1), and of course they show a great deal of the very artifices that he is
elsewhere at pains to denounce. Several speakers within the work, however, echo
Thucydides’ own disdain for spectacular language. Thus Cleon, for instance, in his
speech against the reconsideration of the decision regarding the Mitylenians (3.36ff,
especially 3.38.4-7), chastises the Athenians again and again for the pleasure they take in
clever language, finally calling them spectators of words and auditors of action (oi{tine~
eijwvqate qeatai; me;n tw`n lovgw`n givgnesqai, ajkroatai; de; tw`n e[rgwn, 3.38.4) and even
slaves of extraordinary language (dou`loi o[nte~ tw`n aijei; ajtovpwn, 3.38.5). Cleon thus
echoes Thucydides’ own concerns about decorated language.75
The implied embellishment of lovgo~ that, I suggest, is inherent in e[po~ also offers
a model for understanding Thucydides’ regular pairing of poetry and general knowledge
discussed above. It is not surprising, given the avoidance of supernatural powers in the
text, that Thucydides does not seem to attribute any special knowledge, or special access
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to knowledge, to the poets. In fact, he envisions their productions almost as conveniently
memorizable and easily accessible repositories of general human wisdom and stories,
likely to have exaggerated common knowledge to a greater or lesser degree, but not
otherwise particularly remarkable. Poetry is, in other words, an embellished version of
what most people are likely to know, as e[po~ is an embellished lovgo~ – and moreover
one that is distinguished more by this detail than by the particular method its
embellishment takes.
Thucydides’ use of language that will, after him, become specifically tied to song
is similarly broad in its scope. He refers to people hymning three times (1.21, 2.42,
3.104), in rather different contexts. The passage at 1.21 (already discussed above, p.32)
has the poets hymning (uJmnhvkasi) about their subjects, although they are exaggerating
them beyond the realm of the believable (ejpi; to; mei`zon kosmou`nte~ ma`llon pisteuvwn).
Since the reliability of their versions are being compared, unfavorably, to Thucydides’
own, we can assume that there is at least some overlap in subject matter, and from the
participle kosmou`nte~ we know that the poets are engaged in organizing or ordering their
language in some way.76
Of course, the verb uJmnei`n is well attested in archaic Greek, and is particularly
common in opening formulae for the Homeric Hymns; in those instances, it is clearly
connected not only with song but specifically with praises of the gods.77 However, the
word actually shows a widening, rather than contracting, of meaning during the Classical
period: from being tied to songs sung in praise of gods, it becomes, by the later fifth
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See above on kosmevw in Thucydides.
e.g. Hesiod Theog. 33, Stesichorus fr.35, hH Hermes 1, among many others.
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century, an acceptable synonym for a song on almost any subject, and ultimately to praise
in any form, metrical or not.78 This newer, broader significance is likely the nuance of the
verb here: since Thucydides is comparing the poets’ work to his own, he is likely
referring to stories sung about the famous deeds of men rather than gods. Moreover, the
use of uJmnei`n at 3.104 is explicitly a song of praise directed to mortals, as the poet
finishes his praise by hymning the Delian chorus of women (to;n ga;r Dhliako;n coro;n
tw`n gunaikw`n uJmnhvsa~ ejteleuvta tou` ejpaivnou).
Both of these uses, however, still refer to musical and poetic productions,
regardless of their object. The third and final use of the term in Thucydides takes the even
broader, although not unprecedented, meaning of any kind of speech of praise. At 2.42.2,
Pericles says that he has praised the city for those things that the excellence of the dead
heroes actually accomplished (a{ ga;r th;n povlin u{mnhsa, aiJ tw`nde kai; tw`n toiw`nde
ajretai; ejkovsmhsan).79 Here Thucydides avails himself of the full breadth of the term; he
has allowed us to read what is, in effect, a u{mno~ in presenting Pericles’ funeral oration.
That Thucydides uses the term in its older sense of ‘praise song’ as well as its more
recent sense of ‘praise speech’ gives us some insight into his method of categorizing, in
this instance at least: a hymn is content – praise – rather than form.
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In fact, while literary categorization in Thucydides is admittedly less explicit than
in Gorgias or Herodotus, when he does draw lines they are consistently divorced from
form.80 Both e[po~ and the various cognates of u{mno~, for instance, are applied to both
metrical and non-metrical language, suggesting that the grouping has been made for a
different reason. For u{mno~, as we have seen, it seems to be based on content, while the
e[po~ describes neither content nor form but something else again, the result of tecnhv.
Thus Thucydides draws one boundary where Herodotus did, and distinguishes
literary categories based on content: for instance, a u{mno~ of any form, metered or not,
would be recognizable by its work of praising. The more significant distinction, however,
is more complicated. He grants a time and place for crafted language, such as the
festivals or (albeit somewhat dismissively) the agons, but implies that it is always more
removed from reality, so that its picture of reality is distorted. The ways of manipulating
language are manifold, including both the meter of poetry and the rhetorical devices of
oratory. Regardless of the method, the result is the same: the literary production’s
connection with reality has been compromised, and this, for Thucydides, is a category
that trumps any other.
The two formal categories of prose and poetry, then, for Thucydides, fail to
capture the breadth of possibility for literary productions. That is, while meter might have
marked off a recognizable set of literary productions, it was not different enough from the
linguistic ornaments of the orators to make the distinction particularly meaningful. He
needs, for his own work, a third category of language, one free of the beguiling
80
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ornaments of both poets and prose authors, and one which will, by its very artlessness,
grant more transparent access to the truth. Finally, he sees form as in the service of
function with regard to the categorization of literary productions.

***

We see in these three authors multiple ways of categorizing literature, as well as
multiple reasons for doing so. While form is consistently put forward, however, it is
finally a different set of related categories, articulated in several ways, that proves more
satisfying: content, context, and purpose. Thus Herodotus turns to form as a convenient
way to group Hecataeus and Aesop, but rarely presents the varieties of poetic form as
significantly more similar to each other than to prose – that is, dithyramb is as different
from epic as both are from prose. However, the undifferentiated set of prose, a set marked
off only by its form, offers Herodotus a model for another method of categorizing based
on form, which he appeals to intermittently. Herodotus’ first inclination, then, is to rely
on the essentially contextual distinctions that were inherent to the poetic tradition but
temper them with new possibilities suggested by the more recent prose tradition, just as
he combined poetic and prose traditions in structuring his work.
A reliance on similar methods of literary categorization is also apparent in
Thucydides. He expresses concern in a number of places over the importance of
restricting particular forms of linguistic artfulness to appropriate contexts. Poets are
criticized for being unreliable, for instance, but not for being artful, since manipulated
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language was proper to them and to their contests. The problem, he says, is that artfulness
can be used where it is not expected or not suited, creating a disconnect between speaker
intentions and audience expectations – a disconnect that often results in deceit, as
artfulness can compromise the transparent transfer of truth.
Gorgias is focused rather in another direction, as he is interested in showing the
arbitrary and basically meaningless nature of literary categories. He acknowledges poetry
as a specific kind of formally-marked language, but gives it no unique status: what power
it has is primarily due not to its meter but to it essential component, language. Gorgias
also, unusually, implies a separation of that language component of poetry from its
musical components; this will be seen increasingly commonly, but his is one of the
earliest such gestures.81
In contrast, both Herodotus and Thucydides consistently assume that music is
always implicated in poetry to a greater or lesser degree. We saw, however, that
Herodotus regularly used one family of words when he wanted to emphasize the musicoperformative aspect of music and another when he wanted to emphasize its language
content. This distinction is not preserved in later authors, although the impulse is
reflected in subsequent separations of poetry from music.82
Finally, then, while these authors are beginning to experiment with formal
distinctions in response to the analogous set of non-metrical productions, they are by and
large still engaged in the archaic tradition of distinguishing and judging literary
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productions on the basis of content, context, and function. Moreover, even as poetry
becomes more of a unified concept across genres, prose begins to be broken down into
categories of its own; thus Herodotus sees no reason to set Aesop and Hecataeus apart
from each other, but Thucydides is resistant to being classed with authors who are, to his
mind, inferior, simply on the basis of their shared lack of meter. Gorgias is a rather
different case, but by the fact that he was playing with his audience’s expectations, we
can hypothesize that he would have found categories of content, context and function
familiar and unproblematic.
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Chapter Two: Defining Poetry in the Fourth Century:
Isocrates and Plato

The previous chapter examined the ways that three fifth century authors
categorized poetry. The current chapter extends the discussion into the fourth century
with the same methodology and goals. Although there is a larger body of extant prose
literature from this period, there is, paradoxically, less attention given in most authors to
questions of literary categorization; for the most part, for instance, the Attic orators
express little explicit interest in comparing or contrasting their works with those of their
predecessors or contemporaries, but instead seem to assume a defined niche into which
their productions will fit.83 The work of this chapter supports the idea proposed by a
number of scholars that literary categories, which had been quite flexible in the previous
periods, began to be more narrowly marked off from each other in the fourth century.84
The change was not, however, quick or straightforward, as the works under
investigation here make clear. While Too is correct in noting that most fifth and fourth
century authors did not typically formalize literature into “systems of genres,” she
overstates the case by suggesting that they even played down the distinction between
poetry and prose.85 Instead, what we find is not an elision of distinction, but the creation
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of one: what was to Herodotus a vague and unspecific difference seems, to Isocrates,
more natural, if also not inflexible.
One of the places where development is clearest is in linguistic innovations; while
fourth century authors continue to use many of the same terms as earlier authors, there
are three significant changes. One is that a whole category of terms, those cognate with
ajoidov~ and designating especially performative song, largely fall out of use with minor
exceptions. There is, however, expansion in a new direction: while the POI- compounds
that were so creatively used in the fifth century continue to be employed, we also find in
this period the first consistent uses of the adjective poihtikov~ and its adverbial relative
clearly building on the established literary meanings so prevalent in the family of words.
Moreover, two adverbs, katalogavdhn and cuvdhn, appear for the first time in this period
in Isocrates and Plato. These changes suggest dissatisfaction with the available
vocabulary for describing literature, and thus continue the semantic negotiations begun in
the previous century; if the terminology were to hand, they would not have needed to
appeal to new words.
Isocrates is unique among the orators for his persistent interest not only in literary
categories in general, but specifically in the category of poetry, and his considerations of
the subject show more subtlety of thinking than tradition tends to credit him with. In
Plato, on the other hand, we see a desire to distinguish his own projects from those of
others, but a great instability in the ways he attempted to do it. Ultimately, the two
authors complement each other in interesting ways, and together they provide us with a
picture of the ways that poetry was being considered by the thinkers of the age.
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***

Isocrates stands with Plato as a representative of some of the most important
developments of his age in philosophy and rhetoric, although their ideals were often in
conflict.86 One of the most obvious differences between the philosophies of the two men
is their attitude towards mousikhv in general, and one key piece of it – poetry – in
particular.87 While Plato competed with the poets and their productions in many different
ways on many different occasions, Isocrates generally viewed them as innocuous, and
moreover as an integral piece in achieving his goals.88
Isocrates shows more consistency in his literary categorization than the fifth
century authors, and a greater reliance on a simple dichotomy of two essential types of
literary performance, one metrical and one not. It will become clear, however, that the
dichotomy is still not entirely sufficient, and, as we saw in the previous chapter, other
means of categorizing and distinguishing types of literary productions remain quite
active, particularly distinctions based on content and function. With the exception of the
Evagoras, where he reframes his views somewhat in the interest of his larger rhetorical
purpose, Isocrates will be seen to be relatively clear and straightforward in his thinking
about the poetic.
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We begin, then, with a look at whom Isocrates identifies as poets. As in the
authors studied in the previous chapter, poets – poihtaiv – often line up with creators of
metrical song. At To Nicocles 43-4, for instance, he names Hesiod, Phocylides and
Theognis as poihtaiv whose maxims provide the best counsels for living well. At Helen
64, too, he identifies Stesichoros as a poihthv~, apparently for what we now know as his
Palinode to Helen. Passages such as these reinforce our assumption of the essential
similarity between the ancient poihthv~ and our modern idea of poet: an organizer of
metrical language, a creator of (as Auden had it) memorable speech.89 Several other
passages, however, serve to muddy the waters and nuance the distinction.
A passage of the Antidosis provides a useful starting point for the discussion of
the various complications of the idea of the poetic in Isocrates:

Prw`ton me;n ou|n ejkei`no dei` maqei`n uJma`~, o{ti trovpoi tw`n lovgwn eijsi;n
oujk ejlavttou~ h] tw`n meta; mevtrou poihmavtwn. oiJ me;n ga;r ta; gevnh ta; tw`n
hJmiqevwn ajnazhtou`nte~ to;n bivon to;n auJtw`n katevtriyan, oiJ de; peri; tou;~
poihta;~ ejfilosovfhsan, e{teroi de; ta;~ pravxei~ ta;~ ejn toi`~ polevmoi~
sunagagei`n ejboulhvqhsan, ajlloi dev tine~ peri; ta;~ ejrwthvsei~ kai; ta;~
ajpokrivsei~ gegovnasin, ou}~ antilogikou;~ kalou`sin. ei[h d j a]n ouj mikro;n
er[gon, eij pavsa~ ti~ ta;~ ideva~ ta;~ tw`n lovgwn ejxariqmei`n ejpiceirhvseien:
h|~ d j ou\n ejmoi; proshvkei, tauvth~ mnhsqei;~ ejavsw ta;~ a[lla~.
(First of all, you should know that the types of lovgo~ are no fewer than the
types of things made up with meter. For some men have given over their
lives to researching the genealogies of the demigods, while others have
philosophized about the poihtaiv, and others still have desired to put
together the events of wars, and some, who are called the disputatious,
concern themselves with questionings and responses. But it would be no
small task if one should try to count out all the types of lovgo~, so I will
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concern myself here only with that which pertains to me, ignoring the rest,
Ant. 45-6)
Isocrates is here doing what Herodotus did not, and what Thucydides seemed to want:
acknowledging a multiplicity of categories within the larger category of ‘un-metered,’
just as there is a multiplicity of categories within the larger category of ‘metered.’90 The
categories he indicates, moreover, are essentially based on content, although it is difficult
to tell how significant he envisioned the distinctions to be. However, the fact that he feels
the need to assert this and provide so many examples suggests that it might not have been
immediately obvious to his addressees, and thus that he needed to make his case.
On the other hand, the first division, a level above the distinctions within the
category of lovgo~, is made precisely on the basis of its lack of meter and, as a
consequence, metered language is naturally grouped against it. However, Isocrates goes
on to say that the best kind of lovgo~ – the one he will concern himself with, and of course
the one he himself practices – has a great deal in common with poihvmata meta; mevtrou,
immediately undercutting the bifurcated set of literary productions. The similarity has to
do in particular with audience reaction: people delight in hearing this type of lovgo~ no
less than they do things composed with meter (w|n a{pante~ me;n ajkouvonte~ caivrousin
oujde;n h\tton h] tw`n ejn toi`~ mevtroi~ pepoihmevnwn, Ant. 47). He is talking specifically
about a Panhellenic type of speech, and the source of the pleasure of this type of speech
seems to be precisely what they share with the poetic tradition. Isocrates describes the
types of speeches he has in mind as those
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ou}~ a{pante~ a]n fhvsaien oJmoiotevrou~ ei\nai toi`~ meta; mousikh`~ kai;
rJuqmw`n pepoihmevnoi~ h] toi`~ ejn dikasthrivw/ legomevnoi~.91 kai; ga;r th/`
levxei poihtikwtevra/92 kai; poikilwtevra/ ta;~ pravxei~ dhlou`si, kai; toi`~
ejnqumhvmasin ojgkwdestevroi~ kai; kainotevroi~ crh`sqai zhtou`sin, e[ti de;
tai`~ a[llai~ ijdevai~ ejpifanestevrai~ kai; pleivosin o{lon to;n lovgon
dioikou`sin.
(which all men agree are more like things made with music and rhythm
than those spoken in the law court. Indeed, they make the facts clear with
a more poetic and intricate style, and they try to make use of more
elevated and original thoughts, and, furthermore, they populate the entire
speech with other quite remarkable ornaments, Ant. 47.)
Within a single section of the speech, then, Isocrates has illustrated the
slipperiness of categorizing lovgo~: he begins by dividing lovgoi into the metrical and the
unmetered, dismissing the metered for the time being as irrelevant to his discussion.
However, when he attempts to make clear the ways in which the type of lovgo~ that he
himself practices is superior to the lesser productions of the Sophists, he can only revert
to the language of poetics. In other words, his categorization circles back on itself and
describes his literary productions in terms of what was originally set out as their opposite:
they are not poihvmata meta; mevtrou, but they are better than other types of speeches in
that they are poihtikwtevra.93 They are not poems themselves, but are superior to other
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It is interesting, especially in light of Gorgias’ definition of poetry, that Isocrates here includes music but
elides the non-linguistic features of poetry, although it is obvious that he is imagining language as a third
component. This is similar to definitions that will be put forward by Plato and Aristotle, as will be
discussed below. The components he identifies as poetic, too, are almost identical to the ones Aristotle
singles out in his discussions of style in the Poetics and Rhetoric.
92
One of the earliest uses of this adjective, which is found elsewhere in Isocrates only once, at Soph. 12,
where it seems to refer to all productive arts. Because of the dearth of evidence, there is little more we can
say on this term in Isocrates, but it will be put to fuller use in Plato.
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The fluid shifts between nominal and verbal terminology here are also interesting: the beginning of Ant.
45 identifies the metrical works as poihvmata, but Ant. 47 reverts to the less-specific participial usage –
rather than being poihvmata, the works in question are now pepoihmevna, and are explicitly contrasted not
with non-metrical lovgo~, but with the spoken word, the legomevnoi~. While the verbal uses of poievw are, as
always, too common to be taken as consistently significant to the question of literary categorization, several
occurrences elsewhere argue for a quite broad meaning of the idea of the lovgo~ pepoihmevno~.
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kinds of literary productions because of what they share with poetry.94
We have, then, in the case of literary types, an oscillation between a
straightforward dichotomy and a more nuanced set of possibilities. The creators of the
various types of lovgo~ are similarly fluid, as the poihthv~ can create more than poivhsi~,
and need not even rely on meter. The poihthv~ is at one point contrasted with the
logopoiov~ as someone who is capable of hymning (uJmnhvsonte~) worthy men (Antidosis
137), but elsewhere (to Philip 109) grouped with him as someone who has praised the
labors of Heracles while neglecting to praise his spirit, as Isocrates will. At to Philip 144
and Evagoras 40, similarly, the poihthv~ and the euJrhthv~ lovgwn are both engaged in
praising benefactors of Greece.
These examples show Isocrates distinguishing types of literary makers in several
ways. Content and function, interestingly, remain the primary lines by which categories
are drawn: what the creator will be praising, rather than how he will be praising it.95 Most
interesting, though, is the breadth he gives to poihthv~: Isocrates, like Herodotus and
Thucydides before him, seems generally to assume that the term is specific enough on its
own to need no objective genitive. Often, then, contrasting the poihthv~ with a literary
producer connected etymologically with lovgo~ (e.g. logopoiov~, euJrhthv~ lovgwn) implies
two complementary formal categories like poetry and prose, but that is not the end of the
story.
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Implicit in this judgment, of course, is a positive valuation of at least the poetic, if not of poetry per se.
Echoing older context-based generic delineations, although we will see formal ones moving in alongside
them.
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The phrase poihthv~ lovgwn, for instance – an innovation of the period, whether or
not specifically of Isocrates himself – complicates the picture.96 Isocrates twice describes
a poihthv~ with the genitive lovgwn (Against the Sophists 15, Antidosis 192), thus
disregarding the generic distinctions he seemed to be drawing above. Both times, he is
discussing the limitations of training, and the fact that a man with no natural abilities for
the work will never become a great speaker, however extensive his education.97 The use
in the Antidosis seems to take advantage of its ambiguity, as the poihthv~ lovgwn in that
instance may, through training, become more pleasing (carievstero~), a trait associated
with poets; Isocrates regularly acknowledges the pleasure of poetry and may here be
using poihthv~ in a kind of wordplay. That is, the speaker may, through education, learn
to incorporate something of the poetic into his speeches without literally becoming a poet
himself.98 Thus the label would thus carry the force of both words: the poihthv~ lovgwn is
not strictly a poet, but makes speeches that have something in common with poetry.
Another figure that is regularly contrasted with the poet is the sofisthv~, although
they are assumed to be distinct from poets, orators and philosophers. The sofistaiv are
set beside the poihtaiv at to Demonicus 51 as historical sources for living well: one
should learn the best things in the poets (tw`n poihtw`n ta; bevltista) but also know well
anything useful in the other wise men (kai; tw`n a[llwn sofistw`n, ei[ ti crhvsimon
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This phrase appears twice in Isocrates and three times in Plato, and of course it cannot be known who
used it first, or if it was more common than the extant evidence suggests. It never becomes a particularly
common term, although it continues to appear now and then, in various contexts, into the Byzantine period.
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An idea perhaps suggested by Aristotle as well with regard to poetic composition, as will be discussed
below.
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As the other appearance of the phrase, however, at Soph. 15, carries no similar suggestion of poetic
undertones, the potential wordplay must remain merely speculative. Plato, however, has several analogous
uses, as we will see, so it is not out of the question that the term had acquired a metaphorical resonance.
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eijrhvkasin).99 This recalls the basic, neutral picture of the poets reminiscent of that found
in the fifth century authors: the poihtaiv are keepers of cultural knowledge, and, while the
form of their productions may be assumed or inherent, it is nonetheless not emphasized
as particularly important in the scheme of their role.
A passage from to Nicocles 13 expands our picture somewhat. Isocrates there
warns Nicocles that he cannot afford to be ignorant of any of the famous poets or wise
men (mhvte tw`n poihtw`n tw`n eujdokimouvntwn mhvte tw`n sofistw`n mhdeno;~ oi[ou dei`n
ajpeivrw~ e[cein), and suggests that being a listener to the poets and a student of the wise
men (tw`n me;n ajkroath;~ ... tw`n de; maqhthv~) will be an integral part of training Nicocles
to judge those around him more accurately. The distinction is in the process of reception:
Nicocles should listen to the poihtaiv, but be a student to the sofistaiv. Whoever the
sofistaiv here may be referring to – whether to professionals like Gorgias and
Protagoras, or, more vaguely, to sages of another sort – it is clear that the aural
component of the poets’ productions is key. It is possible, too, that the distinction has
something to do with a more basic reality: the poihtaiv must be learned aurally, through
their works, as they themselves are no longer present, while the sofistaiv are present and
ready to be hired by able students.100
None of these passages offers a completely consistent definition of what Isocrates
had in mind when naming the various kinds of speakers, but it is clear that they have

It is interesting to note that the sofistaiv seem to be less reliable than poihtaiv when it comes to
providing good and useful advice, since Isocrates qualifies their contribution with a conditional: it is
possible that they have something to offer, but not a given.
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Indeed, no contemporary figures are called poihthv~, Pindar being the closest in time to Isocrates – who
was likely born a decade or so after Pindar’s death in the mid fifth century. A similar situation will be
found in Plato, and the implications of this will be discussed below.
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much in common, especially their role in moral and practical education, praise, and
communal memory. Thus the poihtaiv and sofistaiv stand beside the other manipulators
of lovgoi – the logopoioiv, the euJrhth;~ lovgwn, and the poihth;~ lovgwn – sometimes in
comparison, sometimes in contrast, as figures of memorialization and education. Two key
elements that appear again and again in discussing the works of those who deal in lovgo~
are praise and orality: all of these figures either speak before audiences about excellent
men, mythical or contemporary, or come down from antiquity as givers of wisdom and
knowledge to be listened to and recited.
Isocrates’ language thus supports the idea of a connection between the poetic
tradition and the rhetoric being developed and practiced in the Classical period, as
explicitly suggested by Aristotle.101 It is primarily content and purpose rather than form
that unify the works of the different kinds of artisans in these passages: the emphasis is
not on how the speakers convey their praises, but the fact of their involvement in the
work of praising. Of course, Isocrates himself wrote a speech of praise in the Evagoras,
albeit one masquerading as a letter of advice to the late king’s son. In this piece, perhaps
more than anywhere else in the corpus, Isocrates addresses the question of the boundaries
of the poetic head-on. Early in the work, for instance, he explicitly contrasts his own
encomium with traditional poetic encomia:102
oi[da me;n ou\n o{ti calepovn ejstin o} mevllw poiei`n, ajndro;~ ajreth;n dia;
lovgwn ejgnwmiavzein. ... toi`~ me;n ga;r poihtai`~ polloi; devdontai kovsmoi:
kai; ga;r plhsiavzonta~ tou;~ qeou;~ toi`~ ajnqrwvpoi~ oi|ovn t j aujtoi`~
poih`sai kai; dialegomevnou~ kai; sunagwnizomevnou~ oi|~ a]n boulhqw`si,
101

This will be taken up again in chapter 3.
Meijering (1987) 62-3 sees here evidence that Isocrates was doing something quite new, introducing the
“novel genre of an eulogy in prose.”
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kai; peri; touvtwn dhlw`sai mh; movnon toi`~ tetagmevnoi~ ojnovmasin, ajlla; ta;
me;n xevnoi~, ta; de; kairoi`~, ta; de; metaforai`~, kai; mhde;n paralipei`n,
ajlla; pa`si toi`~ ei[desi diapoiki`lai th;n poivhsin: toi`~ de; peri; tou;~
lovgou~ oujde;n e[xesti tw`n toiouvtwn, ajll j ajpotovmw~ kai; tw`n ojnomavtwn
toi`~ politikoi`~ movnon kai; tw`n ejnqumhmavtwn toi`~ peri; aujta;~ ta;~
pravxei~ ajnagkai`ovn ejsti crh`sqai. pro;~ de; touvtoi~ oiJ me;n meta; mevtrwn
kai; rJuqmw`n a{panta poiou`sin, oiJ d j oujdeno;~ touvtwn koinwnou`sin: a{
tosauvthn e[cei cavrin, w{st j a]n kai; th`/ levxei kai; toi`~ ejnqumhvmasin e[ch/
kakw`~, o{mw~ aijtai`~ tai`~ eujruqmivai~ kai; tai`~ summetrivai~ yucagwgou`si
tou;~ ajkouvonta~.103
(I know that what I am to do is difficult, to make an encomium of the
virtue of man through a speech. … For many ornaments are given to the
poets; they are able to represent gods interacting with men, and conversing
with them and aiding whomever they wish in battle, and they make these
things clear not only with ordinary words, but with exotic ones, and with
newly coined ones, and with metaphors, abandoning none of these
devices, but making their poetry intricate with all of them. But these sorts
of things are not permitted to those working through speeches, but they
must make precise use only of words that are in contemporary parlance
and ideas that are concerned with the facts at hand. Additionally, the poets
make all things with meter and rhythm, but speakers do not partake of any
of these. These have a certain grace, so that, should a work be poorly done
both in style and intention, nevertheless it will distract the souls of its
hearers with its elegant beats and proportions, Evag. 8-10)
It is remarkable that the first list of ornaments granted to the poets does not
include meter at all, but rather focuses on narrative and semantic choices that are
essentially myths: the poet is free to relate fantastic stories about gods and men, and then
to decorate them with unfamiliar or outlandish words and metaphors. Here, indeed, the
poihtaiv seem to be purveyors of myths more than versifiers.104 Of course, meter does
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The markers are again very similar to Aristotle’s, although Aristotle sees meter as a subset of rhythm
rather than a separate thing. It is clear elsewhere, however, that Isocrates was very much aware of the
importance of rhythm to oratory; see e.g. Soph. 16, where a speech needs to be spoken eujruvqmw~ and
mousikw`~; c.f. to Phil. 27. On the importance of yucagwgiva to rhetoric, see Meijering (1987) 6-12.
104
For Isocrates’ relationship to myths, see Papillon (1996) esp. 387, where he compares Isocrates’ use of
muvqo~ to that of ta; muqwvdh, and shows that the former was applied to what was deemed useful, the latter to
what was deemed not.
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come up: it is meter and rhythm, Isocrates says, that put a final, almost magical, charm on
content and style. Meter, finally, is able to compensate for any deficiencies in other
aspects of poetic creation.
Shortly afterwards, he suggests that meter is capable of decorating language in
such a way that the inferior idea may seem better than it is because of linguistic
adornment – an opportunity again not granted to authors such as himself:
gnoivh d j a[n ti~ ejkei`qen th;n duvnamin aujtw`n: h}n gavr ti~ tw`n poihmavtwn
tw`n eujdokimouvntwn ta; me;n ojnovmata kai; ta;~ dianoiva~ katalivph/, to; de;
mevtron dialuvsh/, fanhvsetai polu; katadeevstera th`~ dovxh~ h|~ nu`n
e[comen peri; aujtw`n. o{mw~ de; kaivper tosou`ton pleonevktouvsh~ th`~
poihvsew~, oujk ojknhtevon, ajll j ajpopeiratevon tw`n lovgwn ejstivn, ei; kai;
tou`to dunhvsontai, tou;~ ajgaqou;~ a[ndra~ eujlogei`n mhde;n cei`ron tw`n ejn
tai`~ wj/dai`~ kai; toi`~ mevtroi~ ejgkwmiazovntwn.
(One could understand the power of these [poetic features] from this:
should someone retain the words and ideas of the most highly respected
poems, but abandon the meter, they will appear far worse in our esteem
than we consider them now. Nevertheless, although the advantages of
poetry seem so great, the task must not be avoided, but attempted, to see if
it be possible to eulogize good men in no worse a way than those who use
song and meter to sing their praises, Evag. 11)
Here Isocrates is directly challenging the poetic tradition both in the function of his
speech and in its style, and is asserting his own works as not only able to hold their own
beside the traditional poetic encomia, but as actually superior to them. He chastises the
poets for relying on what he claims are essentially linguistic tricks to dress up mediocre
ideas enough that audiences do not see past the decoration to the mediocrity, while he is
limited to common words and phrases and the most relevant details, behind which his
underlying ideas have nowhere to hide – and must, therefore, be formidable in
themselves.
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This is largely in the service of promoting himself over the poets, of course;
elsewhere, Isocrates relies, implicitly and explicitly, on the poetic tradition behind him.
His maneuvers here to demonstrate how different his effort is from poetic productions
serve a purpose: playing up the deceptive powers of meter and rhythm as soul-distracting
features of poetic encomia allows him to simultaneously promote his own encomium for
being free of them.105 The definition of poetry that is implied by the discussion of genre
in the Evagoras, then, is clearly based on formal features, but is not one that is pushed
elsewhere in the corpus. Indeed, elsewhere, when he is not at pains to show the
superiority of his work to the received tradition, literary details such as rhythm are
considered as important to speeches as to poetry, and his judgments of poetry are far
more neutral. That is, he has it both ways: poetic features are part of what makes his
speeches so good, and also part of what makes poetry seem better than it is. What
distinguishes his work from poetry, then, is perhaps the degree to which it relies on poetic
ornamentation, and the superiority of his ideas.
To further investigate this, we turn now to a discussion of poetic products. The
term that would become the standard one for poetry, poivhsi~, continues to be an
uncommon one in Isocrates, appearing only ten times in the entire corpus.106 It most often
refers to the general body of work produced by a poet, especially Homer or Hesiod, and
as such usually appears with a named poet in the genitive.107 Twice, however, it is used as
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Which does, however, make it slightly more prevalent in his corpus than it was in the works of either
Thucydides or Herodotus. Unlike them, however, Isocrates reserves the term for literary productions, and
does not apply it to any other kind of making, as Thucydides and Herodotus did.
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an abstract concept, first in the Evagoras passage discussed above, and then in the
Panathenaicus.
Panathenaicus 35, explicitly contrasts poivhsi~ with lovgo~: Isocrates claims to
have made more praises by himself than all others together, either working in poivhsi~ or
lovgo~ (peri; de; tw`n th`~ povlew~ eujergesiw`n tw`n eij~ tou;~ {Ellhna~ h[dh poihvsomai tou;~
lovgou~, oujc wJ~ ouj pleivou~ ejpaivnou~ pepoihmevno~ peri; aujth`~ h] suvmpante~ oiJ peri; th;n
poivhsin kai; tou;~ lovgou~ o[nte~). This passage is usually translated with the familiar
contrast of poetry and prose. A closer look at another passage that seems to suggest a
similarly simple contrast, however, may help us gain a more nuanced understanding of
what is being expressed here as well.
Isocrates, in to Nicocles 7, uses the uncommon adverb katalogavdhn to discuss
literary gifts such as the one he is presently engaged in presenting to Nicocles: both
poihvmata with meter (tw`n meta; mevtrou poihmavtwn) and things written katalogavdhn
(tw`n katalogavdhn suggrammavtwn) may or may not live up to the promise they showed
at their inception. Again, translations tend to revert to the poetry-prose distinction,
although more than meter is in question. The constructions are clearly parallel, so the
adverb in the second part should be doing the same work as the prepositional phrase in
the first: identifying a defining feature of a particular kind of literary production.
Isocrates presents the two sets as complementary and implies that they encompass most,
if not all, of the possible kinds of literary gifts. Because of this, the passage has generally
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been taken as unproblematically dividing metered language from unmetered,108 but a
more interesting distinction signaled in part by the adverb is actually at work.
Before we can explore the significance of katalogavdhn, however, we will take a
moment to summarize that of poivhma. Herodotus uses the word four times, but always to
identify a material production.109 It does not appear with its literary resonance before
Isocrates and Plato, so Isocrates’ uses here are among the earliest.110 That it should
acquire a literary meaning, as its various relatives in the POI- family do, is not surprising,
but it does suggest that there was a perceived need for it in the fourth century that was not
felt in the fifth. It’s five appearances in Isocrates, then, deserve a brief overview to make
its meaning clearer.
In the passage above, we see it described as meta; mevtrou and set against things
done katalogavdhn; two other passages bolster the idea that a poivhma is, if not yet
precisely a poem, at least most naturally associated with compositions made up of
metrical language. Antidosis 45, for instance, as we saw above, asserts that the types of
lovgo~ are now fewer than those of tw`n meta; mevtrou poihmavtwn, and Evagoras 11 that, if
one should remove the meter of poihvmata, the result would seem far less impressive than
it had before. In each case, a poivhma is, as Gorgias claimed of poivhsi~, essentially being
conceived of as lovgo~ meta; mevtrou.111
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e.g. the dedication of Glaukon at 1.25.7, of Rhodopis at 2.135.13.
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It should be clear that we make no attempt here to assert priority of the uses of Isocrates or Plato, but
accept them as more or less contemporaneous.
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A final use in to Nic. 42 is slightly different, but fits in well enough with this restricted definition.
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While there is not enough evidence to draw firm conclusions, the poihvmata here
are not only more concrete and specific than we have seen before, but also more precisely
language, and less intrinsically music. It is a distinction that recalls the one Herodotus
made between the performative and linguistic aspects of poetry, but that comes even
closer to separating poetry from music. Moreover, it is clear that Isocrates and Plato, far
more than Herodotus and Thucydides, are concerned to explain how their relatively short
performative literary productions differ from poetry; having a concrete analogue to
compare to their lovgoi is a useful step in such a process of disambiguation. The fact that
it is largely dependent on a difference in form is likely a result of the fact that divisions
by content, context and function are hardly meaningful – as Isocrates himself says, he is,
in many cases, doing poetic work.
With a clearer understanding of this antithesis, then, we return to a consideration
of katalogavdhn. The adverb first appears in this period in Isocrates and Plato, although
its linguistic roots are far deeper; Homer uses katalevgw, for instance, to mean ‘to tell in
order’, and the register of citizens in Athens was known as the katavlogo~ from at least
the fifth century.112 Both of these imply a systematic and thorough, if artless, ordering of
information; if that concept of organization was carried over into the new adverb, it
should mean something like ‘systematically, in a list-like manner.’113 This, in fact, makes
better sense in context than “unmetrically” would. Where the poihvmata were marked by
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being meta; mevtrou, the suggravmmata are similarly identified by their form: they are
carefully organized, systematically structured. It is not entirely clear here what the
structure of the suggravmmata might be, but it is something more than simply the absence
of meter. Isocrates is not describing here poetry and prose, then, but rather two categories
of language that have been organized in different ways.114 The distinction, in this case,
falls out as poetry and prose, except that it suggests a plurality of types of prose, of which
the katalogavdhn is only one. There is, moreover, as was suggested in Thucydides, a
suggestion that lack of meter is no more sufficient for grouping prose than its presence
was for grouping poetry.
The question of writing, set against things done metrically in the previous
passage, is also an interesting one. Later in the to Nicocles, Isocrates returns to this
distinction and observes what kind of productions most people consider most useful,
considering both the poems and the things that have been written up (ta; sumbouleuvonta
kai; tw`n poihmavtwn kai; tw`n suggrammavtwn crhsimwvtata me;n a{pante~ nomivzousin, 42).
The formal qualifications that appeared in to Nicocles 7 are here absent, but poivhma is
again contrasted with written productions, suggesting that Isocrates conceived of them as
essentially oral rather than written. That is to say, while texts of poetry are certainly in
existence by the time of Isocrates, the fact of its having been written down remains a
secondary feature that does not affect the nature of the poem or change the general
expectation of poetry as something that is performed.
114

There may be an implication here of a third category, one of language that lacks the metrical
organization of a poivhma as well as the organization of a lovgo~ katalogavdhn – something like casual
conversation, perhaps – but there is simply too little evidence in Isocrates to make the argument. We will
have occasion to revisit the idea in the discussion of Plato.
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A similar comparison of poetry and the written appears in the second letter to
Dionysus. In the opening passages of this letter, Isocrates apologizes to Dionysius for
sending a letter rather than carrying on a conversation in person. He dwells on the
problems of the written versus the spoken word:
oi\da me;n ou\n o{ti toi`~ sumbouleu`ein ejpiceirou`si polu; diafevrei mh; dia;
grammavtwn poiei`sqai th;n sunousivan ajll j aujtou;~ plhsiavsanta~, ouj
movnon o{ti peri; tw`n aujtw`n pragmavtwn rJa`/on a[n ti~ parw;n pro;~ parovnta
fravsein h] di j ejpistolh`~ dhlwvseien, oujd j o{ti pavnte~ toi`~ legomevnoi~
ma`llon h] toi`~ gegrammevnoi~ pisteuvousi, kai; tw`n me;n wJ~ eijshghmavtwn,
tw`n d j wJ~ poihmavtwn poiou`ntai th;n ajkrovasin: e[ti de; pro;~ touvtoi~ ejn
me;n tai`~ sunousivai~ h]n ajgnohqh`/ ti tw`n legomevnwn h] mh; pisteuqh`/,
parw;n oJ to;n lovgon diexiw;n ajmfotevroi~ touvtoi~ ejphvmunen, ejn de; toi`~
ejpistellomevnoi~ kai; gegrammevnoi~ h]n ti sumbh/` toiou`ton, oujk e[stin oJ
diorqwvswn:
(I know, of course, that, for those wishing to give counsel, it is better by
far to do their communication not through writings but in person, not only
because it is easier to discuss matters face to face than to make them clear
through a letter, nor because everyone trusts in the spoken word more than
the written, and hears the former as propositions, but the latter as poems;
and in addition to this, if someone doesn’t understand or believe the things
said in personal conversation, the one speaking, being present, can defend
it, but if this happens with letters or writings, there is no one present to set
it straight.)
Here, poetry is grouped not with the spoken but with the written word. Poems, like
letters, are divorced from their creators, and – as Plato, too, famously complains115 – left
without interpreters or defenders. There is, moreover, a suggestion that a poem, like the
written word, is complete and unalterable, and hence demanding of a different kind of
audience engagement. While the alignment of poems with writings is unique in Isocrates
to this passage, the distance of the poets is not; as at to Nicocles 13, this may reflect an
assumption of absence on the part of poets as on the part of letter writers.
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This assumption of absence lines up with Isocrates’ consistent linking of the terms
poihthv~ and poivhsi~ with earlier poets, especially Homer and Hesiod. Poetry – and the
poets who create it – are thus linked in Isocrates to several important ideas: it is typically
an aural experience, heard and recited in public, rather than written or read; it is generally
old, belonging to a previous period or generation; it is most often concerned with praise,
and may provide educational models of living; it is well organized and artfully laid out,
and often relies on linguistic ornamentation such as meter and metaphor; and, finally, it is
often divorced from its creator.
None of these descriptions of poetry will be particularly surprising. What must be
noted, however, is the general lack of interest in meter as a defining characteristic of
poetry. It is, instead, one among several, and perhaps not significantly more important
than the others. Thus Isocrates was able to link his own productions to poivhsi~ in its
function and even, loosely, form, because he conceived of poivhsi~ not simply as metrical
speech but as one embodiment of an ancient ideal of organized and instructional
language, of which his own work was to be a different manifestation.116 Isocrates
considered the poetic to be recognizable by its content and by the reaction it elicited from
its audience: it conveyed praise and knowledge, and did it in such a way that it pleased
the listeners. Indeed, like Thucydides, he seems to find in content a more satisfying
marker than in meter.
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Finally, the set of words that, especially in Herodotus, stood as a counterpart to
POI- root words deserves attention. In Isocrates, words cognate with aJ/dei`n and wj/dhv are
conspicuous primarily for their absence: the words provided as examples here appear
twice each, and other cognate terms are used very rarely. The distinction that Herodotus
seemed to make, then, between focusing on content with POI- root terms and focusing on
performance with cognates of ajoidov~, is not one that was picked up within the larger
culture, or that survived to the next generation. On the other hand, musical components
are as consistently put forward as essential aspects of poetry as meter is; the musical
dimension of poetry, then, is still very much an active and defining feature of it, even if
Isocrates has lost the terms that, for Herodotus, served to express the connection more
literally.
Isocrates’ views on what poetry is, then, often line up rather neatly with our own
modern ones: it is closer to song than other types of language, is often marked by meter
and other decorative and stylistic features, and is charming to its audience. It is an oral
and aural performance at heart, although separating it from its oral context does not
change its essence. Isocrates regularly assumes two categories of performative language,
using POI- root words for those connected to meter and song and LOG- root words for
the other, but the distinction is not hard and fast, or absolute, as we see with the poihth;~
lovgwn, the description of his own productions as poihtikwvtera, and his privileging of
categorization by content rather than form.
We again see an oscillation between an inclination to set poetry apart by virtue of
its meter, and a desire for a more meaningful categorization; for the latter, like Herodotus
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and Thucydides before him, Isocrates most often turns to content and function. The
slippage can also be seen elsewhere. One such place is the identification of literary
makers: there are poets and makers of lovgo~, who are generally kept distinct, but there is
also the sophist, who does not fit neatly into either category, but bridges them both.117
Similarly, with respect to literary productions, there is the neat division of the metrical
and the unmetered, but it is complicated by the third category of the written, which,
again, fails to fall naturally into one category or the other, although it shares aspects of
both.
While Isocrates may not find a system of organization that is entirely satisfactory,
however, he seems to have a relatively clear idea of poetry as something that is similar to
his works in both form and content, but ultimately inferior. The various genres are
implicitly acknowledged in the passage from the Antidosis that opened this discussion,
although he seems remarkably uninterested in such specific distinctions of poetic kind;
whether he is imagining a multiplicity of styles when he discusses poetry or focusing on a
single one is unclear. He is, however, apparently satisfied with whatever unified set of
poetry he is imagining, even if he is not quite able to articulate its boundaries. On the
other hand, like Thucydides, he seems more concerned to challenge the idea of a
monolithic set of prose, especially for the sake of his own, than to distance all prose from
poetry. While Thucydides wanted his work as far removed from poetry as possible,
however, Isocrates locates his in the middle, having the best share in each.
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***

Plato’s relationship to poetry is famously complex and at times contradictory, and
expressed differently by different characters and in different dialogues.118 One major
source of the complications is the over-determined nature of his use of poetry. While
Thucydides and Isocrates viewed the poets as, in some sense, competitors, they had
surprisingly little anxiety about accounting for the ways in which their productions
differed from those of the poets. Plato, on the other hand, was frequently at pains to
justify his own productions, and especially his particular methodology of dialectic. Like
the poets and the orators, he was himself a language worker first and foremost, and so
needed to both discredit their methodologies as unreliable, and to prove his own as the
most capable of arriving at philosophical truths. That is, Plato is rarely able to discuss the
poets without implicating himself and his own philosophical project in the process.
In this project, then, we look not for an overarching, single and unified
explanation of the poetic in Plato, but rather to tease out major threads of thought woven
through the corpus.119 The differences in the aims, techniques and purposes of the
individual dialogues are significant, but, for many of them, poetry is enough of a
tangential or circumstantial topic that grouping and comparing them is productive. These
dialogues are the Apology, the Phaedo, the Charmides, the Laches, the Lysis, the
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Euthyphro, the Menexenus, the Lesser Hippias, the Gorgias, the Protagoras, the Meno,
the Euthydemus, the Cratylus, the Symposium, the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the
Sophist, the Statesman, the Philebus, the Timaeus, and the Critias.120 The kinds of basic
assumptions we find in this set of dialogues will be broad, on the one hand, but on the
other may be taken as representative, if not of Plato or Socrates personally, at least of the
kinds of assumptions and theories about the poetic that were current in the first half of the
fourth century. In that sense – in that we are given multiple snapshots of multiple ways to
think about poets and their works – the inconsistency that can be frustrating can also be
seen as a valuable insight into the period.
Against this set of dialogues in which poetry is dealt with more or less
circumstantially stand the several dialogues that take poetry as a primary subject of
inquiry to a greater or lesser degree. These dialogues – the Ion, the Phaedrus, the Laws,
and the Republic – will be treated individually. Not surprisingly, the views of poetry
expounded in these dialogues are some of the more marked, and in some cases are
mutually exclusive. Regardless of the contradictions, the views expounded in these
dialogues will be considered in the context of the individual works, and studied especially
for how they compare with the generalizations found in the grouped dialogues.
In this section, then, we will begin by tracing the kinds of language this study is
interested in within the grouped set of dialogues. The examples that have been chosen are
those that either demonstrate what seems to be a basic assumption appearing in the
120
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majority of instances, on the one hand, or notable exceptions, on the other. The
conclusions we draw from this section will then be laid out and briefly compared to the
pictures found in other authors. We will then turn to the individual dialogues, looking
especially for the ways they deviate from the norms found in the grouped set.

1. The grouped dialogues
Plato’s poihtaiv, when they are identified as specific individuals or classes of
individuals, are most often exactly who we would expect: Homer and Hesiod, Pindar,
Theognis, Epicharmus, Solon and Simonides, and many others – but always figures who
had, by the late fifth and early fourth centuries, been canonized in the culture. The Laches
singles out a specific type of poet with the objective genitive tragw/diva~, while the
Euthydemus calls a speech-writer a poihthv~ lovgwn.121 For Plato, then, as generally for
Isocrates, the term seems to have been essentially trimmed of the broader meanings that
continued to obtain occasionally in the fifth century and earlier, and, unless a specific
descriptor is added, has largely become restricted to the maker of poetry, although there
are two exceptions.
In the Sophist, Theaetetus struggles to understand what the Stranger means with
his broad definition of making, and wonders if the Stranger can really be suggesting that
the sophist should be a poihthv~ even of animals (kai; ga;r zwv/wn aujto;n ei\pe~ poihthvn,
234a). In the Euthyphro, similarly, Socrates explains to Euthyphro that he has been
accused of being a poihthv~ of the gods (fhsi; gavr me poihth;n ei\nai qew`n, 3b). Both of
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these instances, however, are such odd and strained uses of the term that they cannot but
be surprising; even when the term is used with its broadest significance elsewhere, it
consistently implies an active maker altering something in the world, which is hardly the
husbandman’s role in the making of animals, or Socrates’ with respect to his daemon. In
the first case, Theaetetus’ incredulous question emphasizes how uncertain he is about the
Stranger’s claim, and in the second, it is clear that Socrates does not consider himself in
any sense a creator of his daemon; the use of the word poihthv~ in these passages, then, is
meant to indicate how unlikely both speakers feel the claims are – work it can do
precisely because it has become so restricted in its significance.
Diotima’s discussion, as reported by Socrates in the Symposium, directly
addresses the disconnect between the breadth of the term itself and the specificity of its
referent:
oi\sq j o{ti poivhsiv~ ejstiv ti poluv: hJ gavr toi ejk tou` mh; o[nto~ eij~ to; o]n ijovnti
oJtw/ou`n aijtiva pa`sav ejsti poivhsi~, w{ste kai; aiJ uJpo; pavsai~ tai`~ tevcnai~
ejrgasivai poihvsei~ eijsi; kai; oiJ touvtwn dhmiourgoi; pavnte~ poihtaiv.
jAlhqh` levgei~.
j ll j o{mw~, h\ d j h{, oi\sq j o{ti ouj kalou`ntai poihtai; ajll j a[lla e[cousin
A
ojnovmata, ajpo; de; pavsh~ th`~ poihvsew~ e{n movrion ajforisqe;n to; peri; th;n
mousikh;n kai; ta; mevtra tw`/ tou` o{lou ojnovmati prosagoreuvetai.122
poivhsi~ ga;r tou`to movnon kalei`tai, kai; oiJ e[conte~ tou`to to; movrion th`~
poihvsew~ poihtaiv.
(You know that poivhsi~ is more than a single thing. In fact, for anything
coming into being from not-being, the whole cause is poivhsi~, so that all
works produced by all these tevcnai are poihvsei~, and the workmen of
these are all poihtaiv.
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Quite so.
But nevertheless, she said, you know that they are not all called poihtaiv
but have other names, and from all poivhsi~ one part, that one concerned
with music and meter, is marked off to be called by the name of the whole.
For this alone is called poivhsi~, and those who concern themselves with
this part of poivhsi~ as a whole are called poihtaiv, 205b-c)
A number of details in this passage are of interest. First, of course, there is the explicit
interest in the arbitrary restriction of the broad term to the specific use; Diotima does not
imply that there is any reason why only this one kind of maker should be called the
poihthv~, she simply observes that it is the case.123 Additionally, she defines the work of
the poets as a tevcnh made out of music and meter.124 Here, the poet is simply another
kind of inventive maker.125 Finally, the piece of poivhsi~ that is singled out is the one
concerned with music and meter (mousikh; kai; ta; mevtra); the fact that the linguistic
element is not highlighted certainly does not suggest that it was not seen as integral, but
the renewed assertion of the connection of music and poetry is worth noting here after the
relatively unmusical poetics of Isocrates.
Agathon’s speech earlier in the dialogue has interesting points of contact with,
and points of departure from, the picture painted by Diotima. When he takes up the
question of Eros’ skill (sofiva), for instance, he says he will, like Eryximachus, describe
Eros in terms of his own craft (tevcnh). He begins by calling Eros a poihthv~, and
123
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moreover one who is so wise (sofov~) that he makes (poihvsai) poets of those he touches:
kai; a[llon poihvsai pa`~ gou`n poihth;~ givgnetai ou| a]n [Erw~ a{yhtai (196e2). Like
Diotima, then, he sees poets as working from some kind of tevcnh, although he implies
that the divine – essentially elided in Diotima’s discussion – may have a role in making
the poet what he is.126 Moreover, he limits the respect in which Eros is a good poet: with
respect to all the poivhsi~ having to do with music (pa`san poivhsin th;n kata; mousikhvn,
196e).127 While he does not specify what kind of poet Eros makes of men, then, it seems
clear that he means to imply that lovers become composers of praises of the beloved, as
Hippothales does in the Lysis.128 That is, whatever their form, poets engage in praise.
The term is thus employed with some consistency, then, even if details of how the
poet works – by means of artful skill or with the help of divine inspiration – vary. We
turn now to a discussion of the activities of the poet to fill out our picture. A passage in
the Timaeus provides details about how one citizen judged one poet, as well as a look at
how poets’ materials were used at festivals. At 21a, Critias begins to tell a story about an
experience of his youth, during the Apaturia. The passage introduces several important
terms and so deserves here quotation in full.
to; dh; th`~ eJorth`~ suvnhqe~ eJkavstote kai; tovte sunevbh toi`~ paisivn: a\qla
ga;r hJmi`n oiJ patevre~ e[qesan rJayw/diva~. pollw`n me;n ou\n dh; kai; polla;
ejlevcqh poihtw`n poihvmata, a{te de; neva kat j ejkei`non to;n crovnon o[nta ta;
Sovlwno~ polloi; tw`n paivd`wn h[/samen. ei\pen ou\n ti~ tw`n fratevrwn, ei[te
dh; dokou`n aujtw/` tovte ei[te kai; cavrin tina; tw/` Kritiva/ fevrwn, dokei`n oiJ tav
te a[lla sofwvtaton gegonevnai Sovlwna kai; kata; th;n poivhsin au\ tw`n
126
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poihtw`n pavntwn ejleuqeriwvtaton.129 oJ dh; gevrwn - sfovdra ga;r ou\n
mevmnhmai - mavla te h{sqe kai; diameidiavsa~ ei\pen: ei[ ge, w\ jAmuvnandre,
mh; parevrgw/ th`/ poihvsei katecrhvsato, ajll j ejspoudavkei kaqavper a[lloi,
tovn te lovgon o}n ajp j Aijguvptou deu`ro hjnevgkato ajpetevlesen, kai; mh; dia;
ta;~ stavsei~ uJpo; kakw`n te a[llwn o{sa hu|ren ejnqavde h{kwn hjnagkavsqe
katamelh`sai, katav ge ejmh;n dovxan ou[te JHsivodo~ ou[te {Omhro~ ou[te
a[llo~ oujdei;~ poihth;~ ejgevneto a[n pote aujtou`.130
(A customary event of the festival relating to young boys happened every
year also at that time: our fathers set up contests of rhapsody for us. Now
in fact many poihvmata of many poihtaiv were recited, but since Solon’s
were new at that time, many of the boys sang those. Indeed, someone of
our phratry – whether it seemed that way to him at that time or whether he
was giving a compliment to Critias – said that Solon seemed to him wisest
in respect to some things but, with regard to his poivhsi~, he seemed the
freest of all the poihtaiv. At which the old man – this I remember exactly –
was exceedingly delighted and, smiling, said, “Amynander, if only he had
not treated his poivhsi~ like a side-project, but had done it earnestly like
the others, and had completed that story he brought back from Egypt, and
not been compelled to neglect it because of civil unrest and all the other
evils he found here when he came back – in my opinion neither Hesiod
nor Homer nor any other poihthv~ would ever have been more honored
than him,” 21b-d.)
Not only do we see here that festivals involved contests in the recitation of canonical
poetry attributed to famous poets, but we see that there was some choice of which poivhma
to sing – and a preference, as in the Odyssey, for the new ones.131 Moreover, we find
reinforcement for the idea that the poihthv~ is specifically the maker, and that any later
performers would be called by a different title.132 Finally, there is the obstacle to Solon’s
fame: namely, that he let poetry be a side project for him, and never fully devoted himself
to it. In other words, he was merely a hobbyist poet – implying that, even if it was
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anachronistic to apply it to Homer, being a professional poet was a possibility.133
Moreover, the implication is that being a poet was work that required time and attention
as well as skill – in other words, that poets were poets by virtue, like craftsmen, of tevcnh.
The specific verbs used to describe the activities of the poet can also illuminate
Plato’s understanding of the term poihthv~. The verb that continues to describe their
activities most generally remains poievw, used absolutely or with a number of direct
objects.134 There is an enormous variety of verbs that show up regularly to describe the
poet’s work, however, from the expected ejgkwmiavzein, aJ/dei`n and uJmnei`n, to the more
surprising but equally common ejnteivnein and kosmei`n, to the verbs most associated with
describing speeches, levgein and dievrcesqai. All of these verbs, however, are almost
equally commonly used to describe language that is clearly not musical or poetic,135
making them simply the vocabulary of describing language in general, without regard to
its particular form or (in many cases) function; one implication of the crossover of verbs
is that all language, regardless of its formal features, was understood as essentially the
same – a point that Plato explicitly makes in several places.136
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Although poets are largely uncomplicated and peripheral to the subjects at issue in
these dialogues, the activities proper to poets are applied metaphorically to non-poets in
several interesting ways. In the Critias, for instance, when Socrates assures Critias that he
will be given indulgence, he does it with an extended metaphor based on the theater:
prolevgw ge mhvn, w\ fivle Kritiva, soi; th;n tou` qeavtrou diavnoian, o{ti
qaumastw`~ oJ provtero~ hujdokivmhken ejn aujtw`/ poihthv~, w{ste th`~
suggnwvmh~ dehvsei tinov~ soi pampovllh~, eij mevllei~ aujta; dunato;~
genevsqai paralabei`n.
(I would warn you, dear Critias, of the dianoiva of the theater, how the
earlier poihthv~ won great acclaim in this, so that you will need great
indulgence if you would manage to succeed them, 108b)
Hermocrates extends the metaphor, telling Critias that he will have to invoke the aid of
Paian and the Muses to shine up and hymn the ancient men (proievnai te ou\n ejpi; to;n
lovgon ajndreivw~ crhv, kai; to;n Paivwnav te kai; ta;~ mouvsa~ ejpikalouvmenon tou;~ palaiou;~
polivta~ ajgaqou;~ o[nta~ ajnafaivnein te kai; uJmnei`n, 108c). Finally, Critias himself calls
the group a theater (tw/`de tw`/ qeavtrw/, 108d).
It is the fact of competition in language that the metaphors serve to highlight, but
the choice remains interesting. Moreover, the comparison here is quite broad: Plato has
not made his interlocutors specifically rhapsodes, but also allowed something of the
tragedian to spill in.137 A similar move is made in the Cleitophon, where Cleitophon
compares Socrates to an actor singing the role of a god in a tragedy (w{sper ejpi; mhcanh`~
tragikh`~ qeov~, u{mnei~...407a). Clearly, none of these men is expecting the others to
break into meter or song, but just as clearly as Plato is conflating rhapsodes and
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tragedians, so he is conflating singers and speakers, breaking down the generic
boundaries that are elsewhere assumed.
These comparisons of speakers of prose lovgoi to poets are metaphorical and,
likely, tongue-in-cheek, but there are many places where Plato attempts to lessen or
completely elide the distinctions between poets and other groups of men.138 The Apology
groups the poihtaiv first with qeomavntei~ and crhsmw/doiv, with the essential similarity
that they are vehicles for the divine, and thus sometimes speak more than they know, or
fail to understand what they say (22b9).139 This points to the idea, played up most in the
Ion, that the poets work not by knowledge or skill, but because of divine inspiration,
although Plato does not pursue it here.
Elsewhere, however, Plato contrasts the poihtaiv with orators and nonprofessionals. In the Gorgias, for example, the chain of questions leads Callicles to agree
with Socrates that, ultimately, what the orators are doing is not fundamentally, but only
formally, different from what the poets are doing, and both of them are doing something
like rhetoric: dhmhgoriva a[ra tiv~ ejstin hJ poihtikhv (502c). The Symposium draws a
different pairing, this time an opposition, between poets and private citizens (ijdiw`tai):
Eryximachus claims in his speech that no one has ever mentioned Eros’ parents, neither a
poihthv~ nor an ijdiwvth~ (178b3).140 This has been taken to signify a prose-verse
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distinction – Joyce’s translation renders it that way, for instance – and that may be
implied. However, given the discussion of Solon in the Timaeus that was mentioned
above, we may see here an emphasis not on the form of the production, but on the role of
the maker – that is, we may see the poet being separated out from the private citizen as a
professional.141
We should take a moment to acknowledge the substantive poihtikhv, although we
will have more to say about it below. The adjective has existed for some time as a way to
mark off any productive thing or idea, but has only recently begun to appear with
reference to literary productions.142 In the context of the dialogue, it is clear that Socrates
means to refer to at least tragic poetry, if not to the broader idea of poetry in general. It is
equally clear that he means for it to be understood with an implied tevcnh, on the model of
mousikhv and rJhtorikhv. His definitional statement here should, however, be understood
as quite new, not only in its use of the abstract substantive for the art as a whole, but in
the equivalence it draws between poetry and public speaking: far from being anything
mystical or powerful, poetry is just another language art.143
In the previous chapter, most clearly in the case of Herodotus, we observed a
difference of emphasis related to the use of POI- root words as compared to that of words
cognate with ajoidov~. The distinction is almost a moot one in Plato; as in Isocrates, that
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other set of terms is largely absent.144 This in itself is interesting, however; we have seen
that the poihthv~ is envisioned fairly consistently as the creator of a literary work that is
likely to be performed by someone at some point and almost certainly involves some
aspect of music and meter, but the poet’s own role as performer is hardly mentioned.
There are several possible explanations for why the poihthv~ continued to be
linked more to making than performing even after ajoidov~ had fallen out of favor as a
productive word, all of which must remain speculative. First, there is the dominance of
tragedy and comedy – in the Platonic corpus if not in the larger culture – and dramatic
poets composed works specifically to be performed by others. Second, nearly all the
poets mentioned by name in Plato belong to previous generations; they may have been
performers in their day, but all that survives of them in Plato’s period are the poems that
others continue to sing. Finally, it is possible that we can find evidence of the search for a
new term for the poet-as-performer in the proliferation in the period of terms to describe
performers; rhapsodes, actors, orators, sophists and philosophers are all coming into their
own in this time, even as the ajoidov~ is disappearing, and as the poet continues to make
songs that he hopes will be known far beyond the audience he himself can personally
address.145
In the set of grouped dialogues, then, we find an idea of the significance of
poihthv~ that is largely in keeping with what was seen in Isocrates: generally speaking, a
poihthv~ is a creator with a central position in society who works with language, meter

The verb aJ/dei`n remains in common use, and wj/dov~ appears regularly; other nominal terms are not used.
The work of Nagy and others on the terminology of singers and song may support this last option; see
e.g. Nagy (2002) 71 and n.4.
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and music. It is a relatively restricted term, and Plato’s uses of it that stretch or strain its
basic meaning serve as exceptions that prove the rule: for the speakers in the Critias to
call each other poets, for instance, works as a metaphor precisely because they are not, in
fact, poets in the strict sense. When we looked at the verbs that describe the poets’
activities, on the other hand, we saw very little to distinguish them from the writers of
unmetered speeches, implying an underlying assumption like Gorgias’ that poetry was,
essentially, decorated language.146
We saw a wider register of meanings when we looked at who the poet was
compared and contrasted with. He shared with prophets a link to the divine that allowed
him to say more than he knew, and with the orator a technical skill related to the
manipulation of language – aspects that might be contradictory if set side by side, but that
were both apparently sufficiently accepted ideas that they did not need justification or
explanation. He could also be classed with the craftsmen, further emphasizing his
technical skill. Being a poet was, moreover, shown to be a profession, and something that
distinguished a man from the ijdiwvth~. Finally, we observed that, while the poet’s
productions were intended for performance, the poet himself was not often pictured as a
performer. It is, ultimately, a fairly straightforward term, although the variety of figures
with which he can be paired – prophets, orators, actors, sophists, politicians, and more –
do speak to the complexity of his role behind the relative simplicity of his title.
We turn now to an examination of the poet’s products. Like Isocrates, Plato uses
poivhma relatively infrequently, but with two distinct resonances against Isocrates’ largely
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See also Ford (2002) 229, who observes that this view did not allow for a rhetorical poetics.
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stable one.147 Most often, Plato’s use of the term poivhma seems unproblematically similar
to our term “poem,” although it sometimes also seems to select out particular verses from
a larger work. Thus the Iliad and the Odyssey are poihvmata in Alcibiades I (112b) and
Hippias Minor (228d), while, in the Timaeus passage discussed above, Critias describes
how the poihvmata of many poets were declaimed (21b). However, Charmides (162d) and
Hipparchus (228d) identify metrical lines inscribed on Herms as poihvmata as well. As
the whole work or a small section of it, however, the primary force of the term is to
identify a specific production.
There are also a number of discussions of the various categories of poihvmata, and
several categories of things that are set against poihvmata as a different kind of
production. The Hippias Minor, for instance, describes how Hipparchus had made148
everything he wore and carried, from his ring to his Persian girdle, and including a
number of literary productions: pro;~ de; touvtoi~ poihvmata e[cwn ejlqei`n, kai; e[ph kai;
tragw/diva~ kai; diquravmbou~, kai; katalogavdhn pollou;~ lovgou~ kai; pantodapou;~
sugkeimevnou~ (and in addition to these [the ring and girdle and so-forth], you also came
in carrying poihvmata– epics and tragedies and dithyrambs – and many lovgoi
katalogavdhn and every kind of composition, 368c-d). There is clearly a distinction of
literary types being made on a formal basis here, and there are at least two levels of
division: poihvmata are first separated off as one broad type of literary production,
This is supported by the fact that Diotima’s discussion of the breadth of poihthv~ and poivhsi~ does not
include poivhma, and indeed the term is not used anywhere in the dialogue. The term appears only 19 times
in the set of grouped dialogues, with this distribution: Alc. 1, Apol. 1, Charm. 2, Hipparch. 2, Hip. Min. 2,
Lysis 3, Meno 1, Parm. 1, Phaedo 3, Soph. 2, Tim. 1.
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Interestingly, Plato uses several verbs (e.g. ejrgavzein, uJfaivnein, plevkein, among others) to describe the
material objects Hipparchus wore and carried, but never poivein– which he seems to reserve here to describe
only the making of the literary works.
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parallel, it seems, to lovgoi katalogavdhn at least.149 Within the poihvmata, he then
identifies three types, epics, tragedies and dithyrambs. He is doing easily here what
seemed less intuitive to Herodotus: viewing disparate kinds of poems as similar in
essence while acknowledging that each belonged to its own genre.
It is less clear what we should do with the second and third categories, the lovgoi
katalogavdhn and the pantodopou;~ sugkeimevnou~. Were there only two categories
presented here, it would be tempting indeed to follow the usual prose-poetry dichotomy
that people have traditionally seen in this passage. If we accept that dichotomy, however,
what are we to make of the third category, the pantodopou;~ sugkeimevnou~? We have
already covered metered and unmetered language, so what is left? There is no need for
the pantodapou;~ sugkeimevnou~ to refer to a specific, identifiable category, but the
implication is that the forms already named have not exhausted the possibilities; at the
very least, it suggests a need for a catch-all category for odds and ends. It is precisely this
messy set that allows us to see more clearly the subtlety of katalogavdhn.
In the Isocrates section above, we saw that the adverb katalogavdhn referred to
organization of some sort, and that, while it was not necessarily a natural opposite to
metered language, it allowed for the creation of a third category against metered speech, a
category that distinguished between unmetered speech that was systematically organized,
and unmetered speech that was not. In this passage, similarly, we see metered language
singled out, but we are left to account for two other types. Others have solved this by

There is nothing in the Greek that prevents us from understanding only one top category, poihvmata, and
setting the other types as subsets of that; equally, however, there is no evidence elsewhere to suggest such a
broad meaning of poihvmata.
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reading the third type as an appositive description of the lovgoi katalogavdhn; Jowett, for
instance, preserves the dichotomy in his translation without quite acknowledging the third
term: “you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prosewritings of the most various kinds,” and many other translators do likewise.150
Fortunately, there is an analogous passage to provide further insight. The Lysis
also suggests a difference between poihvmata and things spoken katalogavdhn, as well as
a suggestion of a more complicated situation. Here, Ctessipus complains about the ways
that Hippothales, in praising Lysis, abuses his friends’ patience and ears:
kai; a} me;n katalogavdhn dihgei`tai, deina; o[nta, ouj pavnu ti deinav ejstin,
ajll j ejpeida;n ta; poihvmata hJmw`n ejpiceirhvsh/ katantlei`n kai;
suggravmmata. kai; o{ ejstin touvtwn deinovteron, o{ti kai; a{/dei eij~ ta;
paidika; fwnh` qaumasiva/, h}n hJma`~ dei` ajkouvonta~ ajnevcesqai.
(And the things he goes through katalogavdhn, although they are
incredible, are not the really incredible ones – those are when he applies
himself to pouring out poihvmata and suggravmmata over us. Even more
incredible than those is when he sings to his darling in a “wonderful”
voice, which we are forced to listen to, 204d.)
Here again, as in the Hippias Minor, we see a multiplicity of categories that our
dichotomy of prose and poetry cannot account for. Ctessipus implies at least four
categories, although there must be overlap between them – for one thing, it is hard to
imagine how a poihvmata could be expressed if it were not spoken, or written, or sung –
and even suggests a hierarchy, of audience distress if not of compositional or
performative form. There are, first, what Hippothales goes through katalogavdhn; more
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e.g. Lamb gives the similar “And in addition you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and
tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose.”

91
incredible are the poihvmata and suggravmmata; and worst of all are what he sings.151
Given the etymology of the adverb katalogavdhn, it is not entirely convincing to think it
would signify idle conversation. Moreover, because they are set specifically against the
suggravmmata– what has been written down in advance, but is nonetheless almost
certainly destined for oral performance – it is more likely that the adverb suggests not
random chatter but rather something organized but not particularly interesting, like a
list.152
Finally, we can wrap up the discussion of poivhma with one brief observation. We
saw above that, when poihtaiv were under discussion, the emphasis was rarely on the
performance of the poetry, even though the terms that made such a distinction clear in the
previous century had fallen away. When poihvmata are mentioned, similarly, the
emphasis is rarely on the public or performative aspects. The term is used to identify
specific works, like the Iliad and the Odyssey, or to indicate types of works, like the
tragedy or the dithyramb; performance might be implicit in the genre, but it is the unit of
content rather than performance that is being identified. That is, while Plato very likely
associated a poivhma with a balanced package of lovgo~, mevlo~, mevtron and other features
all working in tandem, he did not use poivhma to describe the effects or features of the
poet’s activities.153
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Translations are better at acknowledging the nuances of the categories here than in the Hippias Minor
passage. Wright, for instance, gives ‘constant talk’, ‘poems and speeches’, and ‘song’, and Lamb has
‘conversation’, ‘poems and prose compositions’, and ‘songs’. The separation of poivhma from song here,
although it is not sustained, recalls the several places in Isocrates where a separation between poetry and
music was implied, and prefigures the more explicit separation in Aristotle.
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The genre of catalogue poetry like the Gunaikw`n Katavlogo~ may support this, although it is not clear
when it acquired its name.
153
For that, he most often relies on mevlo~ and wj/dov~.
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Turning, then, to the use of poivhsi~. Like poivhma, it is a relatively uncommon
word, appearing in most dialogues only once or twice, if at all.154 However, whereas
poivhma was relatively restricted in its meaning, the broader significance of poivhsi~ as
any made thing continues to be in play. There does seem to be consistency within
individual dialogues; the Charmides and Sophist, for instance, use the term only with its
broad, unspecified and non-literary significance, while the dialogues that use it to refer to
literary productions (Apology, Gorgias, Lysis, Theaetetus, and Timaeus) extend its
meaning to the broader, physical meaning only carefully and with notice.
In its literary incarnations, poivhsi~ often seems to be something akin to our idea
of poetry: the abstract business that poets occupy themselves with. In the Apology, for
instance, Socrates observes that the poets think of themselves as sofwvtatoi on account
of their poivhsi~; it is the abstract practice they engage in that makes them respected and
wise. The description of Solon in the Timaeus passage discussed above adds nuance to
the idea: Solon was wise in respect to other things, but ejleuqeriwvtato~155 with regard to
his poivhsi~, and would have been more famous than any other poet had he taken his
poivhsi~ seriously rather than treating it as a side project.
The uses of the term in the Symposium support the idea of poivhsi~ as the abstract
idea of poetry, although they also demonstrate that the term retains its full range of
meanings. The word appears in two distinct discussions – the same two, in fact, that dealt

It appears a bit less than twice as often as poivhma, with the following distribution: Alc. 1, Apol. 1,
Charm. 3, Gorg. 6, Lysis 1, Menex. 1, Pol. 1, Soph. 4, Symp. 8, Theaet. 2, Tim. 2, with the appearances in
the Charm. and Soph. referring only to material creations.
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The superlative describing Solon there is not well understood; we are not even sure if it should be
ejleuqerwvtato~ or ejleuqeriwvtato~, never mind what it would mean in either case. Capra (2010) 206ff
offers a good discussion of this.
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most fully with poihthv~. First, Agathon claims in his speech that Eros, the poihthv~, is
good (ajgaqov~) at every poivhsi~ having to do with music. The word is clearly related to
something similar to our idea of poetry here, but it retains an almost verbal force: it is the
making that is done through music. Moreover, that qualification of it – that it is
specifically poivhsi~ th;n kata; mousikh;n – especially in a passage that has already made
several references to poetry and even quoted several tragic poets, should be a flag to us
that it retains its breadth; if it were already closely limited, the explanation would seem
extraneous.156
The Theaetetus, too, manages to have it both ways. At 152e, for instance, Socrates
uses poivhsi~ with its restricted resonance to mean something along the lines of the
oeuvre of Homer or Epicharmus. A later passage, however, takes a more unusual
approach, and again gives the noun a verbal, active force. There, in the course of making
an unrelated point, Socrates mentions to Theodorus a practice of the ancient poets:
pareilhvfamen para; me;n tw`n ajrcaivwn meta; poihvsew~ ejpikruptomevnwn
tou;~ pollouv~, wJ~ hJ gevnesi~ tw`n a[llwn pavntwn jWkeanov~ te kai; Thqu;~
rJeuvmata tugcavnei kai; oujde;n e{sthke, para; de; tw`n uJstevrwn a{te
sofwtevrwn ajnafando;n ajpodeiknumevnwn, i{na kai; oiJ skototovmoi aujtw`n
th;n sofivan mavqwsin ajkouvsante~...
(We have received from those ancient ones who concealed most things
with their poetry how the origin of all things is Ocean and Tethys, that all
is flow and nothing stands fast, but from the later ones, who, because they
156

Fowler, in his Loeb translation, sees this as straining the metaphor Agathon began by conflating Eros to
his own field, and it is perhaps not the most graceful extension of meaning, but nothing in the term itself
resisted such an extension. It also recalls Theaetetus’ surprised question about the sophist as poihthv~ of
animals, but the greater restrictions on the significance of the agent noun made that example less natural
than this one. The following section makes this even clearer, as Agathon enlarges the sense of the term by
defining the sofiva of Eros as the poivhsi~ of all life (me;n dh; thvn ge tw`n zw/vwn poivhsin pavntwn, 197a).
Diotima, too, in the discussion mentioned above, observes that poivhsi~, strictly speaking, should be any
making, but in practice is restricted to what the poets make – although the dialogue that is going on around
her belies her assertion about its restriction.
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are wiser, made public demonstrations openly [of these same things], in
order that even leatherworkers, listening to them, might learn their
wisdom, 180c-d).
Here there is a contrast between how things were done in the past, and how they have
been done more recently: the moderns make their knowledge clear and available to
everyone, but the ancients concealed their knowledge with poivhsi~.157 The poivhsi~ is
again a very active molding as the ancients are seen as literally manipulating their
language in such a way as to make it conceal its meaning – they are craftsmen, ironically,
hiding knowledge by means of their craft from other craftsmen. Plato does not clarify
what role the poivhsi~ has in the hiding, but, by the wording, it seems to be a tool or
method of composition.
On the other side of the spectrum from the subtle meanings in the Symposium and
Theaetetus, the Gorgias, in what may be a conscious echo of its namesake, offers a rare
straightforward definition of poivhsi~: if one should strip away song, rhythm and meter
from all poivhsi~, Socrates asks Callicles, what would be left besides lovgo~ (ei[ ti~
perievloi th`~ poihvsew~ pavsh~ tov te mevlo~ kai; to;n rJuqmo;n kai; to; mevtron, a[llo ti h]
lovgoi givgnontai to; leipovmenon, 502c)?158 This is, of course, one step in an argument,
and should not be taken as a clear statement of Socrates’ actual belief, or of Plato’s, for
that matter, although it likely reflects current conceptions; the very way that the question
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This concealment seems to be mythical allegories; see Tate (1929) for Plato and the allegorical tradition,
Richardson (1975) for the allegorical tradition more generally. Aristotle attributes a similar practice to the
ancient poets; they are likely referring to the same, or at least a similar, genre of poets and poetry. See
below.
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Leaving us with the familiar picture of poivhsi~ as lovgo~ with the addition of the ornaments mevlo~,
rJuqmov~ and mevtron – that is, language overlaid with decorative elements.
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is asked suggests that the definition is at least partly facetious – especially when
compared to the other uses in the dialogue.
At 449d, for instance, Socrates asks Gorgias to describe what rJhtorikhv is
concerned with, in the way that weaving is concerned with the making of clothes, and
music the making of a mevlo~ (hJ uJfantikh; peri; th;n tw`n iJmativwn ejrgasivan … kai; hJ
mousikh; peri; th;n tw`n melw`n poivhsin).159 That is, what is the end product of the practice
of the art of rhetoric, as clothes are of weaving?160 The poivhsi~ here is set parallel to
ejrgasiva as the activity that results in the product – mevlo~, in this case – and is thus
similar in its force to the other very active uses discussed above. While poivhsi~ can be
put forward as the result of adding mevlo~ and mevtron to lovgo~, then, it is also, more
actively, the process of adding those things, so that the term is still fluctuating between
multiple meanings.
Moreover, in the course of further honing the ‘simple’ definition of poivhsi~ given
at 502c, Socrates – allegedly in the interest of clarifying distinctions – manages, as we
saw above, to thoroughly confuse at least rhetoric and poetry. Having shown that poetry
is really just lovgo~, and indeed lovgo~ spoken to a great crowd for the sake of pleasure,
poetry was also declared to be a kind of public speaking (dhmhgoriva, 502c).161 The fact
that it is not poivhsi~ that he uses here, however, but poihtikhv, a relatively recent coinage,
lets Plato reserve poivhsi~ as a very active term, referring less to poetry writ large than to
active and intentional manipulation of language.

On the idea that Plato likely coined the term rJhtorikhv, see especially Schiappa (1990) and (1992).
Again prefiguring Aristotle’s reliance on end as definition.
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As was observed above, in the discussion of the poihthv~.
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The term poivhsi~ is thus more complicated than either of its relatives, poivhma or
poihthv~. It operates on multiple valences in Plato, sometimes in close proximity: first, its
primitive sense of making in any respect continues to be productive, although this seems
to have yielded its primary position to newer resonances. It can also refer to a specific set
of poetry: the poetry of a particular author, or of a particular genre, for instance. In this
sense, it functions as a way to group poihvmata into meaningful categories: the poihvmata
of Homer comprise the poivhsi~ jWmhvrou, for instance. It also describes the abstract
practice of making poetry, although Plato usually prefers the newer, and more restricted,
poihtikh; [tevcnh] for this resonance. Most interesting, though, is how often the word
carries almost verbal force in Plato, a nuance that had not been much in evidence
previously.
A final set of POI- root terms remains to be discussed. We saw in the fifth century
a number of new compounds built off the POI- root and put forward to single out makers
or products of specific kinds. These compounds continue to be productive in Plato,
although, more often than not, the compounds he uses relate not to literary arts, or even
the arts at all, but to creation in the physical world, most often in the interest of
explanation by analogy.162 A passage in the Euthydemus that is unusually dense with such
compounds will illustrate his use of, and creation of, such compounds. At 289b-d,
Socrates is trying to prove his point that what is needed is a confluence of knowledge
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For the most part, his interest is in drawing comparisons with craftsmen in the material world, so we see
terms like ojyopoiiva and mhcanopoiov~ in the Gorgias, as well as several entirely unique words like
qhsauropoiov~, turranopoiov~ and deusopoiov~ in the Republic. On Plato’s use of craft analogies, see e.g.
Graham (1990), Warren (1989).
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relating to both the making and the use of a given object.163 As he often does, Socrates
uses a material craft to make a point about language: just as the arts of lyre-making
(luropoiikhv) and lyre-playing (kiqaristikhv) are very different, and the lyre-maker
(luropoiov~) knows only the former but not the latter, and just as the case is the same
with flute-making (aujlopoiikhv), so too we should expect that learning the art of speechmaking (logopoiikhv) should not be good enough unless we also learn how to use the
speeches.164
Given the nature of the dialogue, Plato is likely being facetious here and mocking
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus with the use of ridiculous language, but this is only the
most extreme example of a common occurrence of semantic creativity in Plato.165 What is
most important for our purposes, however, is the evidence this provides of the period’s
continuing interest in developing terminology that allows for precise categorization not
only of makers and their products, but, as seen above with poihtikhv, for the abstract
concept that the making involves. While the terms in this passage of the Euthydemus are
overkill, nominal forms of similar compounds are abundant in the orators of the period,
and continue to be found in Aristotle and beyond.
In these dialogues, then, we have a picture of poetry that is in some ways similar
to that of Isocrates, but with several important distinctions. First, he is largely consistent
with retaining the concept of music whenever he speaks of poetry, whereas Isocrates
163

On the importance to Plato of knowing an object’s end, c.f. Rep. 352e, the rule of classification to which
Aristotle will basically adhere: a\r j ou\n tou`to a]n qeivh~ kai; i{ppou kai; a[llou oJtouou`n e[rgon, o} a]n h] movnw/
ejkeivnw/ poih/` ti~ h] a[rista… (would you have it that the work of a horse or anything else is that which one is
able to do best with it, or only by means of it?).
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These adjectives are found nowhere else in the extant Greek corpus, although they are clearly modeled
both on familiar compounds and on abstract adjectives like rJhtorikhv and mousikhv.
165
Fossum (1931) remains an important starting place for discussions of Plato’s semantic creativity.
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rarely observes the musical aspects, usually presenting poetry as essentially language. On
the other hand, Plato’s usual purpose in mentioning the musical aspects of poetry is to
show that, without them, it is nothing other than language – that is, to break down the
boundaries setting poetry apart from other kinds of language. This allows him, like his
predecessors, to break up the category of non-metrical language in a way that pushes the
less-desirable kind – for him, the poetic – farther into the realm of poetry and away from
the realm of his own works. One consequence of this attempt is the multiplication of
categories elsewhere: thus the incomplete separation of poihtikhv from mousikhv, and the
assertion of the similar category of rJhtorikhv.
Alongside these relatively unsurprising conclusions, however, Plato reveals other,
subtler ideas about poetry. His linguistic innovations, for instance, suggest at least an
awareness of, if not a dissatisfaction with, a vocabulary inadequate for describing literary
categories. In some cases, like that of poivhsi~, it is clear that he saw some value in
preserving the semantic range of the term, and thus experimented with neologisms that
might provide a more stable and precise way to talk about the idea of poetry without
sacrificing the more active force of poivhsi~. Perhaps more importantly, with the coining
of terms like rJhtorikhv and in the semantic precision he aims for with it, we see an
interest in bounding the category of the poetic as distinct from other categories of
language use – an interest that suggests a relatively stable idea of the poetic.
Two final points must be made. While Plato’s picture of the divinely inspired mad
poet is the one that has come to dominate our idea of the poet, it should be emphasized
how much of a deviation that was from his predecessors and peers. Certainly, as was said
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above, the archaic poets themselves claimed a special connection with the divine, but
there is no hint of such a thing in Herodotus or Thucydides, and Isocrates’ conception of
the poet is ultimately rather mundane. Secondly, while we have seen that authors turn to a
variety of alternative categorizations when the formal ones prove insufficient, Plato
appeals on several occasions to classification by causes. This is, in some ways, a natural
development of classifications based on content, context and function, but is more
explicitly articulated in Plato than in other authors – until, that is, it is taken up again by
Aristotle.

2. The individual dialogues
To nuance these generalizations drawn from Plato’s circumstantial discussions of
poetry, we turn now to the individual dialogues that, in one sense or another, take poetry
as a primary subject of discussion. In this section, we will be focusing specifically on
places where Plato deviates from the spectrum of assumptions and opinions sketched
above. That is, the basic ideas culled from the dialogues in which poetry is tangential will
now serve as a measuring stick for what is said when poetry is the explicit topic. The
dialogues under discussion here are the Ion, Phaedrus, Laws, and Republic.
We begin with the Ion, the dialogue that most obviously concerns itself with the
poetic. We will follow roughly the same trajectory of exploration as before, although we
are now aiming more to highlight divergences from the established norms than to tease
out every nuance in the dialogue itself. It will come as no surprise to observe, from the
start, that this dialogue that takes poetry as its subject more than any other should also
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resolve itself with one of the least nuanced views of the poetic. That is, it is easier to take
aim at a still target.
The Ion takes one of the strictest definitions of poihthv~ in the corpus, specifying
that he is the one who makes what performers such as the rhapsode and the actor sing.
Socrates’ further comment that he himself is merely an ijdiwvth~ not only marks him off as
engaged in something different, but distinguishes poet, rhapsode and actor as, in some
sense, professional (ajlla; sofoi; mevn pouv ejste uJmei`~ oiJ rJayw/doi; kai; uJpokritai; kai; w|n
uJmei`~ aJ/dete ta; poihvmata, ejgw; de; oujde;n a[llo h] tajlhqh` levgw, oi|on eijko~ ijdiwvthn
a[nqrwpon, 532d).166 The emphasis on both professional performance and on singing is
heavy throughout the work, with little attention paid to non-professional contests like that
mentioned in the Critias. Thus the poet in the Ion is called melopoiov~ as well as poihthv~,
and he makes e[ph and mevlo~, terms more closely associated with performative song,
more often than poivhsi~ or poihvmata, terms tied more to content and the shape of the
language they are made up of.167

As also Murray (1996) 110, although she is inclined to interpret ijdiwvth~ elsewhere as marking
specifically a prose-poetry distinction – a suggestion I find largely unconvincing.
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Poetic productions are much more frequently referred to in the Ion as mevlo~ than anything else, and
other terms are infrequent; there are no mu`qoi, for instance, and no u{mnoi – regular terms for types of
language in the rest of the Platonic corpus. There are, moreover, only seven instances of lovgo~, a term that
is used fairly neutrally throughout the corpus to describe a language act, whether spoken or sung. For
comparison, there are 22 instances in the Menexenus, a dialogue of 4908 words compared to Ion’s 4091,
and 18 in the 4505 word Hip. Min., plus ten more related nouns built off the LOG- root. In the Ion, lovgo~
appears three times in the phrase ajxiov~ lovgo~ to mean something like ‘worthy of mention’: at 532c when
Ion says he is unable to say anything worth mentioning after listening to someone discourse (dialevgetai)
about a poet other than Homer; and twice by Socrates at 541d to describe why foreign men have been
honored in Athens. Twice Socrates uses lovgw/ as an instrumental dative meaning ‘reason’ (534d and 532e).
Ion uses it 535a to refer to the things Socrates has just said, and Socrates uses it in a similar way at 540a of
Ion’s admission. That is, this dialogue is more careful than perhaps any other to distinguish poetic activities
from non-poetic, although it is also careful to keep the rhapsode firmly on the side of the poetic; see e.g.
Murray (1996) 114-115.
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The most famous contention of the dialogue, of course, is that a poet works not
through tevcnh but by means of a magnet-like chain of force emanating from the divine.168
This is developed carefully over the course of the dialogue, from his starting claim – soon
recanted – that the rhapsode has a tevcnh (530b8). The rhapsode, like the poet in other
dialogues, is soon compared to the mantikov~ as one who knows but has no tevcnh to
account for his knowledge; this is made explicit at 533-4: poets of e[ph make their poems
(poihvmata) not from tevcnh but because of being inspired and possessed (e[nqeoi and
katecovmeno~), and the same is said of the rhapsode, who does the same work as the poet,
although he does it at one level farther removed from reality.
As mentioned above, this dialogue prefers non-POI- root words to discuss the
poet’s productions; there is in fact only one use of poivhsi~ – to refer to Homer’s body of
work, it seems ( {Omhro~ th;n poivhsin pepoivhken, 531d) – and only four uses of
poihvmata, which consistently denote specific productions of poets, as often elsewhere.
They are also, however, in the service of the larger purpose of this dialogue, attributed
not to humanity or men but divinity and the gods, as is explicitly stated when trying to
account for Tynnichus’ one good poem (…oujk ajnqrwvpina ejstin ta; kala; tau`ta
poihvmata oujde; ajnqrwvpwn, ajlla; qei`a kai; qew`n, 534e). Furthermore, they are, again,
edged away from the spoken and towards the sung by the language around them.
This dialogue, then, unlike many others in the corpus, has the implicit goal of
drawing a sharp distinction between lovgo~ of any sort and the poetic. In the process of

168

The magnet analogy is articulated at 533cff. The degree of involvement of the divine is a Platonic
innovation, as noted above, that was nowhere more fully developed and explained than in the Ion, although
it is difficult to sustain the idea to any great extent in the other dialogues.
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achieving this, it shows a preference for the language of song rather than the language of
speech, even though it seems that Ion’s work as a rhapsode has as much to do with
exegesis of Homer – which would almost certainly not be sung – as with recitation of
Homer’s epics, which would almost certainly have been at least chanted, if not actually
sung.169 Additionally, it removes nearly all the skill and responsibility from the poet,
placing responsibility for the excellence of a poem firmly in the hands of the divine;
many other dialogues emphasize the role of divine inspiration in the poet’s work, but
rarely is there an attempt to entirely erase poetic tevcnh like this. The Ion, then, is
anomalous when compared to the rest of the corpus, and equally anomalous when
compared to the larger picture of cultural assumptions about poets and poetry, when it
relegates the poetic almost exclusively to the divine, while men retain some power over
lovgo~. That is, the poetic has been separated from lovgo~ and had its power located
elsewhere, beyond the world of human agency.
The Phaedrus, in some ways, locates itself on the opposite end of the spectrum
from the Ion, although it shares with it an interest in attributing poetry at least in part to
divine inspiration.170 However, it is also at pains to elide the very boundaries that the Ion
was so interested in upholding, and to connect rhetoric with tragedy as the Gorgias does.
The first mention of a poihthv~ in the dialogue illustrates both of these points. Phaedrus
has just completed presenting Lysias’ speech to Socrates, and Socrates’ sanguine reaction
bothers him.
169

See e.g. West (1974), Nagy (1989). See below on Aristotle’s multiplicity of categories that seem to
suggest a middle ground between speech and song.
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Orsini (1975) 47-62 provides an interesting, if now somewhat dated, overview of scholarship on this
dialogue.

103
FAID: mhdamw`~, w\ Swvkrate~, ajll j wJ~ ajlhqw`~ eijpe; pro;~ Dio;~ filivou,
oi[ei a[n tina e[cein eijpei`n a[llon tw`n JEllhvnwn e{tera touvtwn meivzw kai;
pleivw peri; tou` aujtou` pravgmato~…
SWK: tiv dev… kai; tauvth/ dei` uJp j ejmou` te kai; sou` to;n lovgon ejpaineqh`nai,
wJ~ ta; devonta eijrhkovto~ tou` poihtou`, ajll j oujk ejkeivnh/ movnon, o{ti safh`
kai; strogguvla, kai; ajkribw`~ e{kasta tw`n ojnomavtwn ajpotetovrneutai…
(PHAID: Socrates, by Zeus Philios, tell me truly, do you think that any
other Greek would be able to speak on this subject more impressively or
more fully than this?
SOC: What? Must you and I praise this speech in this respect as well, that
the poihthv~ said what needed to be said, and not only in these other
respects, that it was clear and powerful, and that each of the words was
turned out precisely? 234e-235a)
In the course of this project so far we have seen a speechmaker called a poihthv~
lovgwn on several occasions, but it is much less common for poihthv~ to carry this
meaning on its own, without the specifying genitive. This is, moreover, the first
descriptive identification of Lysias’ activities by Socrates in the dialogue, and it comes
only lines after the end of the recitation. In light of these details, and especially in light of
what follows, it is likely that the use here is supposed to be slightly surprising, and to set
the reader just a bit off-balance.
Somewhat later in the dialogue, in the course of describing the speechwriting
process, Socrates describes the speaker as a poihthv~ who sets out from the theater
happily if his speech held good (geghqw;~ ajpevrcetai ejk tou` qeavtrou oJ poihthv~, 258b).
Context, again, makes it clear that it is political speeches being discussed, but the
metaphor makes the speaker into a poet, and the public forum into the theater. In other
words, Plato is here conflating rhetoric and tragedy, much as he did in the Gorgias,
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separating rhetoric from other non-metered language and associating it firmly with the
poetic.
This same conflation is apparent throughout the dialogue, especially in the ways
Socrates describes his own activities. Introducing his speech at 237a, for instance, he first
invokes the muses (a[gete dhv, w\ Mou`sai, ei[te di j wj/dh`~ ei\do~ livgeiai, ei[te dia; gevno~
mousiko;n to; Liguvwn tauvthn e[scet j ejpwnumivan). When he pauses to address Phaedrus at
241d, it is because he has recited a line in meter, and he wishes to make an end to his
lovgo~. When Phaedrus pushes him, Socrates rebukes him: oujk h/[sqou, w\ makavrie, o{ti
h[dh e[ph fqevggomai ajll j oujkevti diquravmbou~, kai; tau`ta yevgwn… eja;n d j ejpainei`n to;n
e{teron a[rxwmai, tiv me oi[ei poihvsein… (don’t you see, my friend, that I am now speaking
ejphv, no longer dithyrambs,171 even though I am blaming – what do you think I would
compose if I were praising? 241e). When he resumes his lovgo~ at 244a, he tells Phaedrus
that he is now speaking not as Phaedrus but as Stesichorus. Finally, as he concludes his
first speech, he acknowledges that he has been compelled to speak poetically
([palinw/diva] toi`~ ojnovmasin hjnagkasmevnh poihtikoi`~ tisin dia; Fai`dron eijrh`sqai,
257a).
Not only has he explicitly labeled his speech poetic in several ways, he has
equated it to several genres – that is, he begins with the dithyramb although he is
speaking subject matter proper to iambs; he then stumbles into epic, and ends up calling
himself Stesichorus and his work a palinw/diva. He is acknowledging a range of wellestablished genres, only to disregard their particular boundaries. At the same time, he is
171

That is, Socrates’ speech began with the phrase that traditionally opened the dithyrambic preludes, but
then fell into hexameters, i.e. epic. See e.g. Thompson (1868) 34.
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throughout maintaining some of the most important features of speeches – most
obviously, a general avoidance of meter. In this way, he illustrates vividly how easily
rhetoric and the poetic bleed into each other.172
We saw similar metaphorical comparisons of non-poets to poets in the Critias and
Cleitophon, although this one is different in several important ways. First, Socrates is in
fact slipping into meter now and then, whereas earlier comparisons were largely
facetious. Second, whereas earlier comparisons were applied by one speaker to another,
here Socrates assimilates himself to the poets.173 He seems, in fact, to be acting out, as it
were, the process of falling into divine inspiration, and demonstrating the lack of control
that poets have with regard to composing their poetry. The Phaedrus is here, like the Ion,
interested in connecting poetry more with divine inspiration – specifically divine
madness, in this case – than any kind of real knowledge, and moreover, in taking rhetoric
with it.174
A few passages later, in the course of describing the different kinds of madness
that can overtake a man, it goes even farther, describing how divine madness works, and
its effects:
labou`sa aJpalh;n kai; a[baton yuchvn, ejgeivrousa kai; ejkbakceuvousa katav
te w[/da;~ kai; kata; th;n a[llhn poivhsin, muriva tw`n palaiw`n e[rga
kosmou`sa tou;~ ejpigignomevnou~ paideuvei: o}~ d j a]n a[neu maniva~ Mousw`n
ejpi; poihtika;~ quvra~ ajfivkhtai, peisqei;~ wJ~ a[ra ejk tevcnh~ iJkano;~
poihth;~ ejsovmeno~, ajtelh;~ aujtov~ te kai; hJ poivhsi~ uJpo; th`~ tw`n
mainomevnwn hJ tou` swfronou`nto~ hjfanivsqh.

A sentiment Thucydides would likely approve of, although his ‘good’ category of lovgo~ would look
little like Plato’s.
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pace Tejera (1999) 45, who argues that Socrates resists being identified with the poets.
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See Tejera (1999) 44 on divine madness in the Phaedrus.
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(there is a madness that can seize a delicate and untrodden soul, wake it
up, and fill it with Bacchic frenzy175 towards wj/dhv and other poivhsi~, and,
decorating the countless deeds of the ancients, it educates later
generations; but he who comes to the poihtikav~ gates of the muses
without mania, persuaded that he will be a poihthv~ from tevcnh, he and his
poivhsi~, being ineffective and of a man in his right mind, will be
disappeared by the poivhsi~ of the madman, 245a.)
In many ways, the uses of the key terms here reinforce what we have seen elsewhere: the
poihthv~ is concerned with music, for instance, and his art is poivhsi~, and a major concern
of poetry is the education of posterity. Singling out wj/dhv as one among an assumed
multiplicity of kinds of poivhsi~ reinforces the broad inclusivity he is attributing to it, and
essentially makes room for rhetoric alongside the many other genres of the poetic. As
Tejera puts it, “Sokrates is broadening the conception of rhetoric in a way unheard of by
Phaedrus.”176 From the point of view of this project, however, Socrates is simply
clarifying that rhetoric is not distinct from poetry in anything significant, even if their
forms are distinct.
Also in this passage is the first of several uses in the dialogue of the adjective
poihtikov~ used with reference to literary productions.177 Later, the poihtikov~ will take its
place as sixth on the list of kinds of men that experienced souls will be drawn to, after the
philosopher, king and prophet, among others (248d-e), and then as one of the four kinds
of divine madness, and particularly the one associated with the Muses (265b). The final
appearance is at 257a, where Socrates ends his speech and comments on the ta; ojnovmata
poihtikav tina he was compelled to use. The Phaedrus is thus quite consistent with
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Elsewhere a poetic word, found in Sophocles and especially Euripides, and in once in the Rep.
Tejera (1999) 48.
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In fact, it is used in the Phaedrus only with reference to literary productions.
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regard to this adjective: it is always connected with madness of some kind, and especially
with the Muses – themselves, of course, the keepers of poetry.
This dialogue, more than the others, also allows us to see the poihthv~ as a
language-worker among other language-workers. There is the orator, of course, whose
work is often similar to the poet’s in spirit if not in form. Alongside the orator and poet,
however, this dialogue also shows us the philosopher: like the poet, he is divinely
possessed and inspired, but he retains a clearer memory of true being.178 In the discussion
of the different kinds of madness, Socrates explains that the soul of the philosopher
retains its wings, and describes his activities:
pro;~ ga;r ejkeivnoi~ ajeiv ejstin mnhvmh/ kata; duvnamin, pro;~ oi|sper qeo;~ w]n
qei`ov~ ejstin. toi`~ de; dh; toiouvtoi~ ajnh;r uJpomnhvmasin ojrqw`~ crwvmeno~,
televou~ ajei; teleta;~ telouvmeno~, tevleo~ o[ntw~ movno~ givgnetai:
ejxistavmeno~ de; tw`n ajnqrwpivnwn spoudasmavtwn kai; pro;~ tw/` qeivw/
gignovmeno~, nouqetei`tai me;n uJpo; tw`n pollw`n wJ~ parakinw`n,
ejnqousiavzwn de; levlhqen tou;~ pollouv~.
(For he is always, as far as he is able, by means of memory, among those
things among which god is divine. Now a man, if he use these
remembrances rightly, is always accomplishing perfect initiations, and he
alone truly achieves perfection; but stepping out from human pursuits and
turning to godly ones, he is rebuked by the majority as one who is
maddened, and it escapes their notice that he is inspired, 249c-d).
It is as if the direction of attention is the main distinction between poet and
philosopher here: both seem to be in the grip of some kind of madness, both deal with an
abstraction of reality. While the poet attempts to create compelling imitations of reality,
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The idea of the poet as an imperfect philosopher is also implied in the Phaedo, when Socrates says that
philosophy is the greatest kind of music (filosofiva~ me;n ou[sh~ megivsth~ mousikh`~, 61a); he explains that
he had turned finally to versification in case the dream telling him to practice music had meant music in the
literal sense (60e-61b).
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however, the philosopher is thrilled by his recognition of the original in the imperfect
copies in the world; the one aims at a better copy, the other at the original form. It is a
more mystical picture of the philosopher than Plato generally gives, but he is playing up,
rather than down, the similarities between that philosopher and the inspired poet/orator
that Socrates is all but acting out.
We saw above that the Ion was concerned with marking poetry off as a category
entirely distinct from lovgo~ and assigning it to the realm of the divine. The Phaedrus,
while it does retain the connection between poetry and divine, works to elide boundaries
between literary categories, to insert rhetoric into the category of the poetic, and even to
implicate philosophy. It makes use of the extended metaphors of orator as poet and the
conflation of rhetoric to tragedy, and even has Socrates slip through a variety of poetic
genres in the course of his speech; the lines between kinds of poetry, and between poetry
and any other kind of literary production, are shown to be thin, and any man can, at any
time, be seized by the gods and made a poet.
The Laws is even more explicit than the Ion and the Phaedrus about the
connection of the poet to the divine: the Athenian announces at 719c, for instance, that
poets do their work when, on the tripod of the Muses, they are struck out of their minds
by divine powers (poihthv~, oJpovtan ejn tw`/ trivpodi th`~ Mouvsh~ kaqivzhtai, tovte oujk
e[mfrwn ejstivn, 719c). Because of its interest in the social function of poetry, it goes
beyond all other dialogues, however, in the extent to which it emphasizes the musicality
of poetry: unlike the rest of the corpus, the Laws relies extensively on the language of
song and music, and does less with the POI- root words that are favored elsewhere.
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One exception to this is seen in the adjective poihtikov~, which is used in
interesting ways in this dialogue. For one thing, although the agent noun poihthv~ is
common, poihtikov~ also appears as a substantive that is not quite synonymous with the
agent noun, but that identifies an aspect of his nature. Thus at 700d, we are presented
with poets who are naturally poetic, but nonetheless ignorant of what was just and
customary in their art (a[rconte~ me;n th`~ ajmouvsou paranomiva~ poihtai; ejgivgnonto fuvsei
me;n poihtikoiv, ajgnwvmone~ de; peri; to; divkaion th`~ Mouvsh~ kai; to; novmimon); their
productions are inappropriate, but by virtue of their misunderstanding, not their natural
poetic inclination.179 Elsewhere a lovgo~ is poihtikov~, and the good lawmaker is said to be
capable of persuading the poihtikov~ man to compose rightly; in this dialogue, then, the
adjective is closely connected with its root meaning of creative and productive, although
the creativity and productivity are consistently channeled through language.
While the Laws thus presents a fairly unproblematic, if extreme, picture of poets
as musicians and their works as essentially performative music, two passages are
particularly interesting for the light they shed on literary categorization and the
significance of the adverb katalogavdhn. Towards the end of the work, the Athenian
explains that the lawgiver must be judge of all kinds of speech; finally, a dichotomy is set
up: the lawgiver must pay attention to speeches that are
ejn poihvmasin e[painoi kai; yovgoi periv tinwn levgontai kai; o{soi
katalogavdhn, ei{t j ejn gravmmasin ei[te kaq j hJmevran ejn tai`~ a[llai~
pavsai~ sunousivai~ dia; filonikiva~ te ajmfisbhtou`ntai kai; dia;
sugcwrhvsewn...
Compare 682a, where the poetic race often hits on truth with divine assistance (qei`on ga;r ou\n dh; kai; to;
poihtiko;n ejnqeastiko;n o]n gevno~ uJmnw/dou`n, pollw`n tw`n kat j ajlhvqeian gignomevnwn suvn tisin Cavrisin
kai; Mouvsai~ ejfavptetai eJkavstote).
179
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praises or censures spoken in poetry, and whatever is spoken
katalogavdhn, whether in writings or in all the various daily interactions
that occur in contention or agreement, 957c-d).
Here again, the organizational adverb is set against poihvmata, but it is now the one that is
further divided: it is both what is written and, although the significance is less clear, what
is said in the course of ordinary negotiations. This is a far less specific resonance than
elsewhere; it appears to encompass any language that isn’t poetry. In short, we have in
this passage a clear distinction between poetry and other, although both categories are
defined more by their content and context than their form. Additionally, as we have seen
before, the poihvmata seem to be the simpler category, with more distinctions required for
the other.
In an earlier passage, however, the adverb is used in a way more in keeping with
its appearances elsewhere. The Athenian is reflecting on the discussion thus far – which,
he observes, has been spoken like a poem (pantavpasi poihvsei tini; prosomoivw~
eijrh`sqai, 811c) – and claims that all discourses like theirs, whatever their form, deserve
to be recorded:
a]n a[ra pou peritugcavnh/ poihtw`n te poihvmata diexiw;n kai; gegrammevna
katalogavdhn h] kai; yilw`~ ou{tw~ a[neu tou` gegravfqai legovmena, ajdelfav
pou touvtwn tw`n lovgwn, mh; meqievnai trovpw/ mhdeniv, gravfesqai dev:
(if, searching, he should happen on poihvmata of the poihtaiv and things
written katalogavdhn or even spoken in a plain way without being written,
kin of this discourse, he must not let it go in any way, but have it written
down, 811e)
Here, as elsewhere, more than two categories are posited: there are poems, and
plain speech – presumably something like casual conversation – and an intermediate
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category of writings katalogavdhn. The interest is on content rather than form, but the
grouping of poihvmata and katalogavdhn against yilw`~ legovmena reinforces the idea that
katalogavdhn is a third category, a distinct kind of prose. While meter stands as one
important feature of poetry, then, its opposite – unmetered language – is here broken into
multiple categories; negotiations of literary type are located among the unmetered rather
than between the set with meter and the set without.
The Laws, then, presents a picture of poets and poetry that is within the spectrum
of valences seen elsewhere, but it also offers insights into how literary categories were
drawn. Language can be grouped by its lack of meter, but requires further discrimination
before the category is specific enough to be meaningful. That is, just as Thucydides
earlier distinguished his prose from that of other authors, and Isocrates identified his
prose as more poetic than its weaker counterparts, Plato here also acknowledges a third
category. It is, however, not a category related to poetry at all, but instead to some other
system of organization; poetry is put forward as a bounded category of musical
performance, while it is now unmetered language that needs more precise definition.
Whereas the previous dialogues emphasized the connection of the poets to the
divine, the Republic aggressively erases it and returns poets completely to the realm of
the human. They are consistently figured as craftsmen. We have seen elsewhere that,
while poihthv~ can, in certain circumstances, retain some of its old flexibility, it strains
the language somewhat, and its broader resonances are used carefully and with ample
warning. In the Republic, however, there are quick and unmarked switches between the
two meanings not once but twice. The passage opens at 594b with a reference to the
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tragic poihtaiv, a particular qualification found nowhere else; that is, a passage that will
be interested in generalizing the poet to a craftsman begins by emphasizing a
qualification that would normally be taken more or less for granted.180 Shortly afterwards,
596d introduces a discussion of poihtaiv of material goods that extends to 597d. 598d
then returns to the concept of the specifically literary poihthv~, in a discussion that
continues until 601b. Two sentences later, at 601d, the poihthv~ is again a material
craftsman, this time a flutemaker. The final references to poihtaiv, found in the discussion
spanning 605a through 606e, refer explicitly to the poet of language – and do so, in fact,
in fairly ordinary ways. That is, in a relatively short span of the dialogue, an equivalency
between poihtaiv of every sort is pushed by the unusual and sudden shifts between
productive realms. For the remainder of the dialogue, the poihthv~ will be an
unproblematic literary producer, a craftsman of language perfectly analogous to the
flutemaker.
Poets are normalized in other ways as well. At 330c, for instance, Socrates
remarks to Cephalus that, like most people who have not personally earned their wealth,
he seems somewhat indifferent to it, whereas those who have earned it themselves are
quite fond of it, as fathers are their children or poets are their poems (w{sper ga;r oiJ
poihtai; ta; auJtw`n poihvmata kai; oiJ patevre~ tou;~ pai`da~ ajgapw`sin, tauvth/ te dh; kai; oiJ
crhmatisavmenoi peri; ta; crhvmata spoudavzousin wJ~ e[rgon eJautw`n, kai; kata; th;n

It is not clear that an unqualified poihthv~ at this point would necessarily be understood as a tragedian,
but the point is he would almost certainly be assumed to be a literary producer unless he were marked
otherwise.
180
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creivan h|/per oiJ a[lloi).181 The comparison of all three productions – children, wealth and
poems – to e[rga emphasizes the very active role that the creators in each case played,
and plays down the exceptionality of the poet.
Moreover, poets are put forward as just one kind of language-worker among
several, and are shown as quite similar to them. 392a, for instance, claims that both
poihtaiv and logopoioiv fail to speak rightly about the issues most important to mankind
(kai; poihtai; kai; logopoioi; kakw`~ levgousin peri; ajnqrwvpwn ta; mevgista). Shortly after,
it is asserted that the poets and mythologists work in similar ways (a\r j ouj pavnta o{sa uJpo;
muqolovgwn h\ poihtw`n levgetai dihvghsi~ ou\sa tugcavnei h\ gegonovtwn h\ o[ntwn h\
mellovntwn… 392d). Even in the following section, when the discussion turns to manner
rather than matter and different kinds of poetic genres are recognized, poets are presented
as essentially craftsmen like any other. Tragedians and comedians and their productions
are used as examples, but it becomes clear when the conversation returns to the guardians
that they are only examples, not exceptions; poetry is just one of the imitative crafts from
which the guardians are to be released (tou;~ fuvlaka~ hJmi`n tw`n a[llwn pasw`n
dhmiourgiw`n ajfeimevnou~, 395c).
The poets’ productions, too, are regularly presented as another craft among crafts,
as at 493d, where a man might make a demonstration of his poetry or political service or
duty, h] poivhsin h[ tina a[llhn dhmiourgivan h] povlei diakonivan. However, while poems
are an entirely human creation in this dialogue, poetry nonetheless possesses a unique
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power that is not shared by other kinds of literary productions. In concluding their
discussion of poetry in book ten, for instance, Socrates asks his companions to agree that
poivhsi~ has been rightly dismissed from the city on the grounds of her essence. It is
acknowledged that poivhsi~ would be welcomed into the city with pleasure if it could be
shown that she were necessary to a well-governed city, but they are cautious, being
conscious of her ability to charm:
h\ ga;r, w\ fivle, ouj khlh/` uJp j aujth`~ kai; suv, kai; mavlista o{tan di j JOmhvrou
qewrh`/~ aujthvn…
poluv ge.
oujkou`n dikaiva ejsti;n ou{tw katievnai, ajpologhsamevnh ejn mevlei h[ tini
a[llw/ mevtrw/…
pavnu me;n ou\n.
doi`men dev gev pou a]n kai; toi`~ prostavtai~ aujth`~, o{soi mh; poihtikoiv,
filopoihtai; dev, a[neu mevtrou lovgon uJpe;r aujth`~ eijpei`n, wJ~ ouj movnon
hJdei`a ajlla; kai; wjfelivmh pro;~ ta;~ politeiva~ kai; to;n bivon to;n
ajnqrwvpinovn ejstin: kai; eujmenw`~ ajkousovmeqa.
(So, friend, are you too not charmed by her, particularly when you see her
through Homer?
Very much.
Is it not right, then, that she return when she has defended herself in a
mevlo~ or some other meter?
Definitely so.
And should we grant to her champions, as many as are not poihtikoiv but
filopoihtaiv, to speak a lovgo~ without meter on her behalf, about how she
is not only sweet but also beneficial to the polity and human life? And we,
being favorable, will listen? 607d-e.)
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Since poets do their work without divine assistance in this dialogue, the power of
poetry must be a result of its form, its music and meter, as well as its content. Thus it is
poetry that charms Homer’s audience, rather than Homer himself, as he is merely the
craftsman. Similarly, poetry’s defenders must speak their lovgo~ without meter, while she
would defend herself in a mevlo~. That is, while the poihthv~ has become indistinguishable
from the logopoiov~ in many ways, poivhsi~ remains dangerous.
Here again, perhaps more fully than elsewhere, language has been separated out
from poetry, but in this case it is the safer component.182 However, if the poet is defined
by his skill in the manipulation of a particular kind of language, but his production
nonetheless is powerful beyond those of other language workers, the power must lie
elsewhere, neither in the language nor the poet. Plato puts it into the form, the music and
meter; in this way, he maintains the integrity of language to be used unproblematically by
those who use it for the right ends.
Whereas the Ion, the Phaedrus, and Laws, then, are concerned to remove
knowledge and tevcnh from the poet as much as possible – a move not made with
particular force elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, let alone in other authors, and thus one
that stands out in those dialogues – the Republic aims to make its poet so completely a
craftsman that the terminology of inspiration is entirely avoided.183 If the Ion, Phaedrus
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A similar separation is implied early in the dialogue at 393c-d, where the poet, if he did not hide himself
(ajpokruvptoito), his whole poivhsi~ and dihvghsi~ would be without mimesis.
183
Or rather, language of inspiration is avoided entirely except for a pun on a usual term for inspiration,
ejnqeov~, at 382d, where Socrates asserts that there is no false poet in god: poihth;~ me;n a[ra yeudh;~ ejn qew/`
oujk e[ni;; see Mitscherling (2009) 213. See also Murray (1996) 153, although she finds less humor in the
word play.
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and Laws went to an extreme to connect poetry to the divine, the Republic goes to the
extreme of severing its ties to the gods.
The dialogues’ assumptions about literary categories, too, differ. The Ion
emphasizes how poetry is distinct from lovgo~, removing it from the world of human
control and raising it to that of the divine. The Phaedrus, on the other hand, pushes for an
equation of poetry and a certain kind of lovgo~, making the orator as prone to divine
inspiration as the poet. The Laws draws a fairly simple line around metered and musical
speech as a unified category, but then proposes finer distinctions for unmetered language.
The Republic, finally, returns the poet firmly to the world of humans, but pulls language
away from poetry in a move similar to, if more extreme than, what was done in the Ion.
Each of these moves stands out as unique in the corpus, but they are nonetheless
natural extensions of ideas and assumptions expressed elsewhere. More than any other
author, Plato is concerned about the role of the divine in poetry and the degree of control
poets have over their productions. When poetry is not the explicit subject of a discussion,
craft and divine inspiration work in tandem more or less unproblematically, but one or
the other can be emphasized according to his needs. Plato also gives more weight to the
role of music in poetry than is seen elsewhere; while he can and does use poetry for its
content, its ideal presentation is never completely forgotten. Moreover, he makes more
use of the ambiguity of language, how it is at once the medium of poetry and rhetoric, but
also of philosophical dialectic. In an effort to address that problem, he experiments with a
variety of ways to bound off the dangerous language while preserving the beneficial one
for himself and his own productions.
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In spite of the contradictions between and among dialogues, however, poetry in
Plato can be generally defined as language to which craftsmanship, inspiration and
musical performance have been applied in some combination, and whose power is
attributed variously to each of those. He is never able to entirely satisfy himself, it seems,
as to the nature of poetry’s power and how it relates to the other language arts, as his
different attempts to align it or divorce it from those arts demonstrates. However, it is a
stable enough idea that the extended metaphors of the Phaedrus and the shifts between
the literary and the non-literary meaning of terms in the Republic are effective: poetry is,
for Plato, bounded off clearly enough as a category that he can use it as a meaningful
signifier. It is, however, a signifier that often takes other kinds of lovgo~ with it, and thus
serves less to mark off poetry as to mark off Plato’s own method of language use. One of
the reasons for this is his simultaneous interest in distinguishing his project from that of
the orators and sophists; literary categorization was so important to Plato because he was
self-consciously creating a place for himself and his own philosophical use of language,
and poetry was one of several ‘others’ against which he sought to define his own works.

***

In some ways, we find these authors engaged in the same kinds of negotiations we
saw in the fifth century authors, although some of the terms have changed. There is little
importance placed on distinguishing the various categories of poetry in Isocrates or Plato,
although they can appeal to genres when they wish; unmetered language, on the other
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hand, is now the site of the great negotiations of literary categories. As such, there has
been an explosion of definitional terms to delineate the literary non-poet: rJhvtwr,
sofisthv~ and many other labels now stand beside logopoiov~ and logovgrafo~ as
available categories for literary makers who are not poihtaiv. Alongside these are a
number of neologisms – organizational adverbs, adjectives in –kov~ and substantives in
–khv, and, to a lesser degree, specifying compounds built on the POI- root – that
demonstrate a continuing interest in marking off literary typologies with precision,
although fewer and fewer of them are focused on the metrical set.
Those same organizational adverbs that acknowledge the importance of form to
typology, however, also reveal an ongoing resistance to a simple dichotomy. Isocrates
and Plato both, in several places, draw a simple line between language that is metered
and language that is not, but they also insist on more complex divisions: of language that
is metered against language that is organized in some other way, against another set of
language that is explicitly sung, against yet another set for which the fact of its having
been written is essential. However, as the set of metered language becomes a more
defined and unified category, its unmetered partner increasingly demands greater
differentiation of its types. In order to articulate these, we find both Plato and Isocrates
resorting to differentiation by means of content, context and function. This is especially
true for Plato, whose interest in identifying a literary product’s end will be seen in a more
fully expressed form in Aristotle’s own literary categories.
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Chapter Three: Aristotelian Poetics
Aristotle stands out immediately for his explicit attempts to systematize the
categories of literature, especially in the Poetics, although we will find that a great deal of
what he has to say about rhetoric in the Rhetoric provides a kind of negative-space
picture of the poetic. The very fact of producing a treatise on poetry, as Lloyd and others
have observed, implies an idea of poetic as a complete and discrete organism, and
moreover one that can be investigated and studied as a thing in itself.184 On the other
hand, the fact that Aristotle thought it worthwhile to expound on his theories in a treatise
suggests that he felt there was an argument to be made about the role, powers, and
definition of poetry – that is, that these remained far from settled questions.
There can be no question that Aristotle’s ideas about poetry depended to a greater
or lesser degree on his teachers and community. Indeed, in the previous chapters we have
seen a number of ways in which the other authors prefigure Aristotle’s methodology,
especially in drawing his boundaries not by virtue of form but by virtue of the causes that
shape his scientific methodologies elsewhere.185 The Poetics as a whole has sometimes
been understood as a response to Plato’s denunciation of poetry, and the knowledge and
opinions of the audience – presumably not always one of philosopher-kings – are taken
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See e.g. Lloyd (1968) 282, Sifakis (2001a) 28-9.
A methodology we will have occasion to refer to in the course of the study, analyzing his own works by
means of the method he relied on; that is, the causes of a given thing will frequently be identified as part of
its definition. The clearest explanation of Aristotle’s system of four causes can be found at Physics 194b
and 198a; see also Meijering (1987) 102-3, who discusses the relationship of the theory of causes to poetry
in general and the Poetics in particular.
185
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into account in discussions of poetry’s effects on both performer and spectator.186 While it
is impossible to know the degree to which Aristotle had Plato in his sights, there are
certainly points of contact between their analyses of the poetic in a number of places. It
would be detrimental, however, to focus only on Plato, as Aristotle is clearly in dialogue
with many of his predecessors. That is to say, Aristotle’s Poetics is very much a product
of its time and place; the work of the previous chapters, then, while directed towards
more immediate ends, supply us with a fuller picture of the poetic theories underlying
Aristotle’s approaches than we might otherwise have had.
For instance, while his rejection of meter as a determining factor in poetry has
been seen as an important departure from standard Greek attitudes,187 we have in fact
observed similar gestures in every author examined. Thucydides, for instance, turned to
artfulness and context to distinguish his prose when meter left him grouped with
productions that, although they were unmetered, he found far too poetic. The situation is
similar with regard to Aristotle’s elision of the divine: in spite of Plato’s vocal insistence
in several dialogue on the central role of the supernatural in poetry, Herodotus’ poets, like
Aristotle’s, are essentially craftsmen who do their work by tecnhv like any other artist,
with no particular cachet. These are the kinds of continuities that this study brings into
focus, and by which in turn we are able to better understand the tradition behind the
Poetics.
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On the Poetics as a response to Plato, see e.g. Lloyd (1968) 282: “Aristotle’s most important
contribution to literary criticism was to have rescued poetry from the denunciations of Plato. Against Plato,
he emphasized the seriousness and moral value of poetry, arguing that what the poet represents is the
universal, even though he does so by means of the particular.” On the relationship more generally, see e.g.
Halliwell (1987) 72-3, Orsini (1975) 63-64.
187
Halliwell (1987) 71.
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What is almost certainly new with Aristotle is a theory of poetry that is fully and
scientifically articulated, and largely consistent through the corpus. This allows us to
consider a number of previously latent relationships. Aristotle gives us the chance to
examine the relationship of individual genres to each other and to the larger idea of
poetry, for instance, as well as the points of contact and differentiation between poetry
and music that have been hinted at in earlier authors. Because we can, for the first time,
assert confidently that the author in question actually had a more or less clear, consistent
and considered conception of the poetic, this chapter will take a slightly different shape
than the previous ones. After the discussion of relevant language, we will have occasion
to reflect on how this work informs our understanding of Aristotle’s poetics in general, as
well as of the Poetics specifically.

***

The term poihtikhv, as we have seen, was a comparatively recent addition to the
critical vocabulary.188 It is precisely poihtikhv, of course, that Aristotle presents as the
subject of his treatise on poetry; the force of the word in general, however, let alone to
Aristotle as the subject of his treatise, is not immediately clear.189 We begin our
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Its appearance in the fourth century, as discussed above, is thought to reflect an important conceptual
shift towards a coherent and articulated conception of poetry, although it was still very much a work in
progress. See e.g. Halliwell (1986) 10: “[I]t is arguable that the development of terminology does reflect a
shift in the balance of ideas about the nature of poetry.”
189
Although, as mentioned above, most scholars now accept that it should be understood, like rJhtorikhv, as
modifying an elided tevcnh. On Aristotle’s conceptions of tevcnh, see e.g. Halliwell (1986) 42ff.
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discussion, then, with a review of the opening of the Poetics, to which we will return
after an investigation of the resonances of the term.
Peri; poihtikh; aujth`~ te kai; tw`n eijdw`n aujth`~, h{n tina duvnamin e{kaston
e[cei, kai; pw`~ dei` sunivstasqai tou`~ muvqou~ eij mevllei kalw`~ e{xein hJ
poivhsi~, e[ti de; ejk povswn kai; poivwn ejsti; morivwn, oJmoivw~ de; kai; peri; tw`n
a[llwn o{sa th`~ aujth`~ ejsti meqovdou, levgwmen ajrcavmenoi kata; fuvsin
prw`ton ajpo; tw`n prwvtwn.
(Concerning poihtikhv, itself and the kinds of it, what power each has, how
one must organize the plot if the poivhsi~ is going to be nobly done, and
furthermore from how many constituent parts, and what sort of constituent
parts, and similarly concerning the other things,190 as many as are relevant
to an investigation of it, let us speak, first beginning, following natural
order, from first principles, Poetics 1447a 1-12)
We are immediately reminded of another language art to which Aristotle devoted
a great of thought: rhetoric. A closer comparison will serve us well here, as Aristotle does
provide a precise definition for rJhtorikhvv early in the Rhetoric: e[stw dh; rJhtorikh;
duvnami~ peri; e{kaston tou` qewrh`sai to; ejndecovmenon piqanovn (So let rhetoric be the
faculty of seeing all possible proofs for any given thing, 1355b 26f).191 That is, he intends
us to understand rJhtorikhvv as a capacity, an intellectual process in potentiality.192 By
analogy, then, poihtikhv should also be primarily a capacity, at least when used in its
technical resonance.193 With this as our starting assumption, we turn to the three other
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This is, as Golden and Hardison (1982) 67 observe, hardly an exhaustive list, but rather gives a picture
of the kinds of inquiries Aristotle will pursue.
191
The imperative and strong particle suggest that Aristotle is indeed making an assertion, and that he
expects that his audience will not have considered it in quite this way before.
192
Understanding tevcnh here in its fullest sense, as both the innate inclination to learn a thing and the
knowledge of the method of executing it.
193
A broader resonance than in Plato, where it seemed to apply strictly to the art.
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treatises (in addition to the Poetics) in which it appears, and begin to illuminate the
contours of that capacity.194
In the on Interpretation, Aristotle proposes to treat only a particular kind of
sentence: the proposition (ajpofantikov~), which is the kind of sentence in which truth or
falsehood take part (ajpofantiko;~ de; ouj pa`~, ajll j ejn w|/ to; ajlhqeuvein h] yeuvdesqai
uJpavrcei, 17a 3-4). The investigation of other kinds of sentences, those to which truth and
falsehood do not apply, is proper to rhetoric and poetry, rather than dialectic (oiJ me;n ou\n
a[lloi ajfeivsqwsan, rJhtorikh`~ ga;r hj poihtikh`~ oijkeiotevra hJ skevyi~, oJ de;
ajpofantiko;~ th`~ nu`n qewriva~, 17a 6-8).195 This is definition by negation, but it does
provide an important detail: poetics, like rhetoric, is not concerned with judgments of
truth, as dialectic is.196
A passing usage at Metaphysics 991a 21-22 points to a similar conclusion. In the
course of explaining the Forms, Aristotle is systematically rejecting false conceptions of
them for various reasons. One of these reasons is that a kind of language inapplicable to
the subject has been adduced: to; de; levgein paradeivgmata aujta; ei\nai kai; metevcein
aujtw`n ta\lla kenologei`n ejsti; kai; metafora;~ levgein poihtikav~ (saying that [these
Forms] are models and that other things have a share in them is to say nothing
meaningful and to speak poetic metaphors).197 Aristotle is not here saying that calling the
Forms patterns is to say something false, but that subjects have linguistic methodologies
194

Leaving out one instance in the Politics that is simply naming the treatise, and of course the appearances
unrelated to literary productions – like its relatives, it retained its broader meaning through Aristotle.
195
Compare Poetics 1460b 14f, where Aristotle observes that each art has a unique “standard of
correctness,” as the Loeb has it (ojrqovth~).
196
For a concise overview of Aristotle’s conception of dialectic, see Hamlyn (1990).
197
Innes (2003) provides an extended discussion of metaphor in ancient literary theory and criticism; see
especially 12-20 for Aristotle’s perspectives.
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appropriate to them, and that application of the wrong method to a given subject will not
result in anything meaningful.198 It is philosophy that is wanted here, not poetry, and
poihtikhv is simply not relevant to philosophical inquiry. Alongside the on Interpretation
passage, the implication is that, in order to find the truth, one must use a method relevant
to truth. More important for the purposes of this study is the extension of that rule: since
poihtikhv is inapplicable to questions with truth-value, the exercise of this capacity
simply does not intersect with the plane of scientific or philosophical truth.
We find at Rhetoric 1404a more information about the process this capacity of
poihtikhv underlies. Here, Aristotle observes that most uneducated people think the poetic
style is the most beautiful, but fail to realize that there is a different levxi~ for lovgo~ and
poivhsi~.199 He goes on to give what he considers to be proof of his claim:
dhloi` de; to; sumbai`non: oujde; ga;r oiJ ta;~ tragw/diva~ poiou`nte~ e[ti
crw`ntai to;n aujto;n trovpon, ajll j w{sper kai; ejk tw`n tetramevtrwn eij~ to;
ijambei`on metevbhsan dia; to; tw`/ lovgw/ tou`to tw`n mevtrwn oJmoiovtaton ei\nai
tw`n a[llwn, ou{tw kai; tw`n ojnomavtwn ajfeivkasin o{sa para; th;n diavlektovn
ejstin, oi|~ oiJ prw`ton ejkovsmoun, kai; e[ti nu`n oiJ ta; eJxavmetra poiou`nte~.
(the result is clear: for those making tragedies no longer use the same
manner, but just as they changed from tetrameters into iambs, because that
is the most similar of the meters to lovgo~, so also they got rid of all those
words, as many as are beyond the scope of dialectic, words with which the
earliest creators adorned, and with which the ones making hexameters
now still adorn, 1404a 29-36)
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Thus also Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary ad loc, where he paraphrases Aristotle’s objection: “it is
vain and useless to posit exemplars of this kind, as he will show; and second, because this manner of
speaking is similar to the metaphors which the poets introduce, which do not pertain to the philosopher.”
199
On the technical significance of levxi~ in Aristotle, especially in the Poetics, see Grintser (2002) 77-78
and Swiggers and Wouters (1995) 21-22. On the relationship between grammar and poetic levxi~, especially
with regard to the Poetics, see especially Swiggers and Wouters (2002) passim. The reference here to the
uneducated audience speaks against the claims for an audience consisting solely of an educated elite; see
e.g. Golden (1976) 356, whose interpretation of catharsis hinges on an exclusively aristocratic audience.
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We see here how utterly natural Aristotle envisions the relationship between those
methods and their style to be: the change in meter naturally resulted in a corresponding
change in levxi~.200 Moreover, although it is clear that the oiJ who are ornamenting their
productions are poets, it is significant that their identification rests in their verbal activity
rather than their nominal label: it is their activity to which attention is drawn. The
suggestion is of a methodology in service of a particular end: anyone wishing to create or
judge a particular kind of poetry or speech rightly will need to familiarize himself with
the kinds of vocabulary and linguistic features (among other things) that are appropriate
to the form in question, and it is the capacity of poihtikhv that allows that.
The Rhetoric provides an important nuance. Although poihtikhv with its literary
sense appears rarely in the early parts of the treatise, it shows up a number of times in the
third book, in the discussions of style and organization (levxi~ and tavxi~). Early in the
discussion, Aristotle remarks on the importance of using the kind of levxi~ that is
appropriate to a given lovgo~:
wJrivsqw levxew~ ajreth; safh` ei\nai: shmei`on ga;r o{ti oJ lovgo~, eja;n mh;
dhloi`, ouj poihvsei to; eJautou` e[rgon: kai; mhvte tapeinh;n mhvte uJpe;r to;
ajxivwma, ajlla; prevpousan: hJ ga;r poihtikh; i[sw~ ouj tapeinhv, ajll j ouj
prevpousa lovgw/.
(let it be emphasized that the excellence of levxi~ is clarity; the evidence of
this is that a lovgo~, if it does not clarify, does not do its proper work.
Moreover, it should be neither lowly nor beyond its worth, being properly
suited; so poihtikhv, perhaps, is not lowly, but neither is it properly suited
to lovgo~, 1404b 1-6)
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Cope ad loc. remarks here on the lack of speculation on Aristotle’s part on why the poets’ made these
changes; I suggest that that is the wrong question: rather, as we will see below, we should imagine the poets
adapting their methods to suit the adaptations they observe. Aristotle says as much at Poetics 1448b 19ff.
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Here, rhetoric is the capacity underlying the linguistic process that produces lovgo~, and it
differs from the poetic in two interrelated ways. First, lovgo~ and the product of poihtikhv
may both do better to avoid the lowly style, but they clearly occupy different realms
regardless; that is, poihtikhv produces something other than lovgo~, but parallel to it.
Second, the proper work of lovgo~, the aspect that determines its excellence, is its
clarity.201 The proper work of poihtikhv is not here defined, but it must be something
other than clarity.202 From these three passages, then, we begin to see sketched out the
details of the capacity for a linguistic method that is not relevant to scientific proofs of
truth, that is not useful for philosophical inquiry, and that produces something that may
have a great deal in common with lovgo~ in its levxi~, but is nonetheless not reliant on
clarity, which is essential to lovgo~. Of course, all of these are definitions by negation, but
Aristotle’s attempts in the remainder of book III to mark off the territory of rJhtorikhvv
from poihtikhv allow us to bring the latter into higher relief.
One place where this becomes particularly clear is in the discussion of the stilted
style (levxi~ yuvcra).203 He identifies four major causes of stiltedness, and goes on to
explain how the specific features that bring it about must be used sparingly in lovgo~,
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Cope (1877c) 13 observes that Aristotle is here following a rule laid out by Plato in Rep.352d, and
elsewhere expressed by Aristotle, that the virtue of anything that can be used as a tool lies in its e[rgon. He
concludes that this refers to all language, as Halliwell asserts throughout his commentary on the Poetics,
but what is interesting in this passage is that, in fact, it seems to refer only to a specific kind of language –
namely, rhetoric – while releasing at least poetics from the restriction.
202
That is, if its end were clarity, it would not differ significantly from rhetoric, and its product would not
differ significantly from lovgo~; compare Rhet. 1355b 27-8, which asserts that each art has a unique
purview. pace Halliwell, who insists on clarity as proper to all language arts, e.g. (1987) 161.
203
Demetrius §114f addresses this: he defines the levxi~ yuvcra as megaloprevpeia, or using a loftier style
than the subject matter deserves. See Cope (1970) 286-287 for more on the term.
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although they are more acceptable in poihtikhv.204 The first cause is compound words
(divplwsi~), and he gives examples from Lycophron and Gorgias, explaining that they
seem poetic because of being compound (pavnta ga;r tau`ta poihtika; dia; th;n divplwsin
faivnetai, 1406a 5-6). The second cause is the use of unusual or foreign words
(glw`ttai), with Lycophron and Alcidamas supplying examples.205
He spends more time on the third and fourth causes. The third problem is epithets
(ejpivqetoi) that are too long, or too out of place, or too densely used. These can make a
lovgo~ exotic and interesting if used moderately, but they are appropriate to poetry and
not to lovgo~ (1406a 5).206 Again, though, the question is one of matching the proper style
to the particular end. Certain features of language are acceptable in any kind of literary
product in moderation, but using too many features that are more appropriate to one
method will make the product less suited for the end of any other method. Compounds
are suited to dithyrambs, for example, unfamiliar words to epic, and metaphors to iambs,
but all of these must be used sparingly in lovgo~.207 Just as using the wrong instrument or
mode will harm the integrity of a literary production, so also will using the wrong kind of
word.208

Cooper (1938) 62-3 provides a lucid summary of the overlapping categories of levxi~ discussed in both
the Rhetoric and the Poetics.
205
He does not explain his reasoning in this instance, although it becomes clear from the passages that
follow that he is concerned with the distancing effect of unfamiliar language.
206
Compare Poetics 1460b 12, where these same elements are explicitly described as ‘given to the poets’
([glw`ttai, metaforai;, polla; pavqh th`~ levxew~] divdomen ga;r tau`ta toi`~ poihtai`~.).
207
This allocation is made at Poetics 1459a 9-14, although Aristotle provides no further explanation for the
suitability.
208
Compare to Demetrius §§78 and 91, where he says that an accumulation of metaphors will make a
dithyramb instead of a lovgo~.
204
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The fourth cause of yuvcra, finally, is metaphors, which are inappropriate to
lovgo~ for three primary reasons: some are ridiculous by association, because the comic
poets use them; others are far-fetched and tragic; and others, like those of Gorgias, are
obscure (crw`ntai ga;r kai; oiJ kwmw/dopoioi; metaforai`~, aiJ de; dia; to; semno;n a[gan kai;
tragikovn: ajsafei`~ de;, a]n povrrwqen. oi|on Gorgiva~..., 1406b 7-9).209 The problem with
these, he says, is that they are unpersuasive, mainly because they obscure the plain
meaning – no one can be persuaded by what he does not understand. That is, just as
arguments composed according to the poetic method were not effective in philosophical
contexts, so too they will not be effective in a rhetorical context, in part because the kinds
of language suited to them obfuscate the clarity that rhetoric demands.
What overuse of compounds, inclusion of foreign words, excessive epithets, and
metaphors share – what, presumably, makes them all suited to poihtikhv and unsuited to
rJhtorikhvv – is that they are unfamiliar.210 Unfamiliar things, in their turn, are
unpersuasive, as he has observed previously (a{panta ga;r tau`ta ajpivqana dia; ta;
eijrhmevna, 1406b 20). The fuller explanation appears in the previous chapter: on account
of speaking poetically in the improper situation, [those using unfamiliar language] make
[their lovgo~ ] laughable211 and stilted, and unclear through inconclusiveness (dio;
poihtikw`~ levgonta~ th/` ajprepeiva/, to; geloi`on kai; to; yucro;n ejmpoiou`si, kai; ta; ajsafe;~
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Gorgias is a favorite source of examples for Aristotle in his discussions of style, perhaps because he was
an obvious illustration of excessively poetic prose – an accusation he would likely have enjoyed.
210
On the idea that this unfamiliarity might make them in some way painful, make them ‘sufferings of
speech’ (pavqh th`~ levxew~, Poetics 1460b 12), see Grintser (2002) 87-8.
211
Here understanding geloi`o~ as a harmless error, as described at Poet. 1449a. Halliwell (2008) 326
explores the implications of this definition on Aristotle’s general idea of humor; 307-331 offers a detailed
discussion of laughter as an ethical virtue in Aristotle more broadly.
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dia; th;n ajdolescivan,212 1406a 32-34). As we know, lack of clarity is a fatal flaw for
lovgo~, but it seems to be closely linked to poihtikhv, perhaps even to the extent that lack
of clarity, in some capacity, is desirable.213
To this point, we have seen that poihtikhv can be understood, in its technical sense
at least, as the capacity for a process whose medium is language, and whose end does not
involve questions of truth and falsehood. A second aspect of it became clear in the
Rhetoric: not only is clarity not part of its work, but lack of clarity, intentional
unfamiliarity in particular respects and in particular situations, is even proper to it. A last
passage from the Rhetoric provides more information as to its end.214 Discussing pleasure
and its several sources, Aristotle mentions that the imitative arts are pleasant because
seeing them brings knowledge:215
ejpei; de; to; manqavnein te hJdu; kai; to; qaumavzein, kai; ta; toiavde ajnavgkh
hJdeva ei\nai oi|on tov te mimouvmenon, w{sper grafikh; kai; ajndriantopoiiva
kai; poihtikhvv, kai; pa`n o{ a]n eu\ memimhmevnon h\/, ka]n h\/ mh; hJdu; aujto; to;
memimhmevnon:216 ouj ga;r ejpi; touvtw/ caivrei, ajlla; sullogismo;~ e[stin o{ti
tou`to ejkei`no, w{ste manqavnein ti sumbaivnei.
212

Reading this term more generously than is usually done. The force of it, however, if we look to Socrates’
definition at Theaetetus 195c and Theophrastus’ Characters 3, is more than just garrulousness. Socrates, in
Fowler’s rendering, calls it ajdolescivan “when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so
stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them.” Theophrastus
has “ajdolescivan is the discoursing of much and inconsidered talk.” That is, it is essentially ineffective
dialectic, which is how I understand it here. Compare to Clouds 1480 and Isocrates 13.8, the former on the
methods practiced in the Thinkery, the latter on the purpose of the Sophistic methods.
213
c.f. 1460b 13f on the correctness of poetry being unlike correctness in other things, which will be taken
up in more detail below. See also e.g. Halliwell (1986) 132: “Aristotle’s poet is not expected to assert or
argue (though he must know how to make his characters do so).”
214
Again, according to Aristotle, to know a thing’s causes, especially its end or final cause, allows you to
know the thing itself.
215
Burnyeat (1978) provides a lucid overview of the several kinds of knowledge that Aristotle conceives of,
as well as a summary of scholarship on the subject.
216
Several emendations have been suggested for this passage, as scholars have not been satisfied with it as
it stands; the problem lies with the substantives that Aristotle offers as examples of the kinds of imitations
he’s talking about. Many have understood these as signifying the products of those arts, rather than the
productivity latent in it. Cope ad loc., for instance, says “we must either read here with Vater grafikh/v &c.
in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the ‘art’ in the three cases is carelessly substituted
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(Since it is also pleasurable to learn and marvel, those kinds of things must
be pleasant also, such as an imitating, like painting and sculpting and
creating poihtikhv, and everything which has been imitated well, even if
the thing imitated is not pleasurable itself; for the pleasure is not in this,
but is the inference that this is that, so that we happen to learn something,
1371b 3-8)
This gives us two further aspects of poihtikhv. First, we see that it should lead to
knowledge,217 and specifically to a kind of knowledge associated with iterative study and
habituation more than demonstrable facts. Secondly, the pleasure is an intellectual one
involving deductive reasoning.218 Given all of this, we can provide a working definition
of poihtikhv, at least in its most technical sense: it is the faculty of a method of production
whose medium is language, whose concern is something unrelated to truth, whose form
does not rely on clarity to be effective, and whose end is deductive learning.
To return, then, to the Poetics. To claim that the poihtikhv in the introduction of
the Poetics text should refer to the capacity of making poetry rather than the product or
abstract concept will not meet enormous opposition, although it has by no means always
been assumed to signify such.219 However, this force can fruitfully be brought to bear
elsewhere as well. When describing the attributes of tragedy, for instance (Poetics 1450a
38ff), Aristotle observes that the last component, o[yi~, is emotionally powerful but rather
outside the particular art and, moreover, least native to the poetic (hJ de; o[yi~
for the ‘product’ or result of the art.” However, we saw above that poihtikhv, like rJhtorikhv,v signifies a
capacity for a process or method of linguistic construction. In light of this, all three terms are perfectly
comprehensible – perhaps a bit more comprehensible – as nominatives identifying methods. See also
Grimaldi (1974) 263-4, who highlights the present tense of the first participle as evidence for understanding
the substantives as processes. That the second and third participles are perfects only strengthens this.
217
The indicative in the result clause, of course, emphasizing that learning actually takes place.
218
On the intellectual nature of poetry in Aristotle’s conception, see Else (1963) 128-130, Lord (1982) 92.
219
See e.g. Else (1963) 3-4 and n.11, who adamantly rejects translating the term as ‘poetry’, which has
historically been preferred.
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yucagwgiko;n mevn, ajtecnovtaton de; kai; h{kista oijkei`on th`~ poihtikh`~, 1450b 16-17).
The following sentence, introduced with an explanatory particle, explains why: o[yi~
refers to the physical, actual performance, and so belongs to the arts of competition and
acting, and is better handled by the costumer (hJ ga;r th`~ tragw/diva~ duvnami~ kai; a[neu
ajgw`no~ kai; uJpokritw`n e[stin, e[ti de; kuriwtevra peri; th;n ajpergasivan tw`n o[yewn hJ tou`
skeupoiou` tevcnh th`~ tw`n poihtw`n ejstin, 1450a 17-18). This separation of the poetic and
the literal, live production necessarily turns the focus away from the finished product to
only the elements active in its composition, as poihtikhv should imply.220
One final passage must be addressed before turning to the other terms of the
poetic. In his description of how best to construct plots (1455a 21ff), Aristotle observes
that the poet who actually, physically, performs his plot as he composes it will be the
more effective, as having his own soul in the grip of particular emotions he wishes to
convey will make his poetry more likely to produce the same effects on his audience:221
dei` de; tou;~ muvqou~ sunistavnai kai; th/` levxei sunapergavzesqai o{ti
mavlista pro; ojmmavtwn tiqevmenon:222 ... o{sa de; dunato;n kai; toi`~
schvmasin sunapergazovmenon: piqanwvtatoi ga;r ajpo;; th`~ aujth`~ fuvsew~
oiJ ejn toi`~ pavqesivn eijsin, kai; ceimaivnei oJ ceimazovmeno~ kai; calepaivnei
oJ ojrgizovmeno~ ajlhqinwvtata.
(One should join up the plot and elaborate in the levxi~ what is as much as
possible laid out before the mind’s eye. … As far as possible also, it
should be elaborated with gestures; for, through nature itself, they are
most convincing who share in the passions, and he who is in a state of
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In a sense, then, it is drawing a distinction similar to that which Herodotus drew with his use of POIwords compared to AOID- words, as discussed above in chapter one.
221
The central role of emotion to the poetic, which Aristotle here takes for granted, will be taken up below.
On the assumption of a direct connection between the speaker’s emotions and the audience’s, see Meijering
(1987) 15-16.
222
Meijering (1987) 16-17 provides a discussion of what exactly pro; ojmmavtwn tiqevmenon means in the
context of poetic composition.
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distress is most realistically distressed and he who is in a state of
provocation most realistically rages, 1455a 21-22, 29-32)
The fact that the poet’s productions are, for one thing, a vehicle for transferring emotion
to the audience, combined with the fact that emotion will be the more powerfully instilled
in poetry when the poet is himself experiencing it, makes clear what kinds of men will be
best suited to poetry. These men are the eujfuhv~ and the manikov~ (1455a 33).
This passage has confounded many scholars for its apparent suggestion –
elsewhere absent from Aristotle – that poetry is connected to madness.223 Various
emendations have been suggested to mitigate the apparent contradiction such a claim
would present; Halliwell, for instance, in his Loeb, suggests adding a ma`llon and reading
the manikou` as a genitive of comparison, because manic “sounds too passionate for the
psychology of composition posited by Ar.”224 The problem will be taken up in greater
detail below with reference to Rhetoric 1408b, but we can say here that Halliwell is both
right and wrong.
Aristotle is not suggesting that poetry depended in any way on a man being out of
his mind, but that poetry is more effective if it conveys high emotions realistically, and
the man who can best portray high emotions is one who himself feels them easily. That
is, the poetic capacity will be best realized in a man whose soul is naturally suited to the
demands of the underlying art; this is, first, the eujfuhv~, the man who is literally wellsuited by nature.225 The manikov~, however, is characterized by heightened emotion,
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Else (1963) 496 provides a succinct summary of the various statements of the problem.
Halliwell (1987) 89, emphasis his.
225
The generic nature of the term is puzzling, but is in keeping with Aristotle’s basic idea that souls are
naturally inclined to the activities that suit their natures.
224
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although he is less able to control it than the eujfuhv~ man. Thus he is also suited to the
poetic, albeit in a different way.226 Allowing the full idea of capacity to resonate here, as
opposed to the narrower scope of tevcnh as skill, makes it clear that a particular kind of
soul will naturally incline towards the poetic because of its innate shape.227
This also makes clear that Aristotle does not see his work as simply laying out a
manual by which to compose the best poetry.228 Certainly he envisions a tevcnh, a skill
that can be taught and learned, that is proper to the poetic; his observation that amateur
poets master plot last would hardly make sense otherwise, for instance. However, the fact
that certain people are better suited to the poetic than others by virtue of their soul
justifies preserving the resonance of natural aptitude that poihtikhv carries.229 Precisely
what that capacity involves is a question we will have occasion to address again, when
we come to the discussion of the poets.
Leaving poihtikhv, then, we turn to what are normally thought of as the cognate
words for poetic products, poivhsi~ and poivhma.230 As in previous authors, these

See Else (1963) 496-502: he sees eujfuhv~ and the manikov~ as two melancholic figures particularly adept
at the imagination required to compose poetry, although the former was notable for being able to control
his ecstasy, whereas the second was in the control of his. Interestingly, Aristotle makes no mention of
whether the poetry of the eujfuhv~ would be superior to that of the manikov~. See also Meijering (1987) 1819, who comes to a similar conclusion.
227
Which is, in itself, a further suggestion of the absence of the supernatural. Perhaps also present is the
suggestion that a poet may be naturally inclined to poetry but lack self-control and discipline; that is, just as
Aristotle distinguished the good dialectician – the philosopher – from the bad – the sophist – so there is also
a good and bad kind of poet.
228
An idea that has been largely dismissed, although it was once considered a plausible theory; see e.g.
Armstrong (1941) 121. pace Meijering (1987) 103f, which seems to assume that it was at least in part
intended as a kind of how-to manual for aspiring poets.
229
Which will be emphasized again below, when poets follow the version of poetry most natural to them.
Compare Isocrates on how anyone could apply himself to the study of rhetoric, but only those with a
natural aptitude would master it.
230
It should be noted that the great majority of the occurrences in the Aristotelian corpus of both words
refer to action or making in the material world, although such uses will be left out of this study for obvious
reasons.
226
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deceptively straightforward words resist simple definition. In addition, they are, in their
literary incarnations, quite infrequent in the corpus; even without doing exact calculations
it is clear that they are by no means the default way to refer to poetry in the general or
specific sense.231 Scholars agree, by and large, that poivhsi~ is much the more active term,
although it is not always clear in what realm the activity is thought to be occurring.232
Fortunately, Aristotle does provide for us a brief account of how poivhsi~ came to
be, which provides a different path to isolating what it is:233
kata; fuvsin de; o[nto~ hJmi`n tou` mimei`sqai kai; th`~ aJrmoniva~ kai; tou`
rJuqmou` (ta; ga;r mevtra o{ti movria tw`n rJuqmw`n ejsti fanero;n)234 ejx ajrch`~
oiJ pefukovte~ pro;~ aujta; mavlista kata; mikro;n proavgonte~ ejgevnnhsan
th;n poivhsin ejk tw`n aujtoscediasmavtwn.235 diespavsqh de; kata; ta; oijkei`a
h[qh hJ poivhsi~: oiJ me;n ga;r semnovteroi ta;~ kala;~ ejmimou`nto pravxei~ kai;
ta;~ tw`n toiouvtwn, oiJ de; eujtelevsteroi ta;~ tw`n fauvlwn, prw`ton yovgou~
poiou`nte~, w{sper e{teroi u{mnou~ kai; ejgkwvmia.
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Aristotle, when he has a particular piece in mind, will typically identify it by name. Other alternatives
are the neuter article with the genitive of the poet’s name; various forms of a passive participle of making
in the neuter plural; verbs of making and doing with or without an expressed object; and, of course, a
generic signifier such as dra`ma or tragw/diva. Such identifiers vastly outnumber the uses of the nouns
poivhma and poivhsi~, even more than in earlier authors.
232
Thus Kristjánsson (2007) 164 has poivhsi~ as “the mechanical process by which an ei\do~ is brought into
being,” Else (1963) 9 calls it “the poetic art itself at work,” while Davis (1992) 9 offers a rather
philosophical take with “[t]he Poetics is about poivhsi~ understood as poetry, or imitation of action, and
poivhsi~ understood as action, which is also imitation of action.”
233
Again because, for Aristotle, knowing something involves first identifying its causes; see e.g. Rees
(1981) 26, Hamlyn (1990) 470-1.
234
Aristotle’s claim here that meter is a subset of rhythm is an interesting one, and perhaps why he will
elsewhere allow rhythmic language to remain mousikhv even without melw/diva; see the discussion of music
below.
235
The term aujtoscediasmavtwn is not well understood; apart from this occurrence, it appears only one
other place in the extant corpus, in a fragment of the comic Plato. Nonetheless, it receives no attention in
the commentaries. There are several simplex cognates which all carry some aspect of the idea of
improvisation, off-handedness, or whimsicality, and the force of the prefix aujto- is familiar enough.
However, conjecturing from that exactly what Aristotle means to imply here is almost impossible. I follow
other translators in giving ‘improvisations’, but it is worth reflecting on what kinds of improvisations he is
imagining as the root of poetry: lighthearted speaking contests, similar to what we see in the Symposium of
Plato? Or perhaps, in order to account for the rhythm piece, it involved physical imitation or dramatization
as well? Again, there is no way of knowing, but it should be emphasized that it is not as simple as the word
‘improvisations’ implies.
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(Because mimesis is natural to us, as are harmony and rhythm (and it is
clear that meters are kinds of rhythms), those who were most inclined
towards these things by their nature, leading it out little by little, brought
poivhsi~ into being from improvisations. But poivhsi~ split according to
its236 inherent characters: the more serious people made imitations of noble
actions and people, but the baser types made imitations of the petty, first
making invectives, just as the others made hymns and encomia, 1448b 1928.)237
That is, the fact that we are naturally inclined to the component pieces of poivhsi~
– mimesis, harmony, and rhythm – is a material cause of poivhsi~, and the fact that it is
common to all is the reason that everyone enjoys it.238 Its roots are in some kind of
extemporaneous performance, which presumably had only the most indistinct restrictions
delimiting it, and then developed stricter boundaries. Thus poivhsi~ is the set of
restrictions on performance done by means of mimesis, harmony and rhythm that were
discovered over time, the gradually revealed abstract idea of its proper shape. Moreover,
that set has a tevlo~ of its own, towards which it is constantly developing, with the aid of
its creators.239
Aristotle is imagining a single originary fountain of all the different kinds of
poetry, as the bifurcation makes clear; the original unity, the genus, is poivhsi~, but the

I follow Else here (pace Halliwell) in understanding the oijkei`a h[qh as belonging to poivhsi~, not to its
practitioners; see especially Else (1963) 136-7.
237
Else (1963) 125 provides a succinct summary of how this chapter recapitulates the first three, although
those addressed the being of poetry, while this one addresses the becoming.
238
According to his natural capacities, of course. The Politics is perhaps most explicit about this; see e.g.
1342a 14-17. See also Golden (1976) passim, which argues that music affects different souls in different
ways. Meijering (1987) 103 identifies the causes in a similar way: lovgo~ + rJuqmov~ + aJrmoniva are the
material causes of poetry, the poet, who has in mind an ei\do~, is the efficient cause, and the tevlo~ is the
correct kind of hJdonhv.
239
This is one respect in which it resembles a living organism, although with interesting complications: it
has no existence outside of its creators, but, while it may provide pleasure and other benefits, its end is not
directly related to its creators. c.f. Halliwell (1987) 10, where he says that poetry is not “a contingent
achievement of specific poets, but a kind of cultural organism whose intrinsic essence is independent of this
work or that.”
236
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more focused differentiations, the individual species, are also poivhsi~. To borrow one of
Aristotle’s favorite analogies, just as man is a kind of animal, and retains his participation
in the genus animal even when the attributes of his particular species are brought to bear,
so poivhsi~ is poivhsi~ whether enacted as a species like tragedy or a dithyramb, or
conceived of broadly as a genus.
This is a clearer and more stable assertion of a literary category than we have seen
before: poivhsi~ is a constant concept standing behind a variety of different
manifestations, an abstraction of, presumably, all potential poems, as well as the outline
of all potential genres. As poivhsi~ develops, too, further possibilities are revealed; for
instance, as Aristotle explains, Homer revealed aspects of drama, although he clearly did
not produce it.240 Aristotle shows that it that remains fixed even as the species evolve:
parafaneivsh~ de; th`~ tragw/diva~ kai; kwmw/diva~ oiJ ejf j eJkatevran th;n
poivhsin oJrmw`nte~ kata; th;n oijkei`an fuvsin oiJ me;n ajnti; tw`n ijavmbwn
kwmw/dopoioi; ejgevnonto, oiJ de; ajnti; tw`n ejpw`n tragw/dodidavskaloi, dia; to;
meivzw kai; ejntimovtera ta; schvmata ei\nai tau`ta ejkeivnwn.
(once tragedy and comedy had been partially brought to light, those who
were impelled to one kind poivhsi~ or the other because of their nature
themselves became makers of comedy instead of iambs, instructors of
tragedy instead of epics, because these forms were greater and more
respectable than the others, 1449a 3-7).241

240

See Poet. 1448b 35-7; this passage has often been connected to Plato’s assertion that Homer was the first
of the tragic poets.
241
On the chronological problems of this outline of development, and especially on how poorly the comic
tradition fits into it, see Else (1963) 147-9.
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The different expressions of poivhsi~ grew and developed, and poets changed their
methods to match its new incarnations, but there was a stable and unified core – poivhsi~
– underlying every schema.242
In its technical sense, then, Aristotelian poivhsi~ is the given set of potential
representations, in the most active sense of the word, of character and action making use
of rhythm and harmony. Moreover, part of its evolution involved the distinction of
linguistic style, and a corresponding deemphasizing of the musical aspects, although its
intrinsic nature did not change. The representation aspect is important: poivhsi~ is deeply
connected to real or potential performance – that is, as a memory or imagined idea of
performance in the absence of the real thing.243 As such, it is the abstract model to which
poihtikhv appeals in order to produce specific poems, a formal cause of poems.
The word can, however, be used more loosely, and indeed is more frequently used
in its colloquial senses: in addition to naming an abstract concept of representations of
human actions,244 it can also signify a specific poem, a body of poetry of a particular poet
or genre, and a specific method or style of poetic composition.245 Thus it is a specific
poem of Tyrtaeus called ‘Eunomia’ at Politics 1306b 39, and the general poetry of
Homer at Sophistical Refutations 171a 10. Illustrating the third resonance, that of
individual style, requires a few more steps.
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It is essential that this not be confused with something like a Platonic form, however, especially because,
by its very nature, Aristotelian poivhsi~ is always in a state of coming-to-be. Also note that we see here
again the relationship between the poet’s nature and the poetry he is drawn to, as above.
243
On memory as an activity in contrast to the passivity of perception, see e.g. Moseley (2010) 88-89; 9091 address the role of imagination in memory.
244
Given the Aristotelian system, it should also be for a particular end, although what that end may be is
never explicitly stated; it may simply be the pleasure that is naturally derived from seeing imitations.
245
Understanding style here in the modern, colloquial sense, rather than as levxi~.
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At Poetics 1458a 20, Aristotle is explaining what kinds of language a poet should
avail himself of. In the course of describing the best kind of levxi~, he observes that
common words provide the most clarity, but can also give a stilted style; he offers the
poivhsi~ of Kleophon and Sthenelus as a model of such a style (paravdeigma de; hJ
Kleofw`nto~ poivhsi~ kai; hJ Sqenevlou). He is not referencing any particular poem or set
of verses, but rather pointing to the overall impression their works give, or what makes
the works inherently ‘Sthenelic’ or ‘Kleophontic’. To put it another way, he is
emphasizing a particular feature found throughout a given body of work that is
illustrative of that body of work: Sthenelus’ reliance on common words, like epic’s
reliance on lofty ones, is an identifiable reason for the qualities that stand out in them. A
poet’s style emerges from his particular uses of all the features that define the art, both
the technical skills he brings to bear (e.g. levxi~ and mevtra) as well as his intellectual
talent (e.g. the ability to put a plot together well).246 That is, we have here a different
species of poivhsi~: just as poivhsi~ could refer to specific genres in the abstract, so it can
be an abstraction of the poetry of an individual poet.
The Rhetoric reveals another important feature of poivhsi~. Claiming that he has
sufficiently covered the elements of lovgo~, Aristotle turns to linguistic purity
(eJllhnivzein, 1407a 22). This depends on five features, the third of which is relevant to
our purposes:
trivton, mh; ajmfibovloi~: tau`ta dev, a]n mh; tajnantiva proairh`tai. o{per
poiou`sin, o{tan mhqe;n me;n e[cwsi levgein, prospoiw`ntai dev ti levgein: oiJ
ga;r toiou`toi ejn poihvsei levgousi tau`ta, oi|on jEmpedoklh`~: fenakivzei
246

See e.g. 1450a 34-37, where Aristotle claims that amateur poets will master diction and character before
structure.

139
ga;r to; kuvklw/ polu; o[n, kai; pavscousin oiJ ajkroatai; o{per oiJ polloi;
para; toi`~ mavntesin: o{tan ga;r levgwsin ajmfivbola, sumparaneuvousin.
(Third, not to be ambiguous – unless the opposite is preferred. This is
what people do when they have nothing to say, but make a pretense of
saying something; for people like this say these things in poivhsi~, like
Empedocles. This circumlocution deceives, and the audience suffers what
most people do at the hands of a mantis – for when they speak their
ambiguities, people assent,247 1407a 35-42)
Here we are given an explanation for why someone might choose to communicate ejn
poivhsei, as well as an idea of how it affects the audience. Using language that is not of
transparent significance can serve to conceal the fact that they actually have nothing to
say, and the kind of people who would do this might choose to speak ejn poivhsei.248 That
is, just as we saw above with poihtikhv, the clarity of meaning that is so essential to
rhetoric is not a particular concern of poivhsi~, and in fact the obfuscation of meaning
might even be a deliberate tactic of poivhsi~, or a reason to use it.249
Aristotle continues with the explanation of why the soothsayers choose to be
obscure: it causes people to accept what they say. In other words, because the audience
cannot easily understand what the mantis is saying, Aristotle suggests, it is unable to find
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My reading here perhaps stretches the grammar some, as I am suggesting taking a different, unexpressed
subject (i.e. the audience) for the second verb. However, the sense is much clearer, as it is difficult to
understand the meaning in the claim that the soothsayers both speak and give their assent.
248
The example of Empedocles here is somewhat puzzling, as Aristotle elsewhere holds him and his ideas
in high esteem (see e.g. Diogenes Laërtius, viii. 57), but it does make an interesting counterpoint to the
claim in Poetics 1447b 18 that Empedocles is not a poet in spite of his use of meter: here, while he is not
called a poet, he is indirectly envisioned as somehow engaged in poivhsi~, or something like it.
249
See also Rhetoric 1404b 6-9: Aristotle observes again that common words make for clarity (tw`n d j
ojnomavtwn kai; rJhmavtwn safh` me;n poiei` ta; kuvria), but the kinds of words discussed in the Poetics make
for elevation and ornamentation (mh; tapeinh;n de; ajlla; kekosmhmevnhn ta\lla ojnovmata o{sa ei[rhtai ejn toi`~
peri; poihtikh`~), which is more appropriate to poetry.
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fault with it.250 Users of poivhsi~ may have different motives for relying on ambiguity, as
the sentence that closes off this section makes clear, but they may, for different reasons,
nonetheless rely on it: a{panta dh; tau`ta o{moia, w{st j a]n mh; toiouvtou tino;~ e{neka,
feuktevon (all these [ambiguities] are of the same kind, so that, unless they are for the
sake of some such reason, they should be avoided, 1407b 6).251 That is, there are a
number of reasons one might choose to be obscure, and one model of obfuscation is
poivhsi~. Given the examples of Empedocles and oracles, along with the absence of
mimesis and the other components of poivhsi~ in its technical sense, Aristotle’s attention
does not seem to be on any of the defining characteristics of poetry, or certainly not of
tragedy. It is, however, a connection between poivhsi~ and obfuscation, a relationship that
will confront us time and again.
A final passage from the Rhetoric will speak to one of the most contentious
aspects of Aristotle’s ideas of poetry: the place of inspiration. At 1408b, he is discussing
the specific situations when an orator might want to make use of compound words,
epithets, and loan words – that is, of language more proper to poihtikhv. These are, he
says, first suited to a man who speaks emotionally by nature (ta; de; ojnovmata ta; dipla`
kai; ta; ejpivqeta pleivw kai; ta; xevna mavlista aJrmovttei levgonti paqhtikw`~, 1408b 1112). They are also appropriate to a man who has already made his audience ecstatic (kai;
o{tan e[ch/ h[dh tou;~ ajkroata;~ kai; poihvsh/ ejnqousiavsai h] ejpaivnoi~ h] yovgoi~ h] ojrgh/` h]
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Aristotle gives here the example of the famous oracle given to Croesus and reported in Herodotus: he
could not blame the oracle for his mistake, since it was not the oracle, but his own interpretation of it, that
was at fault.
251
This passage is frequently misread as pointing to the single intention of misdirection. Freese in his Loeb,
for instance, misunderstands this to be referring only to the ‘deliberate intention to mislead,’ but in fact the
toiouvtou tinov~ should refer to any of a number of possible reasons.
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filiva,/ 1408b 14-15). Finally, such linguistic devices are proper to ecstatic orators
(fqevggontaiv te ga;r ta; toiau`ta ejnqousiavzonte~, 1408b 17-18). He follows this with a
pithy observation about how this makes those features appropriate to poetry: it is
inherently inspired (e[nqeon ga;r hJ poivhsi~, 1408b 20).252
As in the similar passage discussed above with reference to poihtikhv, it is not
necessary to understand this as attributing the power of poetry or oratory in any direct
way to supernatural powers. Rather, while emotional appeals may have their limited
place in rhetoric, the emotional component of poetry is central to it, and inseparable from
it.253 Emotion might be useful for orators in their attempts to persuade, but for poivhsi~ –
here used in its technical sense – emotion is a necessary piece of achieving the desired
end of understanding.
While Aristotle does take advantage of the looser meanings seen in earlier authors
– poem, oeuvre, genre, and so forth – the importance of the technical meaning should be
kept in focus. Aristotle’s poivhsi~ is almost poetry in potentiality, the changing,
developing, abstract set of potential performances of character and action, executed in
media like music and language, that will be poems. The organic nature of Aristotle’s
concept, the fact that its end is revealed slowly and in stages, reflects a new way of
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With a second, puzzling conclusion: the emotionally elevated aspect of it makes it also proper for being
ironic, “like Gorgias did, and the speeches in the Phaedrus” (met j eijrwneiva~, o{per Gorgiva~ ejpoivei kai; ta;
ejn tw/` Faivdrw/, 1408b 21). On Aristotle’s conception of irony as a positive form of wit, see Halliwell
(2008) 320-321.
253
pace Halliwell, who is loathe to admit even this much passion into Aristotle’s conception of poetry. It is
rather unfortunate that, unlike Plato, Aristotle does not attempt to explain precisely how poetry, or language
more generally, caused such reactions. We can infer that it relates to how the audience members’ souls
harmonize with the character represented in the language, but the exact mechanisms are unclear.
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thinking about literary categories, one that has its roots in, but is more successful than, its
predecessors.
While earlier authors grouped literary productions in a variety of ways, most of
them based on form, content or context, only Aristotle attempts to articulate a
fundamental unity underneath the great variety of changes made to form, content, and
context. That is, while earlier authors were able to group literary productions in a variety
of ways, they were inherently descriptive rather than definitional – what a poem did or
looked like rather than what a poem was. They were therefore inherently unstable, as
generic developments would be constantly changing the superficial features. With
Aristotle, although it is incompletely enacted, we can see an attempt to identify the
unchanging essence of poetry when he uses poivhsi~ to show that all its incarnations were
in the service of a unified end, and thus that poetry is itself a unified thing.
In comparison, the other familiar word that can be used for a poet’s productions,
poivhma, is more restricted and concrete in its scope. As mentioned above, poivhma is a
relatively uncommon word in Aristotle, appearing with its literary force only seven times
outside of the Rhetoric and Poetics, but there is a greater consistency to its appearances
than is seen in the other terms: a poivhma is usually imagined as the literal and actual
product of the productive art of the poet, with a particular emphasis on the actual words.
Thus, for instance, there are a handful of passages where Aristotle points to a poem of a
particular poet as evidence with poivhma.254 There is a slightly broader meaning when
Aristotle draws an analogy between a poet’s feelings towards his poem and a father’s
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towards his son, in that it is any given poem, rather than a particular one, that Aristotle
has in mind, but the focus is still very much on a literal product.255 Three slightly different
instances, however, will add nuance to the picture.
First, in the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle observes that it can be difficult to
make an argument (lovgo~) about pitch accent in unwritten dialectic, but easier in
poihvmata and written works (para; de; th;n prosw/divan ejn me;n toi`~ a[neu grafh`~
dialektikoi`~ ouj rJa/vdion poih`sai lovgon, ejn de; toi`~ gegrammevnoi~ kai; poihvmasi ma`llon,
166b1-3). The implication seems to be that, with poivhmata and written works, one can
consult the original text in order to make precise arguments about the details of it, but
that this is not the case with purely oral dialectic.256 In this situation, poivhmata must be
the language that can be read from a text or recited in order to demonstrate the points of
argument, the words without regard for details of context or performance which
elsewhere remain closely tied to the poetic.257
Two passages from Rhetoric wrap up this discussion by identifying specific
features that can turn language into a poivhma. At 1406a, Aristotle is discussing the use of
epithets, and the care one must take with them to avoid becoming excessively stilted. One
of the examples from Alcidamas strikes Aristotle as so egregious that he notes in a
parenthetical aside, and with a clause of actual result, that it has ceased being lovgo~ and
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oracles and dreams.
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become a poem: tou`to d j a{ma kai; diplou`n kai; ejpivqeton, w{ste poivhma givnetai (1406a
31). In a similar passage somewhat later, Aristotle observes the importance of rhythm in
lovgo~ for giving it perceptible limits, but cautions that it must not actually have meter –
for, he explains, that would be a poem: dio; rJuqmo;n dei` e[cein to;n lovgon, mevtron de; mhv:
poivhma ga;r e[stai (1408b 30).258
Thus we are invited to imagine not compartmentalized and sharply separated
categories of lovgo~ and poivhsi~, but a spectrum of language use across which an author
can range: when the situation requires, he can hover near the poetic without wandering
into it, or he can eschew all poetic features and make his production as entirely lovgo~ as
possible.259 In one sense, then, poivhma and lovgo~ are, finally, not inherently different: an
orator making improper use of his art might make a poivhma, just as a poet who lacks
poihtikhv might accidentally end up with lovgo~, as both are simply collections of more or
less ornamented language.260 In other words, a poivhma is a possible product of a linguistic
art, whether or not the creator is aiming at poetry – it is an objective and quantifiable set
of features independent of the intentions or abilities of its maker.
While it has not yet been reduced to the single meaning, then, poivhma comes close
to our colloquial idea of poem, especially with respect to how much emphasis is put on
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its linguistic features, and how little on other features like music and emotion. There is
also greater differentiation between poivhma and poivhsi~ than we have seen before, with
poivhma consistently signifying the particular works and language, while poivhsi~ is more
likely to imply the larger abstract body of potential poihvmata. The relationship between
them can be summarized in terms of cause in this way: poivhsi~ is an efficient cause of
poihtikhv, which is in turn an efficient cause of poihvmata.261 That is, without a bounded
abstract concept, there would be no impulse for a faculty of poetic production, and
without such a faculty there would be no product that is in service to the final cause of
poetry as a whole, which is a particular kind of learning.
With the abstract idea and concrete product, in both general and specific form,
thus explored, we turn now to a discussion of the kind of man who participates in this
kind of production. Often, the poihthv~ in Aristotle is exactly who we expect: Homer,
Simonides, Alcman and Euripides, for instance, are all identified as poihtaiv. They are
shown participating in the kinds of activities we would expect, as well: passing down
traditional stories, as at Eudemian Ethics 1230a 3, where they mythologize about
Cheiron; acting as largely reliable witnesses for factual and historical information, as at
Rhetoric 1375b 28; and, more fully than has been seen before, entirely the craftsmen, the
active producers, of their poetic productions.
Several aspects of the poet’s definition deserve notice, however. When the
difference between Homer and Empedocles is attributed not to their form but to the
object of their respective productions (Poetics 1447b 14-16), Aristotle implicitly suggests
Interestingly, while there are obvious analogues of poivhma and poihtikhv in lovgo~ and rJhtorikhv, there is
no clear partner in rhetoric for poivhsi~.
261
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that most of his contemporaries would have associated a poet first and foremost with the
use of meter. This shows that the same impulse we saw in earlier authors is still active:
meter is an easy way to distinguish poetry, but it is ultimately not a qualifier that gives
more than superficially useful information about product or producer.
On the question of the source of the poet’s powers, the shift is complete: the
poet’s reliance on supernatural connections has been all but erased from his work, and his
productions are explicitly a result of his effort, innate character, and technical skill. In
fact, the treatise is predicated on such an assumption, and it is precisely because the poet
is a practitioner of a tevcnh that Aristotle is able to articulate a system of successful poetic
composition at all.262 In a discussion in the Poetics of the kinds of events that are terrible
or fearful, for instance, he observes that the poet is not at liberty to subvert the major
elements of traditional stories, but should nonetheless be inventive and use the tradition
well (tou;~ me;n ou\n pareilhmmevnou~ muvqou~ luvein oujk e[stin ...aujto;n de; euJrivskein dei`
kai; toi`~ paradedomevnoi~ crh`sqai kalw`~, 1453b 24-5).263 Similarly, when Aristotle
distinguishes well done and poorly done poetry, the weaker is consistently described as
lacking in skill (e.g. ajtecnotavth at1454b 19, a[tecnoi at 1454b 31) rather than
uninspired. The discussions in the Rhetoric and Poetics of poetic style, too, support this:
at every stage, the poet’s choices are conscious and artful, and entirely under his control.
Indeed, in the discussion of the origins and developments of levxi~ in book III of
the Rhetoric, both orator and poet are imagined as craftsmen shaping their language in
similar ways, but according to their unique intentions and ends. Moreover, Aristotle
262
263
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claims that the most important aspect of levxi~, that concerning delivery (peri; th;n
uJpovkrisin, 1403b 19), was first attended to by poets.264 That Aristotle understood there to
be a very close connection between poetic and rhetoric is no surprise,265 but the specific
techniques that he separates out as more appropriate to poets do tell us a bit more about
how he understood the poet’s work to differ from the orator’s.
For instance, at 1404b 39, he says that homonyms are useful to the Sophist for
working their deceits (kakourgei`), but that synonyms are useful to the poet. He does not
explicitly say why, but given what he has said elsewhere we can assume that synonyms
allow for more effective metaphors – that is, while homonyms allow for trickery,
synonyms emphasize the similarities between unlike things.266 He also points out
particular habits: poets use the singular for the plural, which is one way to achieve o[gko~
of style (1407b 33); they invent words in the course of describing through negation,
which is useful for proportional metaphor (1408a 6); and, at least in ancient times, they
practiced the periodic style through their antistrophic songs (1409a 26). While he does
not explain how these relate, the impact of these features has elsewhere been said to
decrease the familiarity the listener will have with what he hears, and so to obscure the
meaning to a greater or lesser degree.267 Although such obscurity is anathema to
composers of lovgo~, we have seen a number of times now that it is allowable, perhaps
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even desirable, for poetry; how it relates specifically to the poet will be illustrated by two
passages in the Metaphysics.
At Metaphysics 995a 8, Aristotle observes that the familiar is most intelligible,
and therefore that people find the kinds of proofs they are used to to be most reliable:
some want a speaker to speak scientifically, others want a speaker to use examples, and
others still value a poet brought in as witness (to; ga;r suvnhqe~ gnwvrimon. ... oiJ me;n ou\n
eja;n mh; maqhmatikw`~ levgh/ ti~ oujk ajpodevcontai tw`n legovntwn, oiJ d j a]n mh;
paradeigmatikw`~, oiJ de; mavrtura ajxiou`sin ejpavgesqai poihth;n).268 The poet’s work is
left implicit, however; while the dialectician and the rhetorician use their proper versions
of inductive logic to persuade, the construction changes for the poet, and all we are told
about him is that a certain kind of man values having him brought in as witness.
The poet’s work is precisely to bring an audience to knowledge that cannot be
accessed through induction, but only through metaphor, by getting the audience to
perceive likeness that it had not previously seen. We have seen that the knowledge
related to poetry is not factual or philosophical, and is not best expressed with clarity, as
that would not allow for the unfamiliarity required to deduce a previously hidden
similarity. Just as the orator must have the capacity to discover all available means of
persuasion, the poet must have the capacity to identify likeness, chains of causal
relationships, where others would only see difference, as another passage from the
Metaphysics will illustrate.
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At 1091b, he is summarizing the difficulty that thinkers have faced in trying to
deal with first principles.269 Typically, he turns to the poets as examples:
oiJ de; poihtai; oiJ ajrcai`oi tauvth/ oJmoivw~, h|/ basileuvein kai; a[rcein fasi;n
ouj tou;~ prwvtou~, oiJon nuvkta kai; oujrano;n h] cavo~ h] wjkeanovn, ajlla; to;n
Diva: ouj mh;n ajlla; touvtoi~ me;n dia; to; metabavllein tou;~ a[rconta~ tw`n
o[ntwn sumbaivnei toiau`ta levgein, ejpei; oi{ ge memigmevnoi aujtw`n kai; tw/`
mh; muqikw`~ pavnta levgein, oi|on Ferekuvdh~ kai; e{teroiv tine~, to;
gennh`san prw`ton a[riston tiqevasi, kai; oiJ Mavgoi, kai; tw`n uJstevrwn de;
sofw`n oi|on jEmpedoklh`~ te kai; jAnaxagovra~, oJ me;n th;n filivan
stoicei`on oJ de; to;n nou`n ajrch;n poihvsa~.
(The ancient poets thought similarly, in that they said that it was not the
first powers, like night and chaos and ocean, but Zeus who was lord and
king. Indeed, it is on account of the rulers changing that they said these
things, since those making these connections and not speaking mythically,
like Pherecydes and certain others – those set up the primary generator as
the good. The Mages, too, say the same, and some of the later wise men,
like Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former making filiva an element,
the latter making nou`~ the first principle, 1091b 4-13.)
He seems to be referring, at least at first, to theogonic poets, and he suggests that they
ordered their theogonies as they did based on their experience with the mutability of
rulers: mortal kings grow old and die, or get overthrown, so that there is a constant chain
of succession, which they transferred back into their mythologies.270 The implication is
that the poets are doing work similar to that of the philosophers – that is, essentially
explaining the natural world – but that they are doing it in a very different way. They are,
in essence, allegorizing: they are conveying truths about the world by hiding them in
narrative stories.271
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Two details are of central importance here: first, that Aristotle is explicitly talking
about the ancient poets.272 Second, that he is describing them as engaged in an activity
that looks very little like what later poets did: while their allegories may have been
superficially mimesis of actions, their end was to reveal truths about the natural world,
which clearly has no part in Aristotle’s idea of epic or tragedy.273 In short, what we seem
to have here is a description of an earlier incarnation of poetry, several generations prior
to tragedy.274 However, because Aristotle’s conception of poivhsi~ is based not on formal
features but on a constantly developing way of performing mimesis by means of harmony
and rhythm, the fundamental similarity between these allegorical poems of natural
science and the tragedies of Sophocles stands.275
It is obvious that Aristotle envisions the poets of his day quite differently, but the
implication of allegory’s participation in poivhsi~ illuminates a number of his assertions
about poetry. The importance of obfuscation, for instance, which has been implied again
and again, makes sense if some earlier incarnation of poetry was heavily dependent on
allegory. Similarly, allegory is precisely finding similarities in dissimilar things. While

relationship between the allegorical tradition and the rhetorical tradition in which Aristotle is basing
himself. Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on a different passage (983b), also associates the early poets
with allegory: “These [theological] poets dealt to some extent with the nature of things by means of certain
figurative representations in myths.”
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the tragic poets of Aristotle’s day had little to do with the philosophical allegorical
tradition, the importance of working by means of metaphor, and revealing likenesses
between things that previously seemed unlike, had not changed.
Putting aside the question of the relationship between philosophy and poetry, we
can turn now to one of the most famous and difficult passages in the Poetics: 1451a 36ff,
where poivhsi~ is described as more philosophical and ethical than history. 276 It will be
seen to resonate in interesting ways with the passage just discussed.
fanero;n de; ejk tw`n eijrhmevnwn kai; o{ti ouj to; ta; genovmena levgein, tou`to
poihtou` e[rgon ejstivn, ajll j oi|a a]n gevnoito kai; ta; dunata; kata; to; eijko;~
h] to; ajnagkai`on. oJ ga;r iJstoriko;~ kai; oJ poihth;~ ouj tw`/ h] e[mmetra levgein
h] a;metra diafevrousin: ei[h ga;r a]n ta; JHrodovtou eij~ mevtra teqh`nai kai;
oujde;n h|tton a]n ei[h iJstoriva ti~ meta; mevtrou h] a[neu mevtrwn: ajlla; touvtw/
diafevrei, tw/` to;n me;n ta; genovmena levgein, to;n de; oi|a a]n gevnoito. dio;
kai; filosofwvteron kai; spoudaiovteron poivhsi~ iJstoriva~ ejstivn: hJ me;n
ga;r poivhsi~ ma`llon ta; kaqovlou, hJ d j iJstoriva ta; kaq j e{kaston levgei.
(It is clear from what has been said that the work of the poet is not to say
things as they are, but the sorts of things that might be and are possible
according to likelihood or necessity. That is, the historian and the poet do
not differ because of speaking with meter or without: The productions of
Herodotus would be no less a history done with or without meter. Rather,
they differ in this point, namely that the one speaks what is, the other what
could be. On account of this, poivhsi~ is more philosophical and serious
than history, because poivhsi~ is concerned more with universals, and
history reports individual events one by one, 1451a 36-b 8.)
Aristotle’s insistence here on the insufficiency of meter as a determining characteristic of
a literary production is familiar from a number of passages, although it is imperfectly
observed in the corpus. The picture of the poet is no less interesting, however.
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Whereas the ancient poets were engaged in concealing natural science in their
poetry with narratives of human action, the poets of Aristotle’s day had a different e[rgon,
namely to not represent actual reality, although still by means of human action. There is
an inherent similarity, however, between these two different ends: neither one would be
as effectively done with clear and transparent language as with some level of obscurity.
Clarity of language belongs to representations of reality, which is not the poet’s realm.277
This – the realm of the actual against the realm of the possible – is the familiar distinction
between poetry and history, the one representing events episodically, it would seem, the
other representing ta; kaqovlou, universal things.
What, exactly, the universals are that poetry should relate is variously understood,
but Halliwell’s assessment will set up this discussion nicely. He associates them with the
discrete and coherent unity that are the components of a good plot; that unity, with
probability and necessity as its basic criteria, allows the audience to simultaneously see
the logical chain of cause and effect that underlies the plot – and that is rarely to be seen
in reality – and come to understand how that logical chain relates to real experience of the
real world.278 That is, recognizing the coherence revealed by poetry allows one to better
understand reality. We can also here add to our definition of poihtikhv: as rJhtorikhv was
the faculty for discovering the available means of persuasion, we can now presume that
poihtikhv is the faculty for identifying the logical chains of causation underlying a plot.
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This brings poetry into conversation with the other arts concerned with
knowledge and understanding, including philosophy, politics and rhetoric, although there
is, perhaps for good reason, great resistance to the idea of letting poetry attain to equal
ground with them.279 Nonetheless, the discussion in the Politics makes it clear that poetry
has ethical value, and several passages assert that learning and increased understanding
are one result of contemplating poetry.280 That is, while it is clearly not in the service of
the same kind of truth that philosophy occupies itself with, poetry is far more than simple
entertainment. The key to its function can be found by bringing a passage in the Posterior
Analytics to bear on this discussion in the Poetics.281
At 99b 20ff, Aristotle is concluding his discussion of the syllogism, and he
addresses the question of how men are able to perceive the immediate premises that are
the necessary starting point of any demonstration leading to scientific knowledge. He
concludes that the ability is neither innate nor based in one of the higher capacities like
reasoning. Instead, they are a result of sense perception. He then describes the process:
ejk me;n ou\n aijsqhvsew~ givnetai mnhvmh, wJspe;r levgomen, ejk de; mnhvmh~
pollavki~ tou` aujtou` ginomevnh~ ejmpeiriva: aiJ ga;r pollai; mnh`mai tw/`
ajriqmw/` ejmpeiriva miva ejstivn. ejk d j ejmpeiriva~ h] ejk panto;~ hjremhvsanto~
tou` kaqovlou ejn th/` yuch/`, tou` eJno;~ para; ta; pollav, o} ajn ejn a{pasin e}n
ejnh/` ejkeivnoi~ to; aujtov, tevcnh~ ajrch; kai; ejpisthvmh~, eja;n me;n peri; gevnesin,
tevcnh~, eja;n de; peri; to; o[n, ejpisthvmh~.
279
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(Memory comes into being from sense perception, as we said, and from
recurring memories of the same thing comes experience; that is, multiple
memories make a single experience. Then, from experience – from the
universal now entirely established in the soul, the one from the many,
which is a single identity among all of them – from this is the origin of art
and science, the one – that is, tecnhv – related to becoming, and the other
– that is, ejpisthvmh – related to what is, 100b 3-9)
In other words, experience comes from repeated exposure to the same pattern of action,
and is the imprint of that pattern on the soul.282 Every time we run into a particular, then,
it brings us closer to the universal – as Aristotle puts it, each instance of sense perception
is of a particular thing, but the perception is of the whole: it is not ‘the man Callias’, but
‘man’ (kai; ga;r aijsqavnetai me;n to; kaq j eJkaston, hJ d j ai[sqhsi~ tou kaqovlou ejstivn,
oi\on ajnqrwvpou, ajll j ouj Kallivou ajnqrwvpou, 100a 16-100b 1). History shows us what
Callias did, but poetry allows us to understand what a man like Callias is likely to do.
Poetry’s work, then, is to provide depictions of actions that the audience will
perceive, and that will imprint the soul with a certain pattern. When a given pattern has
been stamped, as it were, a sufficient number of times, the soul has acquired an
understanding of a universal, an experience.283 This process, the acquisition of
experience, is an inductive one by which we come to know primary premises: dh`lon dh;
oJti; hJmi`n ta; prw`ta ejpagwgh`/ gnwrivzein ajnagkai`on: kai; ga;r hJ ai[sqhsi~ ouJtw to;
kaqovlou ejmpoiei` (it is clear that we must learn first premises by means of induction; for
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even sense perception makes universals in this way,100b 3-5).284 Finally, poihtikhv is in
the service of leading the audience to first premises.
This is not to suggest that poetry leads its audience to the same kinds of truths as
philosophy; poetic truths are very much ethical truths rather than absolute ones: how a
noble man will respond to adversity, for instance, rather than the meaning of nobility.
However, knowledge of probable and likely actions cannot be discovered by
philosophical methods any more than philosophical truths can be found through poetry.
Poetry does not, as Halliwell worried, make any grand claims of gravity or deep truth.
However, as a reliable method of attaining a very different kind of truth, poetry stands
with philosophy as a useful path to knowledge.
When Aristotle says, then, at Poetics 1451a 36ff, that poetry is more
philosophical and serious than history, he means that, whereas iJstoriva is a method that
will bring its audience to an understanding of what events have actually transpired, the
effect of poivhsi~ will have more in common with philosophy. The members of the
audience may or may not gain any knowledge of individual events, but their souls will be
imprinted with a pattern of action that may, with repeated stampings, allow them to
understand how a given character will behave. That is, it can potentially train their
souls.285 Specifically, if people are exposed to good poetry often enough, they are likely
to themselves become more virtuous.286 The highest end of poetry, then, the reason it
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deserves serious consideration, is that, by means of reason and emotion, it results in
knowledge that cannot otherwise be attained.287
My qualification of that as the highest end is a significant one, as it would not be
available to every member of the audience. It has been argued that Aristotle’s description
of the impact of poetry would apply only to the educated aristocrats, and thus that the
audience must have been restricted to them.288 As is clear from the discussion of the
effects of music in the Politics, however, Aristotle’s description actually allows for
multiple effects to match its multiple audiences.289 That is, each member of the audience
would get from poetry what his soul could take: the educated and noble man gaining
understanding of universals, children acquiring ethical training in their souls, and the base
simply enjoying the spectacle. After all, as Aristotle made clear, poetry is enjoyable for
everyone.
Before we move into the other categories of language, it will be useful to look
briefly at Aristotle’s use of compound POI- words. We saw earlier authors making
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paper, but it will be useful to summarize my understanding of the relationship here. In general, I follow
Sifakis (2001a), who asserts that catharsis is “the understanding that comes through contemplation while
the spectator is emotionally aroused, and normally painful emotions … become eventual inducers of
pleasure because they lead to and facilitate understanding” (112). In short, I find more likely the rather
straightforward description of catharsis given in the Politics than the puzzling hints in the Poetics, and
understand catharsis to be something like the relief following emotional excitement. Purgative or healing
interpretations I find unconvincing as that would require an audience in need of healing, and it is difficult to
imagine Aristotle envisioning a theater full of people ailing in an identical way. Finally, although catharsis
seems to be part of the proper end of poetry as well as mousikhv more generally, the particular emotions
Aristotle discusses in the Poetics, pity and fear, belong to tragedy (and perhaps epic), with other genres
being connected to other emotions. Sifakis (2001b) chapter 3 and appendix 1 offer useful reviews of the
various theories that have been put forward, and Halliwell (1986) 184ff gives a broader analysis of the
scholarship on the subject.
288
For a discussion of various theories of who would have been in Aristotle’s imagined audience, see
Sifakis (2001b) 34ff.
289
See e.g. Sifakis (2001a) 96.
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creative and productive use of the various POI- suffixes to identify specific kinds of
literary productions, and to make differentiations for which there were no established
terms to hand. Aristotle uses his own share of compounds, but the great majority of them
refer to material creations rather than literary productions of any kind.
As we saw above, poihtikhv emphasized the capacity for poetic production; it
carries a similar force as a suffix, as a number of such –poihtikhv compounds make clear,
although of course the capacity is now directed to a specific kind of production. Most
examples in the Aristotelian corpus of this kind of compound refer to productivity in the
material world, but one refers to literary production – the diqurambopoihtikhv of Poetics
1447a 14. This word is in fact a hapax in the extant Greek corpus, and certainly flouts
Aristotle’s own stated distaste for flamboyant compounds. As he says in several places,
though, compounds are acceptable if the thing in question lacks a name.290 It is probable,
then, that Aristotle is breaking new conceptual ground here, although we cannot discount
the possibility that it is simply Aristotle inserting some style of his own.291 In fact, a
number of his compounds for literary productions are quite rare, if not unique. The term
dramatopoievw, for instance, used to show how Homer was the first comedian because he
dramatized the ridiculous (Poetics 1448b 37), does not appear again until Plutarch, with
another hundred year break before its third appearance.292
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As at Rhet. 1406a 42-3.
More likely in this passage than in many others; here he is introducing related types of mimesis, and he
emphasizes their making in different ways: ejpopoiiva dh; kai; hJ th`~ tragw/diva~ poivhsi~ e[ti de; kwmw/diva kai;
hJ diqurambopoihtikh;.... Whether or not we follow Else (1963) 6 n.21 in emending the kwmw/diva to the
genitive kwmw/diva~ on analogy with tragw/diva~, which I am inclined to accept, this certainly looks more
like artful variatio than a happy accident.
292
Aristotle’s only other verbal compound, ijambopoievw, has a similar afterlife, appearing only once more,
in a fourth c. CE theologian, Gregorius of Nazianzus, Ep. 176.3.3. While there is not enough evidence to do
291

158
Even with the nominal terms that are made on analogy with rather more common
generic distinguishers, Aristotle’s uses are uncommon. Thus he has diqurambopoiov~ in
the Rhetoric, which is not seen again until the 2nd c. CE.293 Although Herodotus made use
of ejpopoiov~ and ejpopoiiva, neither one seems to have picked up significant currency by
the time Aristotle comes to them.294 Furthermore, apart from a single appearance in the
Rhetoric, ejpopoiiva is limited in the Aristotelian corpus to the Poetics. Within the
Poetics, however, it is relatively common, appearing 22 times against the single instance
in the Rhetoric.
While we must be careful not to put too fine a point on such slender evidence, it is
possible to draw a few tentative conclusions here. First, the fact that so many of the
words Aristotle uses to specify literary type are quite rare – what he himself might call
divploi or glw`ttai, even – suggests that there still was not a definitive and established
vocabulary of literary typology. Moreover, since these words are almost entirely limited
to the works dedicated to defining and describing literary arts, it seems safe to infer that
the generic distinctions were not felt as so important elsewhere; that is, outside of the
Poetics and Rhetoric, Aristotle seems not to have felt it necessary to identify poetry by
species. On the other hand, as we saw above, he is also not turning frequently to the
abstract and concrete terms for poetry more generally, poivhsi~ and poivhma. That is,
Aristotle’s default is to be more precise rather than less – the ‘verses of Homer’ rather
more than hypothesize, it is worth considering whether Aristotle chose to innovate verbal forms of the
compound in order to highlight the activity over the product or idea, as he does so often in both these
treatises
293
Several times in Athenaeus, also in the works of Philodemus, Mnasion and Hephaistion on poets, among
a few other late treatises.
294
There are no attested uses between Herodotus and Aristotle, and after Aristotle the next secure use is
Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
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than ‘epic’, for instance, or the ‘things made by Euripides’ rather than ‘tragedy.’ In other
words, while we have seen almost two hundred years of interest in literary categorization,
it seems only slightly more natural for Aristotle to conceptualize the overarching set of
poetry than it did for Herodotus.
To turn now from the words of making to the other sets of language. We saw,
with Plato and Isocrates, experimentation with two adverbs of organization, cuvdhn and
katalogavdhn. In general, they used them to separate literary productions on the basis of
an organizational system – or perhaps lack thereof – other than the presence or absence of
meter. It seems, however, that – at least for katalogavdhn – the distinction was not
significant enough or clear enough to take hold; Aristotle, for whom ordering and
organization were so important, never uses the adverb at all, let alone to group literary
productions.295
With cuvdhn we are in a slightly happier position. He does not use the word
frequently – in fact, only four times in the corpus – but those passages are helpful for
illustrating the resonance of the term. For one thing, two instances offer a clear visual
picture of what is means when something is done cuvdhn. First, in the Parts of Animals, in
the course of describing a particular mollusk, Aristotle observes that there are
unidentified black objects scattered cuvdhn throughout its body (680a 15). That is,
essentially, the creature had a random scattering of freckles. A very different description
in the Poetics implies a very similar idea: paint smeared cuvdhn, he says, is not as
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It does, however, become a relatively common term in the Second Sophistic.

160
pleasurable as an outline in black and white (1450b 2). In both cases, the implication is
complete absence of order or organizing principle: the relevant principle is chaos.296
The final occurrence, at Rhetoric 1409b 7, finally, does involve literary
categorization. In his discussion of the pros and cons of various styles (levxei~), he has
observed that the continuous style, like that of Herodotus and the dithyrambic preludes, is
unpleasant because the audience has no sense of where they are in the piece. He favors
the periodic style, which is easy to learn and pleasant: the latter because the audience
consistently knows where it is and feels that some conclusion has been reached, the
former because it is easily retained in memory, thanks to the fact that it has number.297
His proof of this is that everyone remembers things in meter, ta; mevtra, more easily than
tw`n cuvdhn.
This is usually translated as poetry and prose,298 of course, but the real contrast is
in the absence or lack of organization by means of number: language in meter has it,
language that respects rhythm without turning into meter has it, language that has been
scattered at random lacks it.299 Thus Herodotus writes an inferior prose because he lacks
perceivable boundaries (in Aristotle’s opinion, at least); his work, like a dithyrambic

Compare Politics 1324b 5, where the laws are described as developing cuvdhn. Compare the uses of Plato
and Isocrates above in chapter two.
297
Cope (1938) 99 offers a very lucid illustration of what Aristotle means when he says the audience is
always able to keep track of itself: it is like walking up and down a colonnade because, although the portico
is of a discrete length such that a walker always knows how far he is from an end, he can turn and make the
walk as many times as he likes. Thus there is boundary, but not limit. The following page clarifies what is
likely meant here by ‘dithyrambic prelude’: something like “the novel, relaxed, often incoherent,
extravagances of Melanippides.”
298
Aristotle indeed does use ta; mevtra in several places to refer to poems. See also Else (1963) 38-9 and
133-4, who defines the plural mevtra as verses in the concrete sense, as opposed to the singular mevtron,
which is meter.
299
Cope ad loc. defines cuvdhn more or less as I do, but nonetheless retains the translation “poetry and
(disordered) prose,” which I suggest does not do justice to the real force of the adverb.
296
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prelude, is too much cuvdhn. Good prose is again the happy medium between unorganized
and strictly organized language.
This is an important distinction to clarify for several reasons. To retain the poetry
versus prose dichotomy here, while it does not do egregious harm to the meaning of the
passage, elides an important aspect of Aristotle’s idea of good prose: namely, that it must
have clear and rhythmic organization. It stands in a middle position between poetry, for
which meter, or elaborate and patterned rhythm,300 is a normal feature, and some
disorganized third, perhaps conversations, perhaps poorly executed speeches, but in any
case no category that could be subjected to systematic study. Indeed, Aristotle remarks
several times on the importance of rhythm to prose, and is clearly concerned that the
speeches be laid out properly; it is difficult to imagine that he would think of ta; cuvdhn as
having any share in good rhetoric. It must not be forgotten that prose, while not subject to
the same kinds of organizing principles as poetry, nonetheless is very much reliant on its
own system of organization, including rhythm. There is, again, a spectrum: poetry is
highly numbered, and there is an undesirable and ineffective kind of language having too
little share in number, while good prose sits between the two.301
We come now to the language of song and music. It will come as no particular
surprise that Aristotle uses few of the archaic terms for song and poetry; already in
Herodotus, after all, we were seeing a significant favoring of POI- words over AEID-
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301

That meter is a kind of rhythm is clearly stated by Aristotle himself, as seen above.
Compare the multiplicity of categories implied in earlier authors.
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terminology.302 The old term for bard, ajoidov~, appears only once, and only distantly in
Aristotle’s voice; he is citing an old adage when he remarks that the ajoidoiv tell lies.303
Similarly, the verb ajeivdein appears only once in the corpus, at Politics 1339b 8. Aristotle
is here discussing the low status of musicians and poets, and as proof of that status he
observes that Zeus himself does not sing and play kithara for the poets, but rather listens
to and is entertained by them.304 There is not, finally, enough data to draw any serious
conclusions about what resonance Aristotle would have attached to these words, but they
are conspicuous in their absence. Song terminology, it seems, has been almost erased
from the lexicon of the poetic, replaced almost entirely by words having to do with
making.
The term mevlo~, however, has been retained, and in fact is one of Aristotle’s
default words for unspecified music.305 More interesting is the way that this term serves
to highlight distinctions within and outside of poetry, as mevlo~ is compared and
contrasted with both poivhsi~ and lovgo~. That poivhsi~ and mousikhv are intricately
connected is indisputable, but in the course of analyzing and categorizing literary
productions of various kinds, Aristotle shows that the line between them is coming into
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That is, using POI- words when he was primarily interested in content, AEID- words when he was
focused on performance.
303
ajlla; th;n paroimivan polla; yeuvdontai ajoidoiv, Met. 983a 4. The adage has obvious resonances with
Hesiod’s famous passage at Theog. 27-8: i[dmen yeuvdea polla; levgein ejtuvmoisin oJmoi`a, / i[dmen d j, eu\t j
ejqevlwmen, ajlhqeva ghruvsasqai. The word is found more than once in the corpus, but the other uses are all
within quotations of other, older authors. The situation is even more interesting with the nominal cognate
for the product. Like ajoidov~ and ajeivdein, Aristotle uses w/jdov~ just once. However, that usage refers not to
human song at all, but to the song of a partridge.
304
There is also the implication here that poet and performer / musician are the same. Given the
anachronism of this equivalence, and the mythic nature of his example, he likely imagines a Phemius more
than a Sophocles here; much of the low status of the poet is related to performance, and actors have largely
taken over that aspect of poetry by Aristotle’s day.
305
Far more frequently, of course, given Aristotle’s corpus, the term applies to physical limbs.
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sharper focus. This can be best be seen by an examination of the adjective yilov~ and the
ways that Aristotle uses it to draw distinctions between language and song.
Although language is never taken up explicitly in the discussion of music in the
Politics (1339bff), it is clear that, throughout, mousikhv is being understood in its broad
sense, which includes poetry.306 Early in the discussion Aristotle observes that music is
pleasant whether it be done yilhvn or meta; melw/diva~ (1339b 21). There have been
arguments made that the music described here as yilhvn refers to purely instrumental
music, but more recently scholars have largely come to agree that it must be the other
way around: it is not music with language and music without, but language with and
without tuning.307 The resulting categories of music are thus language with meter but
without tuning, and language with both meter and tuning.308 That is, the linguistic element
is being considered separately from the melodic one, although both are still considered to
be mousikhv. It is presumably the retention of rhythm – that is, meter – that allows the
language to remain mevlo~, and therefore mousikhv, even though it is no longer done with
music as we understand it. Meter is thus an essential aspect of mousikhv, and so of
poihtikhv, in this instance, but the fact that meter and tuning can be separated serves to
split the previously unified category of poetry in two.
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See e.g. Lord (1982) 86: “he simply takes for granted the prominent place of poetry in music education.”
C.f. Lord (1982) 103 and Simpson (1998) 42, following Kraut, Lord and Jowett.
307
Lord (1982) 85-87 outlines the linguistic arguments for this case, which relies especially on the
significance of melw/diva as essentially ‘musical mode’ – that is, a more or less closed set of tones in more or
less set relation to each other. I translate melw/diva throughout this discussion as ‘tuning’ after Lord.
Compare Plato at Republic 389d 1, where he defines mevlo~ as language with rhythm and harmony; c.f.
Poetics 1449b 29.
308
With the implication of a third category of language lacking both rhythm and tune, which is perhaps
similar to the ta; cuvdhn discussed above.
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A similar passage in the Poetics reiterates this, and provides further detail.
Aristotle observes that the linguistic arts, like painting, dancing, and music for aulos and
lyre, can provide imitations of both objects of mimesis, the serious and the base.309 He
identifies two categories of linguistic art here which are envisioned as fundamentally
similar: lovgo~ and yilometriva (1448a 11). Given that Homer is the first example of
yilometriva, the significance here is likely something like rhapsodic recitation against
true lyric song, perhaps akin to the distinction between recitative and aria in opera.310 He
is pairing plain language with something like recitative, and asserting that it has the same
capacities for imitation that music does: there is posited again a middle term, a set
between music and not-music. Because the compound that describes it emphasizes the
meter rather than the tuning, we again see the middle term drawing a division between
music and poetry.311
There is, moreover, a similar hybridization appearing on the other side. This is
most explicitly seen at Poetics 1447a 29, where Aristotle identifies an unnamed category
that includes both metrical and unmetered language:
hJ de; movnon toi`~ lovgoi~ yiloi`~ h] toi`~ mevtroi~ kai; touvtoi~ ei[te mignu`sa
met j ajllhvlwn ei[q j eJniv tini gevnei crwvmenh tw`n mevtrwn ajnwvnumo~
tugcavnei ou\sa mevcri tou` nu`n.
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Implicit in the claim is the conviction that some people must have held that poetry’s power came from
music more than from language, and there were certainly suggestions of such an idea in earlier authors.
Aristotle, however, is asserting that language is capable of representing character and action as well as
music is. While this is puzzling to those of us raised in the Western tradition of music, it remains viable in
the musical traditions of the Near and Middle East. See especially Sifakis (2001b) 30-35.
310
An analogy suggested by Lord (1982) 86.
311
Else (1963) 62, remarking on this set of categories, reads it slightly differently: “To be sure, [mevlei and
mevtrw/] have particular reference to [aJrmoniva/ and lovgw/]; but back of that is the basic fact that ‘song’ and
‘verse’ are both species of lovgo~” (emphasis his). I agree with him, and consider my assertion to be
attendant on his.
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(The [art] making use of bare words alone or meters, either with these
combined with each other or of a single kind of meter, is even now
unnamed, 1447a 28-1447b 2)
The examples he gives are Sophronic mimes and Socratic dialogues, which are mimesis
of human actions, but are without meter and, perhaps more importantly, are without
music.312 That is, he is delimiting a category that is almost-poetry, that differs from poetry
primarily in its lack of music. Putting this together with the previous discussion of
recitative and song, the resulting categories of the two different kinds of division can be
illustrated as follows:313
dividing by language and tune:314
dividing by mimesis, meter and tune:315
‘music’ [-language, +rhythm, +tune]
‘poetry’ [+mimesis, +meter, +tune]
‘song’ [+language, +rhythm, +tune]
‘mixed’ [+mimesis, ±meter, -tune]
‘recitative’ [+language, +rhythm, -tune]
‘ordered prose’ [+rhythm, -tune]316
‘unordered prose’ [-rhythm, -tune]
The relationship between the two different sets of divisions is not immediately
clear – i.e., how ‘recitative’ and ‘song’ relate to ‘poetry’ – but two details that have been
implicit in many of the earlier authors here become explicit: literary productions can be
312

Else (1963) 37 claims that this is the first such separation of poetry and music expressed in classical
Greece. As suggested above, I see it in several other places in Aristotle, but more importantly I suggest it is
already present in nuce even in the fifth century, and certainly in Plato.
313
To be clear, the labels I am assigning to each combination of media are simply for convenience’s sake;
as the quotation marks suggest, they should be understood more or less in their modern senses, without
reference to the kinds of complications under discussion. That is, ‘music’ is not supposed to overlap with
mousikhv. I believe the potential confusion brought about by this is less than what would result from using
no labels at all.
314
A trichotomy similar to my column of ‘divisions of language and tune’ is reached by Else (1963) 67,
who makes his divisions according to medium. He ends up with “sub-poetic”, which is music without
language, “poetry bare”, which is language without music, and “poetry with music.” I suggest that rhythm
is just as important as language and tune, because, without it, it is difficult to see how what I call
‘recitative’ could remain mousikhv.
315
Language being assumed in this system of division, as it is for the implied categories of prose.
316
The two categories of prose, judged according to the standards discussed above, are implied by both
divisions, but explicit in neither.
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categorized with meaningful results according to almost any of the media proper to them,
and the results will be different sets, with some overlap but different emphases. That is,
there are any number of ways the lines can be drawn, and each one results in slightly
different sets, some simpler and some more complex, but none of them absolute.
Aristotle finally shows a basic acceptance of the difficulty of precisely
distinguishing the categories, and explicit awareness of the great variety of ways that sets
of literary productions could usefully be grouped – by form, rhythm, music, mode, object
of mimesis and so on. On the other hand, following methodologies that were already
nascent in Plato – and perhaps even earlier – he achieved greater success in identifying
stable categories of literature than anyone before him. Paradoxically, of course, one of the
reasons his system displays stability is that he allowed for the instability inherent to it:
that is, the boundaries were never hard and fast. Song could drop a register and become a
simpler kind of language, rhetoric could take on too many metaphors and become poetry;
by moving the focus away from the product – the particular poem or speech – and onto
the causes underlying it, he effectively did away with the concern of the categories
bleeding into each other. The products might be coextensive, but the causes were
discrete.
Although he is in many ways carrying on a tradition that had been under
development for centuries before him, Aristotle’s contributions are nonetheless
remarkable. First, he established a largely consistent set of causal relationships between
the words that had been, since Herodotus at least, the primary identifiers of the poetic.
Second, he found a way to account not only for the different genres, but for the changes
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within individual genres – that is, by envisioning the poetic as an enactment of features
innate to us – rhythm, harmony and mimesis – he described an idea with an end of its
own, towards which it would naturally develop. With that, variations and evolutions,
however significant, could no longer impact the essence. Even when tragedy had more in
common with rhetoric than the dithyramb, it remained a mimesis of human action, done
by means of language, meter and harmony, with a highest end of leading the audience,
with the help of metaphor, towards an understanding that was accessible no other way. It
remained, in short, recognizably poetry.
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Conclusions
Reflecting on the multiplicity of ways that these six authors responded to the
problem of identifying and distinguishing between literary productions, what is perhaps
most remarkable is the underlying consistency in several areas. Motivations for drawing
boundaries between literary productions changed from author to author, for instance, but
in every case the dichotomy proved to be insufficient. It did provide, however, useful
standards between which to negotiate: Thucydides wanted his work farther from a
version of unmetered language he saw as too poetic, Isocrates wanted his farther from a
version of unmetered language he considered too prosaic, but both of them were able to
illustrate the positions they saw their productions occupying by means of the illusion of a
simple opposition of prose and poetry. Gorgias made it his aim to straddle the midpoint,
and thus emphasize the arbitrary nature of the midpoint itself. Herodotus oscillated
between seeing two equivalent sets based on form, and seeing the formal distinctions
within poetry as no less important than that between poetry and prose. Plato
experimented with multiple ways of dividing language such that some kinds of it could
be marked off as beneficial and philosophical, while other kinds were unreliable and
deceptive; poetry was often set up, by virtue of its form, as the epitome of the unreliable
language art, but then revealed to be a combination of music and rhetoric, thus forcing
hybridity.
Aristotle implicitly granted the inefficiency of the dichotomy from the start, as we
can see that he posited at least three, and likely more, distinct kinds of language arts that

169
could be marked off and described. His treatises on two of them, the Rhetoric and the
Poetics, make it clear that even with a multiplicity, the boundaries were vague – an
assertion expressed more explicitly and succinctly in Gorgias’ productions, as Aristotle
seems to acknowledge.
An equally important result of this study is our ability to see the essential
continuity underlying these various postures. Each of these authors has poetry in mind for
a different reason, uses it for a different end, and finally relies on poetry to identify the
place of their works within the tradition. The authors show greater or lesser interest in
generic distinctions within the set of the poetic, and even acknowledge a separation of
poetry and music quite early on. On the other side, we saw regular and significant interest
in the divisions within the larger category of prose. In both cases, this was typically
accomplished by allowing the opposite set to stand as a simple and unified monolith; that
is, poetry was allowed to be complicated when prose was simple, and vice versa.
Aristotle, however, manages to present the enormous complexity of literary
categorization while still maintaining a loosely structured order by allowing for a range
of differentiations not only within poetry or within prose, but in a spectrum across them
both. Form is thus retained as a useful descriptor, but not relied on as an essential
signifier.
This dissertation also lays open the path for several fruitful studies. The place of
music in relation to the poetic was raised on a number of occasions, and, although our
evidence on the subject is regrettably thin, our understanding could only be increased by
tracing out that thread. It would also be interesting to look forward from Aristotle, and
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perform similar studies on the Hellenistic scholars and scholiasts; just as chapters one and
two of this study filled out our understanding of the background of the Poetics, so our
increased understanding of Aristotle, detailed in chapter three, provides a starting point
for contextualizing his intellectual descendents. Finally, we are no more able than Plato
to single out poetry clearly enough to identify it absolutely, but, as with Dr. Deutsch’s
phantom words, we know song when we hear it.
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